On Friday, November 17, 2017 at 11:30:04 AM UTC-7, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 16, 2017 at 1:57 AM, <agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > >> I didn't mean to imply that all atoms in a baseball have the same >> entangled state. >> > > Then a baseball is not in one > definite state > . > > > > >> I just meant that whatever state it's in, it's not in contradiction with >> REALISM. >> >> Even superpositions are not in contradiction with REALISM >> > > We > > know > > the Bell Inequality is violated and that proves that if things are > deterministic then either locality or REALISM or both are untrue. And we > know the > > Leggett–Garg inequality > > is also violated and that proves that if things are deterministic and > REALISTIC > > then > > the non-local forces must be very odd indeed, they > > must violate > > the Arrow If Time, that is to say the future must effect the past. > Face facts, n > o matter what turns out to be true of one thing we can be certain, it will > be WEIRD! >
*How do you distinguish LOCALITY from REALISM?* *As I wrote, and you ignored, the constituents of the baseball are in entangled states, with their neighbors to create the macro "object", and some entangled in vibrational modes with the external environment. These states are different and constantly fluctuating, but the overall "state" of the object -- if one could be defined -- does NOT contradict localism or realism -- which is what I thought we were discussing. OK, maybe not one single state, but that's not what this discussion was about, from my pov.* > > >> >>> Explain to me how >>> Everett's MWI >>> can work without the Multiverse. The fact that string theory also >>> needs a Multiverse just give more support to Everett, or at least it would >>> if there were any experimental evidence to indecate string theory was true, >>> >>> >> >> > >> The Many Worlds of Everett and String Theory have no direct or indirect >> relationship >> > > Except that they both require a multiverse, as does Big Bang Inflation > theory. > > > >> > >> You keep ignoring the fact that these other worlds, if they exist, arise >> in totally different contexts and theories >> > > > Ignore it? I didn't ignore it I'm the one who pointed it out! Three > entirely different theories in 3 apparently different areas of physics all > were forced to come to the exact same conclusion, the Multiverse must exist. > *I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some world. I see no reason for this assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse". Same situation in String Theory; no "must"; simply other possible universes in the landscape. Do you really think that when you pull a slot machine and get some outcome, the 10 million other possible outcomes occur in 10 million other universe? Seems ridiculous to me.* > > >> > >> As for the continuity of time and space, to the extent we can test for >> it, continuity is so far affirmed. >> > > That is true, so far, of course we can never prove experimentally that its > > continuous, the best we can do is say if its granular > > then > > the grains must be smaller than X. > > I do admit that if space and time really are granular then much of my > argument probably goes out the window. I say probably because if anything > is going on > > at > > distances smaller than the Planck Length or during time less than the > Planck Time we don't have a clue what they could be > > because > > both Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity break down entirely at such > small scales and give nonsense answers. > > *> Essentially, all calculations and predictions in physics are >> approximations. * > > > Yes, a computer simulation of a hurricane is an approximation of the real > thing. Suppose a meteorologist said "Its not my computer model's fault for > not being exactly the same as the physical hurricane, its the physical > hurricane's fault for not being exactly the same as my computer model". If > mathematics is really more fundamental than physics then the meteorologist > would have a point. > > > > *> the fact that a Turing Machine can't do an exact calculation in >> finite time seems irrelevant. * > > > > Forget finite, it can't do it even in infinite time! > > A supremely important type of physical machine can produce almost none of > the Real Numbers even > i > n a > n > > infinite > amount > of > > time, and that strongly suggests almost none of the Real Numbers are > needed for a supremely important physical operation. That doesn't sound > irrelevant to me. > *Can't a Turing Machine calculate some rational numbers in finite time, like .5, or calculate an irrational to arbitrary precision if allowed to run long enough? I don't see what you are arguing. Physics uses approximations regularly, always. Does this mean mathematical knowledge is meaningless; just a "story"?* > > * > if you claim irrational numbers are not fundamentally important for >> physics, how do you account for the fact that PI comes up in Maxwell's >> equations and Einstein's field equations? * > > > In the entire history of the world nobody has ever made one single > physical calculation using PI, they've only used approximations of PI. > *The fact that PI can't be calculated precisely doesn't mean that irrational numbers, in this case PI, are irrelevant to physics. Keep in mind that if space-time is continuous, the Many Worlds allegedly manifested as outcomes in a simple slit experiment is UNCOUNTABLE. * > > John K Clark > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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