On 25 Sep 2017, at 21:37, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Sep 25, 2017 at 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> The only identity criteria I remember agreeing
to is "the Moscow man" means the man who saw Moscow.
> You have agreed that the Moscow Man (like the Washington
Man) is an honorable Helsinki Man survivor.
I have agreed that the Helsinki Man is a proper subset of
the Moscow man but the two are NOT equivalent, if they were it would
be stupid to give them different names. I also said the Helsinki man
survives because the Moscow man remembers being the Helsinki man and
remembering is how I define "survival", but how you define survival
I don't know.
> Yes, the Helsinki man is in two places,
Then what are we arguing about?
On the expectation to live the experience "being in M (resp W)" after
pushing the button.
> but the point is that he does not feel that way.
Oh yes now I remember, we are arguing about the identity of
the mysterious Mr. He.
Never. On the identity question you have agreed with all the points,
since long.
> nobody can feel to be in two places at once with
computationalism
That is not a sacred axiom of computationalism!
It is simple consequence.
The Moscow man and the Washington man could be merged back together
and the resulting Moscow/Washington man would have vivid memories of
being in both cities at exactly the same time, as well as having
memories of being just the Helsinki man.
In a metaphorical sense? But strictly speaking, after fusing, the guy
will remember having been in only one city without having been able to
predict which one in Helsinki before. He will remember this for the
two cities, but that will not give him an algorith to make a future
similar prediction, obviously, so without changing the protocol, the
indeterminacy remains, and is doubly confirmed by the fusion.
In fact you could feel to be in 2 cities at the same time even
without a people duplicating machine, just feed in detailed sensory
data from Moscow and Washington back to the fellow in Helsinki.
"I" is the usual indexical. You can duplicate it in the 3-1 picture,
but not in the 1p view, viewed from that 1p view.
Good old "the"! Misusing personal pronouns is not the only way
to sweep illogical thinking under the rug, forgetting that there is
a difference between the English articles "the" and "a" also does a
good job at muddying the waters.
Nope. The 1P/3P distinction brings complete clarity on what the "the"
mean. The confusion arise only from your systematic dismiss of that
difference.
>> All the copies were NOT asked the question yesterday back
in Helsinki,
> The prediction is asked to the Helsinki guy before the
duplication. The copies are the Helsinki guy,
Yes the copies are the Helsinki guy because they are
everything the Helsinki man was, but the Helsinki guy was never
everything the copies are, one is a proper subset of the other. Not
all connections between things have the Equivalence Relation,
equality does but "is grater than" does not, 4 is grater than 3
but 3 is not grater than 4. Personal identity also does not have the
Equivalence Relation, the Moscow man is the Helsinki man but
the Helsinki man is not the Moscow man.
>> you ask "Which one will become the Moscow man?" and the
answer of course is "the one the sees Moscow".
> That does not help the Helsinki man,
Well.... I could add that the one the sees Moscow will turn out to
be the Moscow man. That's all the help I can give the Helsinki man
because I don't understand what he is asking.
> given that in helsinki he still doesn't know if he will feel
to be being the M-man or not.
That's right, "he" still doesn't know and "he" will NEVER know
because nobody will ever know what "he" means in the above.
Then computationalism is false. Of course the helsinki man will be
able to answer and verify the prediction. Indeed, he will verify in
both place that P(W v M) = 1, and all the others were not equal to 1.
> >Yes that's a trivial answer but then it was a trivial
question, and at least it's true just like all tautologies.
> But can be false when used to predict "moscow" in helsinki.
So the Moscow man didn't see Moscow?
The W-man did not see Moscow. And computationalism gives similar
credits to both copies.
! Well then who did see Moscow, the Washington man??
> Answer this before we proceed, please. Should the H-man
expect or not to drink tea when tea is promised to be given to both
copies?
I still don't understand why you're more interested in
expectations than reality
Reality is the goal. Of course, stopping in the middle of the
reasoning cannot help you on this.
but if you insist in a answer I will give you one. No, he
should not expect to get tea he should expect the promise to be
broken and it would be better if he expected to end up in Santa
Claus's workshop instead. Why should he expect that? Because he
will happier if he does, Santa Claus's workshop sounds like more
fun than drinking tea. Of course expectations need not turn out to
be correct to bring happiness
Good joke.
Now be serious, and answer if P(tea) = 1. You evade this question by
all means, which makes me suspect that 1) you already got the point
that P(tea) = 1, and 2) you already got the point that this will
entail P("W v M") = 1.
Bruno
John K Clark
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