> On 27 Mar 2018, at 19:49, agrayson2...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, March 27, 2018 at 11:34:41 AM UTC-4, agrays...@gmail.com 
> <http://gmail.com/> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 5:25:59 PM UTC-4, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, March 26, 2018 at 4:20:02 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/26/2018 10:17 AM, John Clark wrote:
>> Brent Meeker Wrote"
>> 
>> > It seems to me there's something fishy about making behavior and conscious 
>> > thought functionally equivalent so neither can change without a 
>> > corresponding change in the other.  My intuition is that there is a lot of 
>> > my thinking that doesn't show up as observable behavior.  No doubt it's 
>> > observable at the micro-level in my brain; but not at the external level.
> 
>  The behavior of your neurons at the micro-level is what I’m talking about. A 
> change in the brain corresponds with a change inconsciousness and a change in 
> consciousness corresponds with a change in the brain. So mind is what the 
> brain does. So unless there is some mystical reason that carbon is conscious 
> but silicon is not a intelligent computer is also conscious.
> 
> I don't doubt that.  But does equal intelligence imply equivalent 
> consciousness. 
> 
> 
> IMO, the way you pose the question confuses the issue. You could have two 
> Rovers which do different tasks, and conclude they have different 
> intelligences based on some well defined definition. But how could you 
> ascertain whether either is conscious?  AFAICT, there is no understanding of 
> what "conscious" means. I suppose one can say it involves the perception of 
> sensation, pain, pleasure, etc. If you tore off a Rover's arm, it might be 
> programmed to complain or otherwise register the adverse modification of its 
> body. But if it did, wouldn't it be just simulating or mimicking a human 
> response without being "conscious"? What the hell are we talking about? TIA, 
> AG
> 
> You could program both Rovers to do arithmetic, but only one to do calculus. 
> So you could say one is more intelligent than the other. Or you could program 
> both to see in visible wave lengths, but only only to see in IR. So you could 
> say one has superior vision than the other. But what you can never do IMO, is 
> determine whether either Rover, in any circumstance, has self knowledge or 
> self perception, or can experience rudimentary or complex sensations. So I 
> don't think we're any closer to an explanation or understanding of 
> consciousness than when we started, however long ago that was. AG
> 
> If we had a clue how self-reference could result from a neural network such 
> as the human brain, we could, perhaps, duplicate it in a Rover or whatever, 
> But I see no evidence that we have such an insight to do the modeling. 
> CMIIAW. AG 



It can be proved that if the neuronal network is Turing complete (an that 
happens quickly), it has the precise self-reference ability which gives him the 
same theology (including physics) that the one of PA, ZF, or of any machine 
believing in any arithmetical or combinatoric induction axioms. 

Self-reference is where computer science excels the most. It is indeed born 
from a reflexion on paradoxes due to the self-reference ability of many 
mathematical structures.

You added:

"And if we had such a clue, we could determine if carbon is necessary for 
self-reference, or if silicon would do just fine. But I seriously doubt we know 
enough now to make such a determination, or to even begin the analysis. CMIIAW. 
AG “



We do have the clues, and we can answer that carbon, silicon cannot make any 
difference, unless you disbelieve in Mechanism. It is up to you, to  suggest 
what a continuous non mechanist matter could be, and how it links consciousness 
(first person, knowledge) and the observation (something that the materialist 
have failed to explain since about 1500 years). 


Bruno


> 
> 
> In other words could I design two Mars Rovers that behaved very similarly (as 
> similar as two different humans) and yet, because of the way I implemented 
> their memory or computers their consciousness was very different?  Of course 
> this is related to the question of how do I know that other people have 
> consciousness like mine; except in that case one relies in part on knowing 
> that other people are constructed similarly.
> 
> Brent
> 
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