> On 8 Jun 2018, at 16:26, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 8, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >> I said information was as close as you can get to the traditional > >> religious concept of the soul and still remain within the scientific > >> method. In the past I pointed out exactly what those similarities and > >> differences were, I will repeat them now: > > * The soul is non material and so is information. > * It's difficult to pin down a unique physical location for the soul, and the > same is true for information. > *The soul is the essential, must have, part of consciousness, exactly the > same situation is true for information. > > *The soul is immortal and so, potentially, is information. > > > Well. Thanks. Brent was quoting me, but your answer is not too bad. > > >>But there are important differences too. > > *A soul is unique but information can be duplicated. > > > With mechanism, obviously a soul, or a first person experience can be > > duplicated from a third person pov. But not from a first person pov, > > And that is one (of many) problems with your “proof”. You start off by > assuming a physical mechanism can duplicate everything
False. I start from the assumption that I can survive from a digital emulation of my brain at some level. From this I have deduced many years ago the non-cloning theorem (without assuming quantum mechanics nor even an ontological physical universe). > EXCEPT for the first person pov, EXCEPT *from*, not for. > and then at the end you conclude you have proven mechanism can duplicate > everything EXCEPT for the first person pov . Mechanism cannot duplicate or do something. Your phrasing is non sensical, and as often, you don’t seem to listen to what I say, and attribute me non sense that I have never asserted. > > > you say that with Everett the observer does not feel the split. > > Yes, but observers will feel things after both the Everett type split and the > duplicating machine type split, and if the environments they are put into are > different then what they feel will be different and they will become > different people from that point on, although both will remember being the > same person before the split (or walking into the copying machine). OK then, but that entails the first person indeterminacy for the self-duplication. You make my point. > > >> *The soul is and will always remain unfathomable, but information is > >> understandable, in fact, information is the ONLY thing that is > >> understandable. > > > Theaetetus is *the* counterexample to this, > > That is of course Bullshit, and like most of the wise men you recommend on > this list the guy who dreamed up Theaetetus would flunk a freshman algebra > test No. He was a great mathematician. He proved the irrationality of all square root of non perfect square. And his definition of knowledge is one of the main improvement in theology for that period. > and didn't even know where the sun went at night. You've recommended many > many books on this list but only a very small number of them were written by > authors who have been dead for less than a century, but even those books are > unable to calculate 2+2. <sigh> Bruno > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
