I think you understand, Bruce, that step 7 shows that any ontological property beyond universal computation and robustness can have no phenomenological entailment. It heavily relies on the CT thesis for that. In this sense, ontology can be sliced away by Occam's razor, applicable to primitive physics and arithmetical platonism in equal measure. Bruno's appeal to arithmetical Platonism is that is supposed to be uncontroversial - but endless debates and niggles indicate it may not be.
But Bruce is right - this is not a contradiction as such, except to ask the question "what is the use of a primitive physics that one cannot measure or access in any way?". Step 8 is the supposed contradiction - Olympia and Kara etc. I have a paper on this argument, which I really must get around to addressing the reviewer's concerns and get published. I tend to think that is more of an argument by incredulity than a genuine logical contradiction, though... On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 09:34:23AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a > >mathematical notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce > >to matter, computationalism is false by definition, as computation > >as such is not a physical notion. > > That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not, > in itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored > physically). Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it > is an abstract description of what a computer does. But the computer > is physical, and the computation does not exist absent the computer. > > It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis > that physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of > computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping > of the basest kind. > > Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not, > of itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue > that the notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the > physical otiose. There is still no contradiction. The best that > Bruno can achieve is something that seems absurd to him. But that is > merely a contradiction with his instinctive notions of what is > reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated logical contradiction. > > Bruce > > > > > >Regards, > >Quentin > > > >Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au > ><mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> a écrit : > > > > On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker > > <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: > > > > On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that > > you claim that > > there is some mysterious substance (he finally called > > it a "soul") > > that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I > > claim is this: > > under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. > > The problem is > > that physicalism leads to a contradiction, > > > > > > I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction. Can spell > > out what that > > contradiction is? > > > > Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour): > > If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently > > supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. > > Maybe > > your current computation happens in the original planet Earth > > but also > > in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a > > far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume > > that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the > > simulation > > argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as > > unique. It > > follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or > > temporally situated, thus cannot be physical. > > > > > > This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In > > fact, you examples are all completely consistent with the > > requirement that any computation requires a physical substrate -- > > "a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a > > far-away galaxy" is a completely physical concept. > > > > Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is > > a computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You > > have to add something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, > > the idea that all computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, > > and do not require physical implementation. But that is merely the > > assumption that physicalism is false. So it may be the case that > > mathematical platonism does not require a physical universe, but > > it does not contradict physicalism: it is perfectly possible that > > your consciousness is a computation, and that mathematical > > platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive physical > > universe and that any actual computations require a physical > > substrate -- as JC keeps insisting. > > > > No contradiction has been demonstrated. > > > > Bruce > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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