On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 12:02:03 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Sep 2016, at 19:43, agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, September 10, 2016 at 1:45:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 09 Sep 2016, at 19:14, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 10:38:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 09 Sep 2016, at 16:08, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, >>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the >>>>>>>>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes >>>>>>>>> necessary for >>>>>>>>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you have >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. Not >>>>>>>>> good >>>>>>>>> enough from my pov. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>>>>>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far as >>>>>>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am not >>>>>>>> sure >>>>>>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in some >>>>>>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's >>>>>>>> measurement >>>>>>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue of >>>>>>>> FLT >>>>>>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>>>>>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even know >>>>>>>> QM >>>>>>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>>>>>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the >>>>>>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes >>>>>>>> meaningless. >>>>>>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be sure, >>>>>>>> but I >>>>>>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past >>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>> action (it does not make sense). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ah, you wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to how >>>>>>>> events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown in >>>>>>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in one >>>>>>>> universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information to >>>>>>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense of. >>>>>>>> It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, it >>>>>>>> looks >>>>>>>> like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the universal >>>>>>>> machine). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution of >>>>>>> SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the >>>>>>> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this transformation >>>>>>> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems >>>>>>> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system result >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's >>>>>>> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds of >>>>>>> its >>>>>>> advocates. AG >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too seriously. >>>>>> AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >>>>>>> alive), >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it >>>>>> does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Then the SWE is wrong. >>>>>> >>>>>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the box, >>>>>> but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the >>>>>> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest >>>>>> known >>>>>> antic theory of mind (mechanism) >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and >>>>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is refuting >>>>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? >>>>> No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this). >>>>> >>>>> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state (dead+alive), >>>>> and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself with the cat >>>>> state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead (linearity of tensor >>>>> product). Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a *phenomenological >>>>> collapse" like if the cat was reduced to "alive", and O-b lives a >>>>> phenomenological like if the cat was reduced to "dead", but in the 3p >>>>> picture, no reduction ever occurred. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat, >>>> presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You may >>>> be >>>> entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no superposition of >>>> alive and dead. AG >>>> >>> >>> I don't see how you can apply the SWE to this problem. It's a function >>> of space and time and its solutions have nothing to do with alive or dead. >>> And if you can't do so, your analysis makes no sense. AG >>> >>> >>> We usually judged if an animal is dead or alive by a (rough and macro) >>> analysis of the position of the atoms of its body. >>> >>> If the cat lies down: it is dead. If the cat walks: it is alive. No need >>> to go beyond the space and time descriptions. >>> The quality dead and alive are sort of biophysical macro (in the >>> computer science sense). >>> >>> The superposition of the decaying atom contaminates all particles around >>> and that contagion of superposition propagates to the whole box, and beyond >>> if the box leaked or is opened. >>> The propagation speed is subliminal (interaction-time). >>> >>> With Everett theory, which is just Copenhagen theory minus a postulate >>> (collapse), we get back determinacy, locality, realism (although not at the >>> usual mundane level, which I admit can seem shocking). >>> >>> My point, or result, is that IF we postulate Mechanism, an assumption in >>> the cognitive science, or in philosophy of mind, or in psychology, or in >>> theology, THEN we get Everett minus, yet again, a postulate: the SWE >>> itself. It *has to*became explained as providing the unique measure for the >>> first person plural emerging view on all computations in elementary >>> arithmetic, or combinator algebra (etc.). And this works, in the sense that >>> the modal, intensional, variant of self-reference available to any >>> "sufficiently rich" (Löbian, or Gödelian) machine provides a quantum logic >>> and a quantization on the states accessible by a Universal Dovetailer (the >>> sigma_1 arithmetical reality, in logician's terms) relatively to itself. >>> >>> That provides an utterly clear arithmetic interpretation of a theory >>> due to a neopythagorean of the first century of the C. era: Moderatus of >>> Gades, but also of the main Enneads of Plotinus. >>> >>> And this 'machine's theology' contains physics, and so is testable. The >>> conception of matter becomes weird and quite counter-intuitive, and without >>> quantum mechanics, I would have judged it highly unplausible. But both the >>> theology of the universal machine, and the verifiable measurable facts >>> points toward a Platonist like theology. >>> >>> The Enlightenment Period will be transformed when theology, the modest >>> and humble, and highly skeptical, science, will return at the faculty of >>> science where it was born. Until then we are still in the middle-age like >>> we can see by looking around us. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> *It 's easier just to claim the cat shares the wf of the radioactive >> source. But you still have the 800+ pound gorilla in the room you can't >> account for; namely, by your CHOICE to do the cat experiment, you're >> claiming the creation of another world with another cat and another >> observer.* >> >> >> Where did I claim something like that? The terms of the branches does not >> depend on my choice, >> > > *It seems that they do. If you do a cat experiment, you get two branches. > If you don't, you don't. * > > > Well, there are explanation why our type of brain favors the position > base, but when you choose to do an experiment, you don't create branches, > you differentiate on the alternative you are interested in. > > > > *They don't exist apriori, unless you want to deny free will. They come > into existence when an experiment is done, or possibly when there's some > sort of decision tree, such as playing a slot machine at LV. AG* > > > We don't know. We need a coherent quantum theory of gravitation to figure > out. No problem with free-will, as it is not related to quantum of > computationalist indeterminacy at all---but that is quite a different topic > (already discussed here). >
*I think we do know. See comment below. AG * > and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen. >> > > *It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for > example, result in different bases. AG* > > > They correspond to different base, but the numerical result are not > dependent of the base chosen to describe the wave evolution. This is well > explained in Everett long paper. > *I don't see how you reach this conclusion. If I measure spin, I surely get a different numerical result than if I measure energy, AG * > It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no >> worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse >> is locally and relatively to me partitionned. >> > > *These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring > infrastructure. * > > > No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too. > *Please; no appeals to authority. Do you need observers or not on the other worlds, or branches, or whatever, and their measuring infrastructures? AG * > *You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do you > back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible > outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow? * > > > You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by looking > at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable > (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th > *What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will the alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such an experiment? AG* > > > *Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and > observation. AG* > >> >> * Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. >> There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the >> collapse as meaning irreducible randomness, * >> >> >> The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first >> person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics. >> >> *why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a >> delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an >> as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to >> measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to >> collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG* >> >> >> That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads to >> many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non >> linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR, >> > > *Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on > thermodynamics? TIA, AG* > > > Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics". > > > > > >> etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with >> non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have >> to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non >> linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that the >> physics is reversible and linear, etc. >> >> Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. >> Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* >> the point). >> > > *Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and > possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch > IMO. AG* > > > It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more. > > You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor > consciousness. > > Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis in > cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive with a > digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of > Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions like > Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is high. > *Are you referring to Peter Putnam who used to teach at Colombia University in the late 1950's? Do you have a link? AG * > > Some sum up it by "no magic", a bit like Dideort defined rationalism by > Descarte's mechanism. > > Then it is a theorem that elementary arithmetic reality (model) realize > the universal dovetailing, and that both consciusness and matter are > emergent pattern on a self-referential structure which exist in arithmetic > (or Turing equivalent) and the math confirms this by showing that the > (antic) definition of matter when translated in arithmetic gives a quantum > logic. > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's Cat. >>>>>> AG* >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse >>>>>> solves it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. >>>>>> I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more >>>>>> operate at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for >>>>>> the >>>>>> collapse, but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that >>>>>> the >>>>>> collapse is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if comp >>>>>> is >>>>>> true then that hallucination is somehow necessary. >>>>>> >>>>>> With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of >>>>>> the physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the >>>>>> mathematician >>>>>> in arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). >>>>>> >>>>>> Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin of >>>>>> the appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that we >>>>>> can >>>>>> test it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, I >>>>>> think, >>>>>> the only theory explaining consciousness, including why it cannot be >>>>>> completely explained in any first person convincing way (the so called >>>>>> hard >>>>>> problem, which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism >>>>>> solved >>>>>> the "easy part" (AI)). >>>>>> >>>>>> I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what I >>>>>> might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in >>>>>> philosophy, >>>>>> which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science which is a >>>>>> branch >>>>>> of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good lantern to >>>>>> search the key around, not more. >>>>>> >>>>>> My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation >>>>>> between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover >>>>>> and >>>>>> guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., >>>>>> neoplatonism) >>>>>> and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before Plotinus) >>>>>> than the materialist Aristotelians. >>>>>> >>>>>> I say this being aware that some scientists still take the >>>>>> Aristotelian metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just >>>>>> beginning to be able to formulate the problem (which of Plato or >>>>>> Aristotle >>>>>> is closer to reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number is >>>>>> still a very recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea and >>>>>> their relation with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness fundamental >>>>>> results. >>>>>> >>>>>> I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you >>>>>> dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the consequences >>>>>> of >>>>>> the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis >>>>>> "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic >>>>>> (both >>>>>> published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically minded. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well >>>>>>> described by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted >>>>>>> multiplicatively, and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at >>>>>>> this >>>>>>> stage the "O" can be considered being in a superposition state. That is >>>>>>> what I called the linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the >>>>>>> linearity of >>>>>>> the wave evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves >>>>>>> classically (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can >>>>>>> repeat >>>>>>> their measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies that >>>>>>> they will always find the same measurement result. So the MWI explains >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if that >>>>>>> means something precise). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is compatible >>>>>>> with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the persistence >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> explained from a statistics on *all* computations (which exist once you >>>>>>> agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can derive >>>>>>> quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical structure that >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" >>>>>>> needs no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> meta-background). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The only axiom that I use are the following: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >>>>>>> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >>>>>>> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >>>>>>> x + 0 = x >>>>>>> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >>>>>>> x * 0 = 0 >>>>>>> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kxy = x >>>>>>> Sxyz = xz(yz) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence of >>>>>>> the UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, but I >>>>>>> prefer to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, and >>>>>>> we get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of knowledge >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be true, >>>>>>> we remain with the task of explaining what is their role for >>>>>>> consciousness >>>>>>> (or just first person experience). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence of >>>>>>> a physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the >>>>>>> mind-body >>>>>>> problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile simplifying >>>>>>> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >>>>>>> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of >>>>>>> justifying >>>>>>> the relation between first person discourse and third person discourse. >>>>>>> We >>>>>>> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >>>>>>> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >>>>>>> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the mechanist >>>>>>> hypothesis. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body >>>>>>> problem, and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> appearance of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of "*all* >>>>>>> computations + machine self-reference when distributed in those >>>>>>> computations. It works (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and it >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> well known that the mind-body problem has been put under the rug since >>>>>>> Aristotle (except by the Platonists, who were just banned from our >>>>>>> civilisation 1500 years ago). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the >>>>>>> last match. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above my >>>>>>>>>>> pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I can >>>>>>>>>>> make of >>>>>>>>>>> them. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and >>>>>>>>>>> played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone >>>>>>>>>>> asked me >>>>>>>>>>> what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, I'd >>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> that would be a crazy question. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which >>>>>>>>>>> counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* >>>>>>>>>> exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, >>>>>>>>>> doesn't >>>>>>>>>> mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I >>>>>>>>>> see no >>>>>>>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the >>>>>>>>>> wave. I agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple >>>>>>>>>> interfering >>>>>>>>>> histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid that >>>>>>>>>> multiplication/differentiation consequence. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are >>>>>>>>>>> confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen >>>>>>>>>>> Interpretation. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different >>>>>>>>>>> because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere >>>>>>>>>>> and thus >>>>>>>>>>> have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, especially >>>>>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>>>>> assuming the collapse of the wave. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, >>>>>>>>>> Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of >>>>>>>>>> collapse, >>>>>>>>>> believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution is >>>>>>>>>> purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the QM >>>>>>>>>>> wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a revenge: >>>>>>>>>>> interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This >>>>>>>>>>> makes >>>>>>>>>>> wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a >>>>>>>>>> linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue >>>>>>>>>> here. >>>>>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the >>>>>>>>>> collapse leads to non-linearity. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and >>>>>>>>>>> that, strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> SWR = ? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects elements >>>>>>>>>> which are space-separated. Einstein explained this already at the >>>>>>>>>> Solvay >>>>>>>>>> congress. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You introduce a duality between observer and observed, or >>>>>>>>>>> between macro and micro-physics. And, you assume non-mechanism in >>>>>>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>>>> science. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> H*ow can we test our models without the duality of observer and >>>>>>>>>> observed? You demand the impossible. * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Read the book by Hans Primas on the foundation of chemistery. It >>>>>>>>>> explains well why Everett restores monism in the philosophy of mind >>>>>>>>>> (but he >>>>>>>>>> missed this happens directly with Mechanism). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *What "non mechanism" have I assumed? QM just gives us >>>>>>>>>> probabilities. It's not a causal theory. AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> With the collapse. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> That is lot of things for which we don't have evidence. >>>>>>>>>>> Cosmologists applies QM on very big object, like black holes, if >>>>>>>>>>> not the >>>>>>>>>>> entire universe, and people trying to justify a physical collapse >>>>>>>>>>> get a lot >>>>>>>>>>> of problem, like non-locality, to cite the one Einstein disliked >>>>>>>>>>> the most, >>>>>>>>>>> and I share a bit that opinion. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and actual time irreversibility (not FAPP) is an easier concept >>>>>>>>>>> to accept than the real or fictional other worlds necessary to >>>>>>>>>>> support the >>>>>>>>>>> MWI. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Well, with mechanism, in all case (with or without QM) we get >>>>>>>>>>> the many histories/dreams/computations, and they exist like natural >>>>>>>>>>> numbers. We don't have to take the "worlds" as primitive >>>>>>>>>>> ontological >>>>>>>>>>> reality. I tend to not really believe in *any* world. Those belongs >>>>>>>>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>>> imagination of the relative universal numbers, whose proof of >>>>>>>>>>> existence can >>>>>>>>>>> already be done in elementary arithmetic. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Physics is about constructing and testing models of physical >>>>>>>>>> reality, not about dreams. * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Assuming there is a physical reality per se, but with Mechanism, >>>>>>>>>> the physical reality is "only" a persistent statisticl illusion >>>>>>>>>> emerging >>>>>>>>>> from all computational histories. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *You can call the MWI a dream, but for me it's a nightmare. LOL. >>>>>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> BTW, the time irreversibility is not FAPP since the collapsed >>>>>>>>>>> wf, when inserted back into the SWE, recovers only itself exactly >>>>>>>>>>> at an >>>>>>>>>>> earlier time, but not the original wf which collapsed. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Yes, OK. If there is such a collapse, but I don't see evidence. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *If you measure a system repeatedly, you get the same >>>>>>>>>> measurement. That's the evidence for collapse; * >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Not at all. That is what Everett explains in all details. You >>>>>>>>>> don't need the collapse to explain, using only the SWE that in each >>>>>>>>>> branch >>>>>>>>>> the observer feel like there has been a collapse, using only a >>>>>>>>>> notion >>>>>>>>>> similar to the First Person Indeterminacy that we have anyway in >>>>>>>>>> arithmetic. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *that the system remains in the same eigenstate after >>>>>>>>>> measurement, not in the original superposition. AG* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yes, with a collapse which is not explained, nor even well >>>>>>>>>> defined, and which contradicts the SWE. >>>>>>>>>> Computationalism and QM without collapse leads to immaterial >>>>>>>>>> monism, which is nice as we don't have any evidence for primary >>>>>>>>>> matter. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think it is human coquetry (grin). Nature loves to do things >>>>>>>>>>> in many exemplars, and elementary arithmetic loves that to. >>>>>>>>>>> Personal >>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness is an illusion (provably so in the mechanist theory of >>>>>>>>>>> mind). >>>>>>>>>>> The evide >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
