> On 6 Aug 2018, at 21:11, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > On 8/6/2018 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 6 Aug 2018, at 09:23, agrayson2...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 5:50:56 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com >>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote: >>>> >>>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude >>>> the wave function has only epistemic content. >>> >>> >>> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. >>> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you >>> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply >>> to us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less >>> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, >>> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken >>> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously >>> that idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism. >>> >>> Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do repeated >>> trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is finished. I >>> forget; what is mechanism? AG >>> >>> There is no probability waves. >>> >>> IIUC, the wf has the mathematical form of a wave, of which the amplitude is >>> part of. AG >> >> The point is that it behave also like a wave. Even if I send only one >> particle, the position of the screen is determine by a wave which take into >> account all physical available path. >> >> You have proposed an instrumentalist interpretation, and that is OK if you >> goal is to build microscopic transistor or atomic bombs. Here we try to make >> sense of a theory. The choice is between a non-local guiding potential, the >> relative states or a (magical) collapse, also non local. > > You want to make sense of a theory that is defined by complex valued fields > in a Hilbert space built on spacetime.
In this thread, yes. We just discuss Everett’s QM theory. > You begin by assuming mechanism, Everett assumes it, more or less explicitly. The important idea is that he defines the personal identity by the personal diary of an observer involved in a superposition. > which implicitly replaces everything physical, including the spacetime, with > conscious thoughts which are realized as theorems in arithmetic (or > equivalent computation). Not in this thread, where we discuss QM, not Mechanism. That concerns my critics of Everett, and physicalist metaphysicians. Once we use a measure on computations, we must explain why the quantum computation win the measure on all sigma_1 sentences. That is what I ahem done. > You have not shown how this entails conscious thoughts about a > quasi-classical world, i.e. one in which there appears a shared reality. See my papers for the progress in that direction. The point is that there ara no other ways, and it works up to now. That just means that mechanism is confirmed and not yet refuted, unlike physicalism (when we assume mechanism of course). > So wouldn't it be simpler to just adopt the interpretation of QBism. I just forgot what you mean by that. Can you repeat it? Thanks. > It seems compatible with the idea of a computational substrate, but it > doesn't need to assume one. If you believe in the SWE, you need to believe in elementary arithmetic, and from that you can prove the existence of all computations, and you face the measure problem. > That fact tells me the computational substrate is an independent assumption > that does not follow from QM. There is no computational substrate, as with computationalism there is no notion of substrate which makes sense. Then in today’s QM, all hamiltonian used are computable. Logically, you are right, we can build ad hoc non computable wave function, but using them in a theory of mind is a bit like invoking a miracle. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
