On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 9:17 AM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:

>> If "Abbey" is the being before the teleportation then obviously by
> definition "Abbey" will not exist after the teleportation. Are you sure you
> really want to go with that definition?


*> Okay we can go with your definition as anyone who remembers being Abby,
what is important is that our language and definitions are consistent.*

Yes, some definitions are more useful than others but the most important
thing is that they be used consistently

>
>
>
>
> *> So we have:"Earth Abby" - The Abby at time 0 on Earth"Abby-1" - The
> Abby who ends up at her intended destination on Mars, at time 1"Abby-2" -
> The Abby who ends up at her admirer's destination on Mars, at time 1"Abby"
> - Anyone who remembers being Earth Abby (includes Earth Abby, Abby-1,
> Abby-2)*


After duplication it would be misleading to call anything "THE Abby".
Abby-1 is just Abby plus something extra, lets call it M.  And Abby-2 is
just Abby plus something extra that is different, lets call it W.  Both are
Abby but Abby-1 is not Abby-2.

>> I define "Abby" as anyone who remembers being Abbey before the
> duplication. Do you disagree?
>
>
*> No, we can go with that.*


OK, and since 2 people meet the definition of "Abbey" then there is simply
no getting around the fact that "Abbey" will see 2 entirely different
things at exactly the same time. Whenever I say something like that Bruno
says but that contradicts blah blah, but if true then the only alternative
is to change the definition of "Abbey" or change the blah blah. And then of
course Bruno would accuse me of playing with words as he does whenever I
try to be precise, as if precise thinking is not necessary in a matter of
this sort.

>> If the future doesn't unfold as I expected and my retirement investments
>> go bad then I will have lost some money, but if I develop Alzheimer's
>> disease in retirement and lost my past then I will have lost far more than
>> money, I will have lost my identity. The past and the future are not
>> symmetrical, we can remember the past but not the future.
>
> ​
>
> *> But the important point is we have expectations about the future, and
> physical theories attempt to predict likelihoods of various future outcomes*


Yes but those theories have nothing to do with our self identification so
why are we even talking about it?


> *> which we (at time now) have no memory of, but nonetheless expect to
> experience in the future.Do you agree on this point?*


I agree that very often our expectations about the future turn out to be
entirely wrong but when that happens we do not loose our identity or
consciousness. So I repeat, why are we even talking about this?


>
> *> the only point in having a brain is to predict and prepare for the
> future.I was suggesting the same thing as you did regarding Alzheimers. If
> memories are erased and we have no access to other evidence, the past can
> become indeterminant, similarly to the future.*

The future is always indeterminate to us, when the past also becomes
indeterminate to us that might be a good definition of death. That's what
makes Alzheimers so horrible, it doesn't kill you all at once, you merge
into oblivion slowly by degrees and you can feel your mind going. I
wouldn't wish that on my worse enemy, I hope I don't live long enough to
get it.

> >> So what was that one bit of information that "Abby" gained?  Did "Abby"
>> (and I am the only one who has given a precise definition of that word and
>> stuck with it) end up seeing W or M?
>
>


>
>
> *> The bit is gained by "Abby-1" and "Abby-2".Abby-1 will say "Huh, I am
> experiencing life as Abby-1 rather than Abby-2" -- let's call this outcome
> "0"Abby-2 will say "Huh, I am experiencing life as Abby-2 rather than
> Abby-1" -- let's call this outcome "1"Each of Abby-1 and Abby-2 have gained
> a bit of information.*


But, assuming she was told the truth by the experimenters, Abby already
knew that would happen before the duplication, no new information was
gained by her in a Shannon informational sense. The only difference between
Abby-1 and Abby-2 is that  Abby-1 saw M and Abby-2 saw W, so when Abby sees
W she is not surprised she will not ask herself why she is not Abby-1
because she already knows the answer, because she did not see M.  The
amount of information is a measure of surprise and there is zero surprise
in any of this so there is zero information.

*> The bit of information was "I got to use my swimsuit today" or "I had to
> use my winter coat",*


What's with this "or" business? John Clark is using his swimsuit today AND
John Clark is using his winter coat today, and John Clark knew all this
yesterday before the duplication. Nothing is surprising in any of this.

*> But you don't have to take my word for it. Max Tegmark explained the
> same in a thought experiment he describes in "Our Mathematical Universe",
> starting on page 194:*
>


>"The fundamental reason that quantum mechanics appears random even though
> the wave function evolves deterministically is that the Schrodinger
> equation can evolve a wavefunction with a single you into one with clones
> of you in parallel universes. "



I agree with Tegmark. Let's modify Bruno's thought exparament, its the same
in that you are duplicated and   transported to Moscow and Washington
however you were NOT told you would be duplicated, you were  told you would
be transported to Washington OR Moscow (or just told you would be
transported to some unspecified city). In that case you really would
receive new information when you saw Washington for example, although the
scientists performing the exparament who had more information about what
was really going on from the beginning would not.

When we flip a coin and see that it lands heads we really do gain a bit of
information because we don't know with anything even close to certainty
that Many Worlds is really true. But suppose we somehow obtained ironclad
proof that it was, what then? If the results of a coin flip would have
different consequences for me then I'd start making plans for both
eventualities before the flip and none of my thought processes would end up
being waisted. Now lets suppose we somehow obtained ironclad proof that
Many Worlds was NOT true and the coin flip really was fundamentally random,
then I'd still make plans for both possibilities even though half of that
brainwork would end up being a waist of time, that can't be helped, it just
comes from living in a universe that is truly random. So I'd live my life
the same way regardless of if I thought Many Worlds was true or if I
thought fundamental randomness existed.

*>  Is it not also interesting, that they all reach similar conclusions,
> namely, that computation sits at the basis of reality,*


I don't want to talk too much about the nature of reality, that topic can
quickly suck you down into a metaphysical quagmire, but I will say
computation certainly sits at the basis of understanding because
information is the ONLY thing that we can understand. And the thing that
makes matter interesting is that it can perform computations and nothing
else can.

*> and moreover that "all computations exist"*


The 7918th Busy Beaver Number is finite and can be proven to exist, BUT a
computation to produce the 7918th Busy Beaver Number can be proven NOT to
exist. The 5th Busy Beaver Number is also finite and can also be proven to
exist, a computation to produce the 5th Busy Beaver Number may or may not
exist, nobody knows, and whats more there is no guarantee anybody will ever
know if such a computation exists or not.

*> if taken as true, could explain the appearance of our physical reality,
> that physics itself might be explained from a more fundamental ensemble of
> computations?*


I don't see how it could because nobody has found a way to make a
calculation without using matter or energy; I know typing ASCII characters
onto a computer screen won't work because that is just a list of
instructions to DO something, and matter/energy is the the only thing ever
found that can change, that is to say DO something.

​ ​
John K Clark

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