> On 6 Aug 2018, at 22:47, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote: > > > > On Monday, August 6, 2018 at 6:22:45 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 6 Aug 2018, at 09:23, agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 5:50:56 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com >> <http://gmail.com/> wrote: >> >> >> On Sunday, August 5, 2018 at 4:43:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 4 Aug 2018, at 23:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote: >>> >>> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude >>> the wave function has only epistemic content. >> >> >> Then you need to explain how that epistemic content interfere in nature. >> Your idea might make sense, and indeed if we believe in a collapse (as you >> have to do if you believe in QM and that the superposition does not apply to >> us) the idea that consciousness collapse the wave is perhaps the less >> ridiculous idea. That idea has indeed be defended by von Neumann, Wigner, >> and some others. But has been shown to lead to many difficulties when taken >> seriously by Abner Shimony, as well guessed by Wigner itself. Obviously that >> idea would be inconsistent with Mechanism. >> >> Easy to show that consciousness doesn't collapse the wf. Just do repeated >> trials and don't look at the screen until the experiment is finished. I >> forget; what is mechanism? AG >> >> There is no probability waves. >> >> IIUC, the wf has the mathematical form of a wave, of which the amplitude is >> part of. AG > > The point is that it behave also like a wave. Even if I send only one > particle, the position of the screen is determine by a wave which take into > account all physical available path. > > You have proposed an instrumentalist interpretation, and that is OK if you > goal is to build microscopic transistor or atomic bombs. Here we try to make > sense of a theory. The choice is between a non-local guiding potential, the > relative states or a (magical) collapse, also non local. > > > >> >> There is only an amplitude of probability wave, and the weirdness is that we >> have strong indirect evidence that the amplitude of that wave is as >> physically real as the particles that we can observe, because the particle >> location is determined by that wave having interfered like wave usually do. >> In particular, even if send one by one, the particles will never been found >> where the wave interfere destructively, and the pattern on the screen will >> reflect the number of holes, and their disposition. >> >> The fact that the wf gives information about the constructive and >> destructive inference pattern on the screen, say, is within the meaning of >> having an epistemic property. > > Not at all. It is based on inter-observer sharable documentation. The whole > mystery is in the double slit, or all the many-slits elaboration, like the > “joke” of Feynman asking what if we put slit everywhere. >> If you want to claim it has ontic property, you need to define what that >> means. AG > > That it predicts result sharable by many people, who can then repeat the > experience, and see indeed that te arrival or non arrival of one election > depend on the sum of the amplitude of the happening events relative to > sharable device and device plan. > > Epistemic has this property.You haven't distinguished epistemic from ontic.
I did, but perhaps you have other definitions. You might give them for proceeding. > If you want to know what's "real", or ontic, compare an EM wave with a > probability wave. In the former case it can be detected when it passes, say > with an antenna, in the latter case not. The “probability wave” can de detected by the interference fringe. > No device exists that can detect a probability wave when it passes. AG Two slits or an interferometer do that all the time. That is why we postulate the wave to begin with. I really insist that you bought the little book by David Albert “Quantum Mechanics and Experience” (Harvard University Press, 1992). That would be a good base to progress in the discussion. Bruno > > If this contains epistemic (and it does with mechanism), that epistemic part > can share the fact that some happening, and perhaps all, is a sum on > infinitely many virtual path. With mechanism, there might still be too much > parts, but that is testable. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> It is OK to say that probability comes from ignorance, and that the wave >> describe that ignorance, the extraordinary thing is then that this >> ignorance interfere independently of you. >>> So I have embraced the "shut up and calculate" interpretation of the wave >>> function. >> That can be wise. Nobody can enforce the search of the truth. It is >> frustrating because we can’t be sure if we progress toward it or the >> contrary, and it is shocking because truth always beat fictions. >>> I also see a connection between the True Believers of the MWI, and Trump >>> sycophants; they seem immune to simple facts, such as the foolishness of >>> thinking copies of observers can occur, or be created, willy-nilly. AG >> That remark deserves your point and diminish your credibility. It also >> suggests that you are a “True Believer” in something. >> >> Assuming Mechanism in cognitive science, you don’t need quantum mechanics to >> understand that there are infinitely many relative computational states >> corresponding to you here and now emulated by infinitely many universal >> machines. Even without mechanism this is a theorem of arithmetic using only >> Church thesis. With mechanism, we have to derive the “guessable wave" from a >> statistics on those computations, and so we can test Mechanism if it leads >> to more, or less extravaganza than Nature. It fits up to now. So with >> Mechanism, we get the *appearance* of many interfering “worlds”, and this >> without any worlds, from just the natural numbers and the laws of addition >> and multiplication. I will show that with the combinators as it is much >> shorter (but still long) than showing this with the numbers. This is known >> by logicians since the 1930s (I mean that a universal Turing machine is an >> arithmetical object). Computationalism, or Indexical Digital Mechanism >> imposes a Many-Dreams internal interpretation of Arithmetic (or combinator >> theory, or game-of-life theory, … we have to assume only one universal >> machinery). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <>. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
