On 26 May 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 26 May 2017, at 14:04, David Nyman wrote: > > On 25 May 2017 at 16:23, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 24 May 2017, at 13:56, David Nyman wrote: >> >> Let me know if anything is still unclear. >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> >> Date: 20 May 2017 at 01:30 >> Subject: Re: Movie argument >> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> >> >> On 19 May 2017 at 21:00, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 5/19/2017 8:45 AM, John Clark wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, May 18, 2017 spudboy100 via Everything List < >>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>> > >>>> So which is the Boss, John, Mathematics, somehow at the 'base; of the >>>> universe, or is physics the top dog from the 1st split second? >>> >>> >>> >>> One of >>> >>> René >>> Magritte's >>> most famous paintings is called "Ceci n'est pas une pipe", in English >>> that means " >>> this is not a pipe". >>> >>> http://i3.kym-cdn.com/entries/icons/facebook/000/022/133/the >>> -treachery-of-images-this-is-not-a-pipe-1948(2).jpg >>> >>> This is how Magritte explained his painting: >>> >>> *" The famous pipe. How people reproached me for it! And yet, could >>> you stuff my pipe? No, it's just a representation, is it not? So if I had >>> written on my picture 'This is a pipe', I'd have been lying! "* >>> >>> Mathematics is a representation of something it is not the thing >>> itself. Physics is the thing itself. >>> >>> >>> Bruno's a Platonist. >>> >> >> I am open that Plato is right, in theology. In mathematics, I am not that >> "platonist", I just keep calm when I see that we tell the kids that 2+2=4. >> >> The point is that "Mathematics is a representation of something it is >> not the thing itself. Physics is the thing itself" is the Aristotelian >> theological credo. It makes no sense with Mechanism. >> >> (I comment Brent, I think here, and you, David, below) >> >> That means that conscious thoughts are what we have immediate access to >>> and the physical world is an inference from perceptions (which are >>> thoughts). We take the physical world to be real insofar as our >>> inference has point-of-view-invariance so that others agree with us about >>> perceptions. Bruno observes that consciousness is associated with and >>> dependent on brains, which are part of the inferred physical world. He >>> supposes this is because brains realize certain computations and he >>> hypothesizes that conscious thoughts correspond to certain computations. >>> But computation is an abstraction; given Church-Turing it exists in the >>> sense that arithmetic exists. So among all possible computations, there >>> must be the computations that constitute our conscious thoughts and the >>> inferences of a physical world to which those thoughts seem to refer... but >>> not really. It's the "not really" where I part company with his >>> speculations. >>> >> >> I prefer t say that I assume. I don't speculate that Mechanism is true. I >> assume Mechanism is true, for the sake of showing it testable. >> >> >> >> That inferred physical world is just as computed as Max Tegmark's >>> >> >> If that was the case, there would be no white rabbit problem. The problem >> of mechanism, is that our first person conscious thought are associate to a >> statistics on infinitely many computations, and that is NOT computable per >> se, and it is part of the job to explain why the physical laws seem so much >> computable. To invoke one computation, like in "digital physics", is still >> a manner of doing physics, and putting the mind-body problem (the mechanist >> one, now) under the rug. >> Brent forget the first person indeterminacy problem here. >> >> >> >> and is just as necessary for consciousness as brains and skulls and >>> planets are. So, for me, the question is whether something is gained by >>> this reification of computation. Bruno says it provides the relation >>> between mind and body. But that's more a promise than a fact. >>> >> >> Not at all. I show that there is a problem. First, there is no >> reification of computation. They are unavoidably executed by the >> arithmetical reality. We can't brush that away, because Mechanism requires >> that arithmetical reality to just define what a computation is. Then, below >> our substitution level, we have infinities of computation at play, and we >> *have to* justifies the laws of physics from that statistics (structured by >> the points of view). >> >> >> >> >> It provides some classification of thoughts of an ideal thinker who >>> doesn't even think about anything except arithmetic. >>> >> >> Assuming mechanism, he thinks "Gosh, if mechanism is true, where does >> this appeararance of material reality comes from?". >> >> >> >> >> >> >> I really think you continue to miss something crucial here. >> >> >> Brent miss the problem. he thinks I come up with some bizarre new theory, >> when I just show that an antic honorable theory, Mechanism, in the digital >> version, leads to a big problem: we *have to* explain the physical >> appearances from a statistics on first person (plural) views emulated >> infinitely often in arithmetic. >> >> I show a problem, then I illustrate the beginning of the solution that >> the universal Löbian number find by themselves, and I show it is quite >> similar to the (neo)platonist one. >> >> >> >> The thinker (which is admittedly a toy version at this stage) isn't >> merely thinking "about" arithmetic. It's thinking about (or more accurately >> perceiving) *arithmetical truth*. >> >> >> Well he perceive the limiting result of the 1p indeterminacy: the >> physical reality. It can infer something bigger than the arithmetical >> truth. It is the Skolem-like paradox: the arithmetical truth, seen from >> inside, can seen bigger than the arithmetical truth. Already qG* is bigger >> than God V. >> I would not say that we perceive arithmetical truth. We intuit it from >> pour lives and thought. It is just vocabulary, but I prefer to keep >> perception for the physical and the geographical reality. perception is >> when we open the reconstitution box, and see that we are in Washington and >> not in Moscow. It is discrimination of results of experience. >> >> Brent was just oblivious of the 1p indeterminacy problem rised once we >> assume Mechanism. Then the arithmetical hypostases, which existence are >> enforced by incompleteness shows that ... Mechanism is not (yet) refuted, >> and that QM becomes an ally of mechanism, given that we get already a >> quantum logic for the measure on all computations. >> >> >> So what's the difference? Well, 2+2=4 is a tautology of arithmetic; IOW >> it merely expresses something that is formally necessitated in the very >> definition of the terms. What does it then add to say that it is true that >> 2+2=4? Well, we test the truth of this assertion by perceiving that it >> corresponds with the (perceptual) facts. For example, as you often like to >> say, we can simply see that two objects plus two more objects is indeed >> equal to four objects. Now, this idea of truth as correspondence with the >> facts has no direct parallel in physics, computation per se, or any other >> purely formally-defined procedural specification. For these latter, it is >> sufficient that there is such a procedure and that it is followed. There is >> no further entailment of truth or falsity that can have any bearing on the >> outcome. On the other hand the notion of truth parallels precisely that >> characteristic of perception fixed on by many thinkers on the subject, >> perhaps most notably Descartes who correctly intuited that the one thing in >> his experience that could not coherently be doubted was that it was true. >> To be unambiguous, that primary truth is not of course proof against >> delusion; as Descarte also correctly inferred, his true experience could >> nonetheless have been imposed on him by a malignant demon. In that case, >> however, it would still of course have been the canvas on which the >> delusory perceptions were truthfully painted. >> >> But what's the relevance of such a notion of simple arithmetical truths >> to perceptions such as our own? Well, if thought and perception, by >> assumption in the computationalist framework, are to be considered a >> consequence of computation, >> >> >> Perception is as much the result of computation (of my brain) than the >> result of the outcome of the self-localization after the general >> "WM-duplication", the one which multiplies you by infinity in arithmetic, >> which is not computable, because it relies on infinities of computations, >> and the logic of the material self-reference (with the Bp & Dt (& p)). >> >> >> >> >> which itself devolves upon arithmetical relations, then the truths of >> perception must in some relevant sense be generalisations of the truths of >> arithmetic. As Bruno says, perception becomes a view from the "inside" of >> arithmetic, >> >> >> Yes. It is somehow the view on the non computable part of arithmetic by >> the locally computable part. Keep in mind that most truth in arithmetic are >> not computable. >> >> >> >> >> where that elusive internal space (which we seek in vain in >> extrinsically-completed models such as physics tout court) >> >> >> Here we might differ, and you might be more mechanist than me (!). We >> could have used a notion of physical truth, instead of arithmetical truth. >> What the UDA shows is that this requires to abandon mechanism. But if we >> get evidence that consciousness reduces the wave, or that QM is false, then >> we might reasonably consider that a physical reality exists ontologically, >> and well, in that case we must find a non computationalist theory of mind, >> which of course, in that case, will rely on the physical notion of truth. >> It is an open problem if we can use or not the same hypostases with >> non-arithmetical modal boxes. G and G* remains correct for a vast class of >> non mechanical entities. >> > > Well, I think, with your help, that I've reached an elementary > understanding (or at least a better intuition) of what you mean by > arithmetical truth and its possible application in the resolution of the > mind-body problem. > > > Arithmetical truth is easy, although its use is more delicate. It is easy, > and it is taught in primary school (here = 6 to 12 years old). > > The complexity is only in metamathematics (mathematical logic). It comes > from the fact that we cannot define a predicate of truth, V, such that a > machine could prove > > p <-> V("p") (which is the least we can ask for a truth predicate). > > If that existed, by Gödel diagonal lemma, we could find a proposition k > such that the machine will prove k <-> ~V(k), and so the machine would > prove both k <-> V(k), and k <-> ~V(k), and eventually conclude k <-> ~k, > and be inconsistent. That is of course the Epimenides paradox. >
Yes, so on pain of inconsistency, not everything the machine can say can definitely be provably true (or false). > > (The predicate ~V would also exist, and the diagonal lemma says that for > all predicate P the machine can find a solution to the formula x <-> P(x), > that is, can find a sentence k such that the machine will prove k <-> P(k). > > But we can define truth predicate on restricted set of sentences. > Necessarily so, it would seem. > And we can use richer theories. In set theory, it is easy to define the > arithmetical truth. Of course, in the background we use the notion of > set-theoretical truth, which, if we would define it would requires strong > infinity axiom (ZF + kappa exists) for example. > > Arithmetical truth is the simplest notion of all definition of truth. > "AxP(x)" is true simply means that P(n) is true whatever n is. It is the > infinite or: > > P(0) v P(1) v P(2), v P(3), etc. > > The amazing thing, alreadu apparent in Post 1922 and Gödel 1931, but quite > clarified since, is that > > 1) we can describe the complete functioning of any universal (and non > universal) system in the arithmetical language, but, and that is the key, > in virtue of the true-ness of the relation between the numbers, the > computations are not just describe in arithmetic, but they are emulated. > In effect, they are actioned. > > I know you and some other have well understood this, but not all here > seems to have grasped that quite important distinction, between truth, > theories and languages. Also, I am sure you forget to apply this sometimes, > see below. I think you don't take mechanism seriously enough. (as working > hypothesis of course). > Oh dear. But I've looked below and I'm not sure where I'm going wrong :( > > > But what might be a corresponding notion of physical truth? Is it just > Brent's insistence on a completed instrumental account of neurocognition in > terms of physical action? > > > Brent defines truth by physical truth. It is OK, but cannot work with > mechanism (uda, etc.) > But then you say below there is no physical truth, only physical modes. But perhaps you mean only assuming mechanism. If one doesn't assume this, what then is physical truth? > > > > > But such an account would not even address the provenance of the > perceptual facts in terms of which that very action appeared to us. Could > that be sufficient to justify the inference that perception was a "physical > truth", as opposed to merely being effectively eliminated? > > > > I think we are perhaps close to a point where we could slightly disagree. > I can still make some sense of Brent's proposition, and of physicalism, by > assuming a physical universe, as starting hypothesis. The price is to > abandon mechanism. That will make everything a bit magical, but it can be > consistent, and worst, true. > Yes, but what's true about a physical universe that could be invoked (or inferred, pace Brent) to explain consciousness of it? better say no to the doctor, in that case. This would need things like > kappa, or even more complex set-theoretical objects. Eventually it is like > Ptolemeaus epycicle, and with mechanism, literal invisible horses, but time > consuming horses to describe when doing the prediction. Today that remains > possible, and that is why I try to propose a test. > Do you mean YD? That's some test! Mind you, partial brain prostheses are almost upon us. > > > I suspect, in the end, that any viable notion of physical truth would > inevitably collapse, under analysis, to mechanism and consequently to > arithmetical truth. And so the argument will begin again ;) > > > > The physical truth, with mechanism, is the truth about the (measure on) > the computations which "continues" you in arithmetic, as seen from some > intern > al > points of view. > OK > > using G, we can described it roughly but precisely by Bp & Dt & p, with p > computable (sigma). > > In Plotinus-like terms, arithmetical truth is the One. the only thing you > need to believe in, or understand. > OK again. And as I remarked recently (although you haven't commented yet) the body is perhaps what allows the symmetry of that One to be broken, at least in terms of the points of view. > But that is a semantical reality. it is know that the arithmetical truth > cannot be axiomatize completely by any reasonable/effective theory. We > cannot "really" define it ourselves, but like consciousness, we have > quickly a good intuitive grasp on it. We don't complain when our kids > learns that prime numbers exists, even an infinity of them. > > That is what I sum up by p. It is the sentence asserted by a machine (or > not, here there is the nuance which, if misunderstood paved the road to the > theological trap). Indeed, with mechanism, p will be sigma. And for the > sigma proposition we have G* proves p <-> []p. So God becomes the universal > turing machine! Blaspheme! > Well, the machine becomes the universal experiencer, the monopsychic, multiply-amnesic "solus ipse". Is that God? ISTM that an aspect of God must also somehow be implicated in arithmetic itself which, as the fons et origo of the supremely creative widget, is the sole assumptive ontology for everything that follows. > Not really, because the correct machine will just stay mute on []p -> p. > > With mechanism, we don't go out of the much more tiny, computable (cf the > universal dovetailer, the "splashed universal Turing machine) sigma truth. > The usual Arithmetical truth can also be relegate to the imagination of the > universal numbers. > > So, we have the truth, > > p > > and we have the modal nuances, literally enforced by incompleteness, as > the Löbian machine already know: > > Bp The justfiable (G1 and G1*) > Bp & p The knowable (S4Grz1) > > and the two matters of the neoplatonists: > > Bp & Dt intelligible matter (sharable quanta and piece > of classical and quantum bits) The observable (Z1 and Z1*) > Bp & Dt & p (sensible matter (unsharable qualia, undescribable > by any bits in any language) The sensible (X1 and X1*) > > Thee modes split, by inheriting the G/G* split. Note that the decidability > of G is inherited on all modes, including G*. > The splitting gives interesting corona (G* \ G, Z1* \ Z1, X1* \ X1). > > Some quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*. > > > So, if you want, there is only one notion of fundamental truth assumed > (ontologically).( (sigma) arithmetical truth). All the rest are imposed as > self-referential modalities, by incompleteness (which belongs to the > arithmetical truth) on the self-referentially correct universal number, > relatively to each others. > Which I called, rather vaguely in answer to Brent, (epistemological) generalisations of arithmetical truth (meaning only that they added no new entities or relations to the assumptive ontology) > The physical truth is one way "arithmetic" looks at itself. It is first > person plural, because we share the "measure one", in the "& Dt" > modalities, although this has not yet been completely clarified. > Yes, I've just said that in response to Brent's remarks about the point-of-view invariance of physical observables. > > To put is more bluntly: there is no physical truth. Only some true > physical mode. > OK but what about what you said above? I think I see that you must intend this on the assumption of mechanism only. What physical truth could be on any other assumption is presumably a different matter. > Normally given by []p & Dt (& p). In my thesis I was wrong when saying > that S4Grz1, the logic of (Bp &p), p sigma, collapse. It did not, which > makes things even closer to Plotinus. The soul has already a foot in > Matter, somehow. > Well, surely without a connection to matter it would be perceptually stranded in the unbroken symmetry of the One. > Note that the soul does not split along G/G*. > And therefore....? > > Hope this is not too much technical > !! > , but I needed to get the short answer: there is no physical truth, only > physical modes, which are uncertainty measure on accessible continuation. > Yes, the Born "probabilities" (hopefully). > What Aristotle called the physical universe, is only a map of our most > accessible continuations in arithmetic. > Indeed. David > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David > >> >> >> >> >> is equated with the truths, as distinct from the formal procedures, of >> arithmetic. The strength of the logical models that Bruno utilises in the >> machine interviews is then that they can be characterised in this sense as >> "accessing truths". However, their purely extrinsic formulation is in the >> relevant sense "incomplete" in this regard. Their completion in that same >> sense is to be found in the conjunction of an extrinsic formulation with an >> intrinsic (reflexive) logic that is comprehensible only in terms of what >> the subject thus modelled perceives to be true, i.e to correspond with its >> perceptually-available "facts". The consequence is then that consciousness >> is equated in this view with whatever is perceptually true, in the first >> instance, for a given subject. >> >> >> I mainly agree. I would use "intuit" for the Bp & p, and "perceive" with >> the Bp & Dt (& p). But that is an old bad habit, perhaps, as I thought that >> Bp & p collapse on p sigma. But that is not the case, and Plotinus was >> right (!), the soul (Bp & p) has already a intuition/perception of the >> physical reality). >> >> Here we have the problem that we get three quantum logics, and thus three >> physics. Normally Bp & p, with p sigma, is "heaven physics", and Bp & Dt (& >> p), p sigma, is terrestrial physics. Normally Bp & Dt gives the quanta, and >> Bp & Dt & p gives the qualia, but it is slightly more complex than that, >> for technical reason. >> >> >> >> >> Now, toy model or not, ISTM that there is surely something in the >> foregoing that offers certain relevant conceptual footholds that are >> unavailable in alternative schemas. It's also something that can in >> principle be examined and tested rigorously even though it is at present >> largely neglected and at a very early stage of development. At least it >> seems to offer a way of avoiding the equally unpalatable polarities I >> mentioned before - of brute identity theory on the one hand, or the >> fruitless search for some "internal" state of matter on the other. Either >> of these alternatives has struck me for a long time as falling into the >> category of "not even wrong". >> >> >> OK. I agree, but I think that Brent's main mistake is that he is >> oblivious that I show the existence of a problem with Mechanism, and show >> that the problem can be translated in arithmetic, and that it leads up to >> now to a theology, testable by the constraints it put on the core of >> physics (indeed, we do get a quantum-like logic). I show that Gödel's >> theorem is not only a chance for mechanism by justifying the existence of >> the knower (Bp a p), but Gödel's theorem justifies the existence of the >> matter appearances as well, when p is sigma, and when we add the >> "probability" clause: that is the "Dt". >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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