On 26 Sep 2017, at 23:13, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> nobody can feel to be in two places at once with
computationalism
> That is not a sacred axiom of computationalism!
> It is simple consequence.
Show me how! Explain to me why computers can't do 2 things at the
same time.
They can. But if you duplicate a computer and allow them two different
continuations, they cannot live or experience them both at once. We
are reasoning in a precise context with a precise protocol. You over-
generalize our claim.
Then tell me
why even with todays technology by using telepresence you can feel
like you're in one place
even though you're brain is in another place far away.
Sure. But that is just changing the protocole. You are not
invalidating an argument, but a generalization you are doing of it.
>> The Moscow man and the Washington man could be merged back
together and the resulting
Moscow/Washington man would have vivid memories of being in both
cities at exactly the \same time, as well as having memories of
being just the Helsinki man.
> In a metaphorical sense?
No, in a literal sense.
Then that is ambiguous, and again, even if we could make sense of your
claim, that is a change of the protocol irrelevant for the WM-
duplication. That has been shown in my last post. let us look at your
comment ...
> But strictly speaking, after fusing, the guy will remember
having been in only one city
If after fusing the Moscow man and the Washington man back
together and the resulting being
remembers having been in only one city don't you think it's
a little odd that being is unable to
say what the name of that one and only one city is? I think
it's odd.
It is not odd. You tell me that he has fused the two memories, and the
two memories contains the content" I am in only one city, and I could
not have written in Helsinki that unique name in the diary. That only
confirms the first person indeterminacy.
without having been able to predict which one in Helsinki
before.
Just imagine how that could be like. In helsinki the guy wrote
"Washington" in his diary. he got duplicated and, in the 3-1p
description, he lives the two incompatible experiences:
"I see Washington, my diary contains "Washington", so my bet was
correct, I win!"
and
"I see Moscow, my diary contains "Washington", so my bet was wrong, I
lost the bet".
After fusing the memory (admitting we can make sense of that), he
knows that the bet is incorrect, given that he remembers that it
failed in Moscow, and we have defined "correct prediction" when all
copies agree on it.
So if you asked the newly refused Moscow/Washington man "What is
the name of that one and
only one city you ended up seeing after Helsinki?", do you think
he'd give you that one and only
one name or do you think he's look at you like you were crazy for
asking such a thing?
The question is on the 1p expected before the pushing the button, on
which cities he would see after opening the door.
> That's right, "he" still doesn't know and "he" will NEVER know
because nobody will ever
know what "he" means in the above.
He remembers quite well that in one city, the prediction was false,
and that is enough to conclude, after the fusing, that if the
experience is iterated again, he still cannot predict a specific city,
although he can predict that it belongs to {W, M}.
> Then computationalism is false.
Bullshit.
> Of course the helsinki man will be able to answer and verify
the prediction.
The Helsinki man?!! The Helsinki man can't
verify anything because after the duplication nobody
is in Helsinki anymore.
We did agree that the Helsinki man survives in both city, but of
course lives the experience of one city.
You change the identity criterion that you have accepted before. That
is not a valid way to reason.
>>I still don't understand why you're more interested in
expectations than reality
> Reality is the goal.
Expectations are often proven to be wrong, reality never is.
Yes, but a physical law is supposed to help linking expectation and
some reality. Cf Einstein criteria of reality, or just the goal of
fundamental science.
So in this posts, you change the protocol, and/or you change the
definition/criterion of personal identity. Hardly convincing.
Bruno
John K Clark
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