On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 4:46:16 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: > > > > On Monday, September 12, 2016 at 2:14:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Sep 2016, at 20:48, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 12:02:03 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10 Sep 2016, at 19:43, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, September 10, 2016 at 1:45:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 09 Sep 2016, at 19:14, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 10:38:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 09 Sep 2016, at 16:08, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, September 9, 2016 at 7:56:27 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 21:43, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 1:15:15 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 08 Sep 2016, at 18:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thursday, September 8, 2016 at 7:53:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 07 Sep 2016, at 20:06, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 11:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno >>>>>>>>> Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 06 Sep 2016, at 17:42, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 4:38:53 AM UTC-6, >>>>>>>>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I understand your pov. It has but one problem. You ignore the >>>>>>>>>>> elephant in the room; namely, those other worlds or universes >>>>>>>>>>> necessary for >>>>>>>>>>> the outcomes not measured in this world to be realized. But you >>>>>>>>>>> have an >>>>>>>>>>> out, stated in another post. They form part of your imagination. >>>>>>>>>>> Not good >>>>>>>>>>> enough from my pov. AG >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I should also add that the MWI sheds no light, AFAICT, on the >>>>>>>>>> measurement problem; that is, why we get the outcome we get. As far >>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>> collapse contradicting SR via the result of Bell experiments, I am >>>>>>>>>> not sure >>>>>>>>>> about that conclusion. If FTL occurs, it may be the case that in >>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>> frames Alice's measurement occurs first, in other frames Bob's >>>>>>>>>> measurement >>>>>>>>>> occurs first. I tend to think this muddies the waters on the issue >>>>>>>>>> of FLT >>>>>>>>>> transmission and contradictions with relativity. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The "MWI" explains already a part of the mind-body problem when >>>>>>>>>> formulated in the Digital Mechanist Frame. You don't need to even >>>>>>>>>> know QM >>>>>>>>>> to understand the high plausibility of the "many-computations". >>>>>>>>>> If FTL occurs, and you keep both QM and SR, then an action in the >>>>>>>>>> future can change the past, and physical causility becomes >>>>>>>>>> meaningless. >>>>>>>>>> With mechanism, physical causality is not yet guarantied, to be >>>>>>>>>> sure, but I >>>>>>>>>> would throw digital mechanism if it could lead to future -> past >>>>>>>>>> physical >>>>>>>>>> action (it does not make sense). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ah, you wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Possible correction: my remark about relativity might apply to >>>>>>>>>> how events are seen from a frame moving FTL -- that is, a breakdown >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> causality -- and might not apply to Alice/Bob situation. AG >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Well, OK, then. But it would apply if there were a collapse (in >>>>>>>>>> one universe), even if Alice needs to send two bits of information >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> transformed the effect (and send or get one qubit). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The "collapse" does not even refer to anything I can make sense >>>>>>>>>> of. It looks like a continuous invocation of God. As an explanation, >>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>> looks like a continuum of blasphemes (in the theology of the >>>>>>>>>> universal >>>>>>>>>> machine). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Here's what collapse means to me; the wf evolves from a solution >>>>>>>>> of SWE, namely a superposition, to a delta function centered at the >>>>>>>>> measurement value. No one knows, or has a model how this >>>>>>>>> transformation >>>>>>>>> occurs.It's in the category of a TBD, possibly unknowable. It seems >>>>>>>>> empirically based since repeated measurements of the same system >>>>>>>>> result in >>>>>>>>> the same outcomes. I don't necessarily believe in primary matter's >>>>>>>>> existence. But its statistical persistence seems undeniable, whereas >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> many worlds has yet to manifest any persistence except in the minds >>>>>>>>> of its >>>>>>>>> advocates. AG >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The MWI is only the SWE taken literally. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Maybe that's the problem; taking a calculational tool too >>>>>>>> seriously. AG* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If an observer O observes a cat in the superposition d + a (dead + >>>>>>>>> alive), >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *But that never happens. The state of superposition exists, if it >>>>>>>> does, when the box is closed, and ceases when the box is opened. * >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Then the SWE is wrong. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You beg the question by postulating that QM is wrong outside the >>>>>>>> box, but there are no evidence for that, given that Everett showed the >>>>>>>> consistency of QM-without-collapse with the facts, using the simplest >>>>>>>> known >>>>>>>> antic theory of mind (mechanism) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> *The fact is the cat is dead OR alive when the box is opened, and >>>>>>> presumably alive before the box is closed. So all I am doing is >>>>>>> refuting >>>>>>> your claim that any observer observes a superposition of states. AG * >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In QM+collapse, which assumes that QM is wrong somewhere (but where? >>>>>>> No unanimity of collapse-defenders agree on this). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Without collapse, the cat is in the superposition state >>>>>>> (dead+alive), and when an observer look at the cat, he entangles itself >>>>>>> with the cat state, and the final state is O-a alive + O-d dead >>>>>>> (linearity >>>>>>> of tensor product). Then by linearity of the SWE, O-a lives a >>>>>>> *phenomenological collapse" like if the cat was reduced to "alive", and >>>>>>> O-b >>>>>>> lives a phenomenological like if the cat was reduced to "dead", but in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> 3p picture, no reduction ever occurred. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry, but what you write makes no sense. When you look at the cat, >>>>>> presumably after box is opened, the cat is either alive or dead. You may >>>>>> be >>>>>> entangled with it, but at that point in time there is no superposition >>>>>> of >>>>>> alive and dead. AG >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't see how you can apply the SWE to this problem. It's a function >>>>> of space and time and its solutions have nothing to do with alive or >>>>> dead. >>>>> And if you can't do so, your analysis makes no sense. AG >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We usually judged if an animal is dead or alive by a (rough and macro) >>>>> analysis of the position of the atoms of its body. >>>>> >>>>> If the cat lies down: it is dead. If the cat walks: it is alive. No >>>>> need to go beyond the space and time descriptions. >>>>> The quality dead and alive are sort of biophysical macro (in the >>>>> computer science sense). >>>>> >>>>> The superposition of the decaying atom contaminates all particles >>>>> around and that contagion of superposition propagates to the whole box, >>>>> and >>>>> beyond if the box leaked or is opened. >>>>> The propagation speed is subliminal (interaction-time). >>>>> >>>>> With Everett theory, which is just Copenhagen theory minus a postulate >>>>> (collapse), we get back determinacy, locality, realism (although not at >>>>> the >>>>> usual mundane level, which I admit can seem shocking). >>>>> >>>>> My point, or result, is that IF we postulate Mechanism, an assumption >>>>> in the cognitive science, or in philosophy of mind, or in psychology, or >>>>> in >>>>> theology, THEN we get Everett minus, yet again, a postulate: the SWE >>>>> itself. It *has to*became explained as providing the unique measure for >>>>> the >>>>> first person plural emerging view on all computations in elementary >>>>> arithmetic, or combinator algebra (etc.). And this works, in the sense >>>>> that >>>>> the modal, intensional, variant of self-reference available to any >>>>> "sufficiently rich" (Löbian, or Gödelian) machine provides a quantum >>>>> logic >>>>> and a quantization on the states accessible by a Universal Dovetailer >>>>> (the >>>>> sigma_1 arithmetical reality, in logician's terms) relatively to itself. >>>>> >>>>> That provides an utterly clear arithmetic interpretation of a theory >>>>> due to a neopythagorean of the first century of the C. era: Moderatus of >>>>> Gades, but also of the main Enneads of Plotinus. >>>>> >>>>> And this 'machine's theology' contains physics, and so is testable. >>>>> The conception of matter becomes weird and quite counter-intuitive, and >>>>> without quantum mechanics, I would have judged it highly unplausible. But >>>>> both the theology of the universal machine, and the verifiable measurable >>>>> facts points toward a Platonist like theology. >>>>> >>>>> The Enlightenment Period will be transformed when theology, the modest >>>>> and humble, and highly skeptical, science, will return at the faculty of >>>>> science where it was born. Until then we are still in the middle-age like >>>>> we can see by looking around us. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> *It 's easier just to claim the cat shares the wf of the radioactive >>>> source. But you still have the 800+ pound gorilla in the room you can't >>>> account for; namely, by your CHOICE to do the cat experiment, you're >>>> claiming the creation of another world with another cat and another >>>> observer.* >>>> >>>> >>>> Where did I claim something like that? The terms of the branches does >>>> not depend on my choice, >>>> >>> >>> *It seems that they do. If you do a cat experiment, you get two >>> branches. If you don't, you don't. * >>> >>> >>> Well, there are explanation why our type of brain favors the position >>> base, but when you choose to do an experiment, you don't create branches, >>> you differentiate on the alternative you are interested in. >>> >>> >>> >>> *They don't exist apriori, unless you want to deny free will. They come >>> into existence when an experiment is done, or possibly when there's some >>> sort of decision tree, such as playing a slot machine at LV. AG* >>> >>> >>> We don't know. We need a coherent quantum theory of gravitation to >>> figure out. No problem with free-will, as it is not related to quantum of >>> computationalist indeterminacy at all---but that is quite a different topic >>> (already discussed here). >>> >> >> *I think we do know. See comment below. AG * >> >>> and the results of the measurement do not depend on the base chosen. >>>> >>> >>> *It seems that they do. Measurements of energy, momentum or spin for >>> example, result in different bases. AG* >>> >>> >>> They correspond to different base, but the numerical result are not >>> dependent of the base chosen to describe the wave evolution. This is well >>> explained in Everett long paper. >>> >> >> *I don't see how you reach this conclusion. If I measure spin, I surely >> get a different numerical result than if I measure energy, AG * >> >> >> >> Of course. The point is that if we measure whatever we want, the result >> does not depend of the base used. Many are wrong on this when discussing >> Everett's theory. >> >> >> >> >> It is just the supposition terms of the wave (in any base). There are no >>>> worlds, only relative states. My choice change only the way the multiverse >>>> is locally and relatively to me partitionned. >>>> >>> >>> *These relative states seem to require observers and a measuring >>> infrastructure. * >>> >>> >>> No problem. Everett theory is just that it obeys to QM too. >>> >> >> *Please; no appeals to authority. * >> >> >> mentionning a theory is not an argument of authority, it is called >> honesty. Nobody claims that this or that theory is true or false. We avoid >> "philosophy", or make special thread, which I avoid to prevent confusion. >> >> >> >> >> >> *Do you need observers or not on the other worlds, or branches, or >> whatever, and their measuring infrastructures? AG * >> >> >> Everett assume the Universal Wave, but ignores (like most) the >> consequence of digital mechanism. >> >> I assume only elementary arithmetic and computationalism, in the UDA, and >> only elementary arithmetic in the actual beginning of the derivation of >> physics and of the wave from the interview of the universal machine. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> *You create them by virtue of what you DO, say in an experiment. Or do >>> you back off from the apparent requirement of the MWI that all possible >>> outcomes are measured somewhere, somehow? * >>> >>> >>> You don't create them at all, no more than you create the moon by >>> looking at it. You just localize yourslef relatively to the more probable >>> (numerous, weighted) relative branche(s).th >>> >> >> *What if the probability is 50-50 as in a spin experiment? How is the >> choice made?. But more important, since I've never done one, will the >> alternative histories pre-exist if I decide one day to do such an >> experiment? AG* >> >> >> >> Have you read the sane04 paper? >> > > *No. I wouldn't know where to find it, but more important the theory > doesn't appeal to me. I could be wrong, but it apparently relies on human > memories and seems solipsistic. I think, without appealing to any theory or > paper, you could answer the question directly about the preexistence of > alternative states or histories. If I do a cat experiment, do I create the > alternative states or histories, or are they preexisting? AG * >
*FWIW, I think you've solved the mind-body problem by eliminating the body. AG * > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> *Just having a branch evolving is not tantamount to a measurement and >>> observation. AG* >>> >>>> >>>> * Calling it a branch or whatever doesn't solve your fatal problem. >>>> There's a simpler solution to your problem; instead of conceiving of the >>>> collapse as meaning irreducible randomness, * >>>> >>>> >>>> The point is that the randomness becomes only a case of Mechanist first >>>> person indeterminacy, which exist even without quantum mechanics. >>>> >>>> *why not assume it's a continuous process whereby the wf evolves into a >>>> delta function centered at the value measured? IOW, just assume there's an >>>> as yet unknown, continuous, non linear evolution of the state prior to >>>> measurement, which is time reversible. After all, your objection to >>>> collapse is its standard interpretation as irreducible randomness. AG* >>>> >>>> >>>> That is a Bohm-De Broglie type of move. It assumes QM false, and leads >>>> to many difficulties often discussed here (see Weinberg argument that non >>>> linearity leads to the refutation of thermodynamics, GR, >>>> >>> >>> *Do you have a link for this, particularly about his comments on >>> thermodynamics? TIA, AG* >>> >>> >>> Google on "Weinberg non linear quantum mechanics". >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> etc.), including irreducibly-hidden variables/initial-conditions, with >>>> non local effects. Anyway, I work with computationalism, and show we have >>>> to derive the wave and its equation, so we will see if there is a non >>>> linearity in that case, but the results so far go in the direction that >>>> the >>>> physics is reversible and linear, etc. >>>> >>>> Let us no do "philosophy" and just be clear on what theory we assume. >>>> Once we assume digital mechanism, there is no more choice left (that *is* >>>> the point). >>>> >>> >>> *Succinctly, what is digital mechanism? I don't see how arithmetic and >>> possibly a computer can reproduce any physical theory. It's real stretch >>> IMO. AG* >>> >>> >>> It has too, see my paper already referred, or ask for more. >>> >>> You are right, a computer cannot emulate the physical reality, nor >>> consciousness. >>> >>> Digital mechanism, alias computationalism, is a very weak hypothesis in >>> cognitive science: it is the hypothesis that we could survive with a >>> digital artificial brain or body? It is a modern version of >>> Descartes-Milinda Mechanism. It generalize and weaken many versions like >>> Putnam's functionalism, which assumes the description level is high. >>> >> >> *Are you referring to Peter Putnam who used to teach at Colombia >> University in the late 1950's? Do you have a link? AG * >> >> >> PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A Symposium, >> Sidney >> Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. also in Anderson A. R. >> (Ed.),1964. >> >> ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New >> Jersey. >> (Trad. Française : Pensée et machine, Editions du Champ Vallon, 1983). >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> Some sum up it by "no magic", a bit like Dideort defined rationalism by >>> Descarte's mechanism. >>> >>> Then it is a theorem that elementary arithmetic reality (model) realize >>> the universal dovetailing, and that both consciusness and matter are >>> emergent pattern on a self-referential structure which exist in arithmetic >>> (or Turing equivalent) and the math confirms this by showing that the >>> (antic) definition of matter when translated in arithmetic gives a quantum >>> logic. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *Maybe you have a fundamental misunderstanding of Schrodinger's >>>>>>>> Cat. AG* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It is the measurement problem, and you talk like if the collapse >>>>>>>> solves it, but then tell me precisely the range of QM. >>>>>>>> I read de Broglie who suggested that entanglement would no more >>>>>>>> operate at the distance of an atom diameter. People give criteria for >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> collapse, but the experience refutes them. I share Feynman's idea that >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> collapse is a collective hallucination, and the math shows that if >>>>>>>> comp is >>>>>>>> true then that hallucination is somehow necessary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With computationalism we have to generalize Everett's embedding of >>>>>>>> the physicist in the physical reality to the embedding of the >>>>>>>> mathematician >>>>>>>> in arithmetic (which is actually what Gödel begun). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mechanism explains both the origin of consciousness and the origin >>>>>>>> of the appearance of matter, and this in a way enough precise so that >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>> can test it, and thanks to QM, mechanism is not (yet) refuted, and is, >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> think, the only theory explaining consciousness, including why it >>>>>>>> cannot be >>>>>>>> completely explained in any first person convincing way (the so called >>>>>>>> hard >>>>>>>> problem, which is only the antic mind-body problem after mechanism >>>>>>>> solved >>>>>>>> the "easy part" (AI)). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I do not defend any theory. You should not been able to guess what >>>>>>>> I might believe true or not. Computationalism has an advantage in >>>>>>>> philosophy, which is that it can rely on theoretical computer science >>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>> is a branch of both mathematical logic and number theory. It is a good >>>>>>>> lantern to search the key around, not more. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My main point is that we can study the highly non trivial relation >>>>>>>> between machines' belief and diverse notion of truth they can discover >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> guess. They got a theology closer to Plotinus (300 after C., >>>>>>>> neoplatonism) >>>>>>>> and Moderatus of Gades (neopythagoreanism, 2 centuries before >>>>>>>> Plotinus) >>>>>>>> than the materialist Aristotelians. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I say this being aware that some scientists still take the >>>>>>>> Aristotelian metaphysics for granted, but of course science is just >>>>>>>> beginning to be able to formulate the problem (which of Plato or >>>>>>>> Aristotle >>>>>>>> is closer to reality). The discovery of the universal machine/number >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> still a very recent event and few get really the Church-Turing idea >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> their relation with Gödel's completeness and incompleteness >>>>>>>> fundamental >>>>>>>> results. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I can suggest you some good books if you are interested. But if you >>>>>>>> dislike Everett, it might take some work before liking the >>>>>>>> consequences of >>>>>>>> the digital mechanist hypothesis. The bible is Martin Davis >>>>>>>> "Undecidability", and its own introduction to computability and logic >>>>>>>> (both >>>>>>>> published by Dover) is excellent if you are enough mathematically >>>>>>>> minded. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> we know that, before interaction, the physical state is well >>>>>>>>> described by the expression O(a + d), with the tensor product noted >>>>>>>>> multiplicatively, and that it is equivalent with Oa + Od. So even at >>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> stage the "O" can be considered being in a superposition state. That >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> what I called the linearity of the tensor product. Now, by the >>>>>>>>> linearity of >>>>>>>>> the wave evolution we get O-a a + O-b b, that is each branch behaves >>>>>>>>> classically (P-i = O with i in its memory. And both 0-a and O-b can >>>>>>>>> repeat >>>>>>>>> their measurement, and the linearity of the wave evolution implies >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> they will always find the same measurement result. So the MWI >>>>>>>>> explains the >>>>>>>>> persistence as much well as classical physics, or QM+collapse (if >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> means something precise). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My point is that at this stage, QM (without collapse) is >>>>>>>>> compatible with Mechanism (used implicitly above) only insofar as the >>>>>>>>> persistence is explained from a statistics on *all* computations >>>>>>>>> (which >>>>>>>>> exist once you agree that 2+2=4 independently of you and me). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> My technical point is that this work in the sense that we can >>>>>>>>> derive quantum logic (and normally physics) from the logical >>>>>>>>> structure that >>>>>>>>> the computations inherit from the logic of (machine) self-reference. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That is elegant because at this stage the "theory of everything" >>>>>>>>> needs no less and no more than very elementary axioms (and mechanism >>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>>>> meta-background). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The only axiom that I use are the following: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 0 ≠ (x + 1) >>>>>>>>> ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y >>>>>>>>> x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1) >>>>>>>>> x + 0 = x >>>>>>>>> x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 >>>>>>>>> x * 0 = 0 >>>>>>>>> x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Actually I could even just use the two combinators axioms: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kxy = x >>>>>>>>> Sxyz = xz(yz) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Such axioms are Turing complete, and you can prove the existence >>>>>>>>> of the UD from them (and *in* them if you add some induction axioms, >>>>>>>>> but I >>>>>>>>> prefer to put them in the epistemology of the observers). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The Turing-Church thesis rehabilit the neopythagorean theology, >>>>>>>>> and we get physics exactly when we use the antic definition of >>>>>>>>> knowledge >>>>>>>>> and matter provided by them (notably by Moderatus of Gades). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On the contrary, if primary matter or if physicalism would be >>>>>>>>> true, we remain with the task of explaining what is their role for >>>>>>>>> consciousness (or just first person experience). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Aristotle idea of naturalism or (weak) materialism (the existence >>>>>>>>> of a physical primary reality) has only been a tool for letting the >>>>>>>>> mind-body problem sleep a bit, and that has been a very fertile >>>>>>>>> simplifying >>>>>>>>> hypothesis, but now, with mechanism, and plausibly with only quantum >>>>>>>>> mechanics, we get the (predicted by the Platonist) problem of >>>>>>>>> justifying >>>>>>>>> the relation between first person discourse and third person >>>>>>>>> discourse. We >>>>>>>>> can't use the simple mind-brain identity theory, because we have an >>>>>>>>> infinity of quasi identical brains in arithmetic, and we can't use a >>>>>>>>> selection principle based on a substance without damaging the >>>>>>>>> mechanist >>>>>>>>> hypothesis. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Keep in mind that my origianl goal is to solve the mind-body >>>>>>>>> problem, and with mechanism, we have no choice other than justifying >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> appearance of physicalness from a statistic based on the mix of >>>>>>>>> "*all* >>>>>>>>> computations + machine self-reference when distributed in those >>>>>>>>> computations. It works (till now). Non-mechanism does not work, and >>>>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>> well known that the mind-body problem has been put under the rug >>>>>>>>> since >>>>>>>>> Aristotle (except by the Platonists, who were just banned from our >>>>>>>>> civilisation 1500 years ago). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In Soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. I don't pretend it is the >>>>>>>>> last match. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 2:23:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 05 Sep 2016, at 19:31, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Monday, September 5, 2016 at 8:08:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04 Sep 2016, at 20:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Bruno, thank you for a detailed response. Most of it is above >>>>>>>>>>>>> my pay grade, but I will check some of your links and see what I >>>>>>>>>>>>> can make >>>>>>>>>>>>> of them. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> OK. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As for the MWI, I have a simple approach. If I went to LV and >>>>>>>>>>>>> played a slot machine for a single trial or outcome, and someone >>>>>>>>>>>>> asked me >>>>>>>>>>>>> what happened to the other thousands of outcomes I didn't get, >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'd think >>>>>>>>>>>>> that would be a crazy question. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I mainly agree, because there is no unanimity on which >>>>>>>>>>>>> counterfactual or conditional non standard logic to use. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Isn't it really much simpler? Just because something *could* >>>>>>>>>>>> exist, like those thousands of other outcomes of the slot machine, >>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> mean they *must* exist. The MWI insists all outcomes MUST exist. I >>>>>>>>>>>> see no >>>>>>>>>>>> necessity for that. AG * >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You need it to get the interference between the terms of the >>>>>>>>>>>> wave. I agree with Deutsch: QM is the science of multiple >>>>>>>>>>>> interfering >>>>>>>>>>>> histories. The collapse is an addition to avoid that >>>>>>>>>>>> multiplication/differentiation consequence. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> But that's the question some physicists ask when they are >>>>>>>>>>>>> confronted with the non-linearity of collapse in the Copenhagen >>>>>>>>>>>>> Interpretation. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I tend to disagree here. The quantum situation is different >>>>>>>>>>>>> because with quantum mechanics, different outcomes can interfere >>>>>>>>>>>>> and thus >>>>>>>>>>>>> have some physical underpinning which is hard to avoid, >>>>>>>>>>>>> especially without >>>>>>>>>>>>> assuming the collapse of the wave. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *How can you disagree? Many prominent physicists -- Greene, >>>>>>>>>>>> Deutsch, Carroll -- when confronted with the non-linearity of >>>>>>>>>>>> collapse, >>>>>>>>>>>> believe the MWI avoids or solves this problem. AG* >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ? >>>>>>>>>>>> I agree with them. MWI entails no-collapse, and the evolution >>>>>>>>>>>> is purely linear. Just a "rotation" in the Hilbert space. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Accepting non linearity >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> There are work by Steinberg and Plaga which shows that if the >>>>>>>>>>>>> QM wave is slightly non linear, then we get the WW with a >>>>>>>>>>>>> revenge: >>>>>>>>>>>>> interactions becomes possible in between terms of the wave. This >>>>>>>>>>>>> makes >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong special relativity, but also thermodynamics, etc. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *The wf before measurement is linear insofar as it satisfies a >>>>>>>>>>>> linear DE, and relativity is well tested. So I don't see any issue >>>>>>>>>>>> here. >>>>>>>>>>>> AG * >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> OK, but then there is no collapse. We agree, then, only the >>>>>>>>>>>> collapse leads to non-linearity. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So I guess you mean that there is a (non linear) collapse, and >>>>>>>>>>>>> that, strictly speaking the SWR is false. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> SWR = ? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Why does a non-linear collapse falsify SR? AG* >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> By Bell's violation, if there is a collapse, it affects >>>>>>>>>>>> elements which are space-separated. Einstein explained this >>>>>>>>>>>> already at the >>>>>>>>>>>> Solvay congress. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> <blockquote class=" >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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