On 07 Jul 2017, at 17:44, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 6, 2017 at 4:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

​> ​Stop trolling.

​Stop spouting pompous sounding gibberish.


Ask question when you do not understand.

May be try to explain to someone else what is your problem in step 3, and ask that person to explain the problem.

I do not propose any new theory. I show that the conjunction of the metaphysical hypothesis known as physicalism is problematic (to say the least) with the assumption that our 1p experience (consciousness) is an invariant for some physical digital brain transplant.

We have to extend the view of Everett to arithmetic, and the incompleteness phenomenon, and the fact that the "sufficiently rich" machine is aware (in some sense) provides the tools for doing that.

You, and anyone interested in the "mathematical UDA" should study the relation between the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences and computability and/or recursive enumerability. Again, it is standard results, like Kleene normal form theorem, explained in *all* textbooks I mentioned before (Cutland, Mendelson, Boolos & Jeffrey, Davis).

But you, sir, seems to have a peculiar agenda.

Bruno



John K Clark ​



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