> On 6 Jun 2018, at 21:15, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 6/6/2018 3:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> But in Helsinki, as a computationalist, you know in advance that whatever >> you will live is a definite unique experience, of W or of M. You lost >> unicity in the 3p view, indeed, but as human survivor, you keep it, and feel >> to be only one of the two copies. In all diaries obtained, the results are >> either W and M. This can be predicted, and indeed is verified by the two >> copies, independently. Just take the 3p and 1p distinction into account, >> which is part of the question in that thought experience. >> >> Bruno > > I don't want to get into arguments about pronouns, but now that you've > explicitly admitted that you believe there is soul and the brain is only a > kind interface whereby the soul interacts with a physical world, doesn't that > imply that this soul in not duplicated and only one of the W and M bodies has > THE soul of the Helsinki man?
I have given two definition of the soul, or first person, so far. In the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA), the soul is well approximated by the owner of the personal diary. As such it is not duplicated from its personal perspective, but of course it is duplicated for the 3p observer who did not enter the box. In the abstract translation of the UDA in arithmetic, The soul looks vey much to what you have defended many times: it is the machine and its memory (translated by the Gödel provability predicate in the case of ideally correct machine (which is why we need to get the “correct physics” with the meachniast assumption) conjuncted to either the truth, or consistency, or both, that is the []p & p []p & <>p []p & <>p & p That is akin to your desire to consider the environment in the picture, formally. And you are right, as consciousness is more in p, <>p and <>p v p than in the “machine” ([]p). There is a sort of paradox, as the universal machine’s soul will NOT say “yes” to the doctor. Machines when correct will instinctively say “no” to the doctor, until they understand this, and, for some reason, do the act of faith of the computationalist. This undermines only the position of those who believe that computationalism is obvious and does not require some act of faith. It does. That is why it is more a theology than a psychology, notably. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
