> On 19 Sep 2018, at 22:18, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 4:17 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >>The state of a Turing machine is matched to a number and always has and > >>always will be matched that very same number forever. Nothing changes. > > > You can say the same for your state here and now. But consciousness is not > > supported by the state, but by the sequence of states, or more exactly, the > > logical relation brought by a universal machine relating those states. > > The logical relationships between those states never changes, not in the time > dimension or in any other dimension, and consciousness, just like > computation, demands change; physics can provide that, mathematics can't.
You invoke your metaphysical hypothesis. That is simply begging the question. Then, you are right, computation needs a notion of change, but not of physical change, which emerge from the notion of relative change already definable in arithmetic. > > >Your critics invalidate any block-view of reality. > > You can't have a block-view of reality or of anything else without a block, > and time is one of the dimensions of that block, and time is the one and only > reason the geometry of that block is Non-Euclidean. In your religion. > > > Are you, like Prigogine, assuming a fundamental time? > > Physicists have tried for decades to develop a Theory Of Everything without > making use of time in any way but have not been very successful. Lee Smolin > in his book "Time Reborn" says the obsession so many physicists have had on > getting rid of time is the reason little progress has been made at finding a > quantum theory of gravity. Brains are certainly not fundamental but are > nevertheless of vital importance to cognition, so if we're just talking about > consciousness it doesn't make any difference if time is ultimately > fundamental or not because nothing is more apparent and important to a > consciousness than time. And don't tell me time is just a illusion because > that explains nothing, a illusion is a perfectly respectable subjective > phenomenon and subjectivity is what we're talking about. With mechanism, we distinguish subjective time, which is given by S4Grz1 (the math of the first person), and physical time, which does seem to be no more than an relative parameter. No problem with your theory, but it contradict your belief in computationalism. > > > > Time is an internal indexical, > > The index never changes, but time does and so does consciousness. > > >>Definitions are a bore . SHOW ME! > > >That is just ridiculous. > > I see. So if I were to define a dragon as a huge fire breathing lizard that > can fly it would be ridiculous of you to dispute my claim that by defining > them I have proven dragons exist. > > > Without agreeing on what is a computation, > > We don't learn by reading definitions, we learn from EXAMPLES. A definition > is made of words and all of those words have there own definitions also made > of words and all of those words have there own definitions also made of words > and [...] > > You seem to be very big on fundamental stuff but if we're talking about > meaning definitions are most certainly NOT fundamental, but examples are. > Where do you suppose lexicographers got the information to write the > definitions in their dictionary? > > So forget definitions, just compute 2+2 without using physics and I will > concede defeat and nominate you for a Nobel Prize. > > >>The trouble with arithmetic is it doesn't change. > > >Nor do a block universe; > > And that is exactly why consciousness can not directly perceive the block > universe and in fact until a century ago nobody was conscious of the idea, > and even today nobody knows if it's a correct view of reality. If you admit it could be correct, and is consistent, then there is no reason to criticise the block-mindscape structure of arithmetic, which emulates all computations (a standard fact known since the 1930s). > At best it's just an approximation, and it can't even approximate what's > going on at the center of a Black Hole or at the instant of the Big Bang. > > >Just ask the copies, they know well what they are living. > > And I predicted that would happen long before the experiment started. That implies the first person indeterminacy. > > > Wat I request is that you tell me what the H-guy can expect to live > > And what I request of you You avoid answering. > is far far easier than a prediction, all I want you to do is go somewhere > look around and tell me what you see. > Just answer the following question: "After the experiment is completed and > the 1 H-guy became 2 H-guys what 1 and only 1 city did the H-guy end up in?” That is like building the confusion between first and third person view, to makes the question not answerable. > . If you can't answer that then it was not a experiment No. It means that the H-guy (if he survives, which is the case assuming computationalism) cannot predict the particular outcome he will feel to live. Both copies confirms this, which makes the case if you look at the definition of first person given. > and it was not even a question, it was just a series of words with a question > mark at the end. > > > You have already said that the H-guy survives [...] > > I can make all sorts of statements about the H-guy because I know exactly > what I mean by "the H-guy", but you have no idea what you mean by "the H-guy”. Peremptory gratuitous affirmation. We have agreed since day one what we mean by the H-guy. > > >> I predicted the guy who saw Moscow would become the Moscow guy and the guy > >> who saw Washington would become the Washington guy, > > >Sure, but that is tautological. > > Exactly! Seeing Moscow is the one and only reason the Helsinki man became the > Moscow man. So why did I see Moscow? Because I'm the Moscow man. But he is also the H-guy. Like the Washington man is also the H-guy. So this illustrates the first person indeterminacy. > Why am I the Moscow man? Because I saw Moscow. Trivially. The reason is more, because I was the H-guy, and decided to push the button, and computatioanlism predict that I will see either Moscow or Washington, and I see now that I am the one seeing Moscow. It is the same basic reason why you see a dead cat, or a cat alive, when looking at Schroedinger cat. > That may not be deep but like all tautologies it's true, and I remind you > it's your thought "experiment" not mine. > > >The prediction is on which guy you can expect to be, > > Which guy who can expect to be? Bruno is unable to say what the ASCII > sequence y-o-u means in the above sentence and that's why Bruno is so fond of > personal pronouns, when people duplicating machines are involved they help > cover up the gaping holes in logic. I don’t see any argument here. > > > from the 1p, after pushing the button, with will admit that the symmetry > is broken, and this in a way they were unable to predict with certainty in > Helsinki. > > Unable to predict exactly what in Helsinki? The unique city that both H-guys will see. What they will write in the diary. If you say he will see both city, that is correct in the 3-1 (and indeed is part of computationlism + that protocol), but does not answer the question, which is: I will with probability 1 see only once city, and it could be W, or M. > > >>Regardless of if X stands for a banana or one of the 7.5 billion "the first > >>persons" on the Earth at the current time, if X becomes 2 X it's brain dead > >>dumb to ask what one and only one thing will happen to X. > > > That is refuted by both copies, > > Wonderfull! So both copies agree on the name of the one and only one city the > Helsinki Man ended up in! Yes indeed. One says it is W, the other says it M, and both agree that this well one and only one city. > So which ONE did it turn out to be, Washington OR Moscow? For one copy it is W, and he could not have predicted. For the other it is M, and he could not have predicted. The pronouns are not ambiguous. Only the destination is unpredictable. > > >>you have demanded over and over for years the name of one and only one city. > > >Yes. > > But even after the "exparament" is over you STILL don't know that one and > only one city name so you have no way of knowing if my prediction was correct > or not. That is why there is an indeterminacy. > And if you know before you start you will learn nothing from an experiment > what's the point of performing the experiment? Yes, that is why the H-guy cannot make a definite prediction. Again, all your arguments illustrate the first person indeterminacy. You were the one saying that there is no indeterminacy, so it is you who knows the answer in advance. > > >>The prediction can never be correct, > > >Good. > > The prediction can't be incorrect either. If you predict W, it is incorrect, as it is refuted by the M. Man. Children can understand that the only possible correct prediction is W v M. > and only one thing has that property, gibberish. A burp is neither true or > untrue because it's not a statement, it's just a burp. > > >>and doing the "experiment" and then just looking won't help figure out what > >>the correct answer turned out to be because you have no idea what the > >>question was or what you're trying to predict. > > >False. > > If it's false then just look and tell me if the answer turned out to be > Washington or Moscow. What are you waiting for, let's hear it! The prediction is on the first person experience, so the only way to get the answer is by looking up the diaries. You keep up placing a 3p in front of the answer, but that only avoid the question. Take the iterated case, with n large. It can be shown that most personal histories of the subjects will be random, and that only a set of measure null will contain definite correct predictions. > > >>And I don't even understand why you're so obsessed with prediction when > >>that has nothing to do with our sense of self, we get that by looking into > >>the past and a good thing too because nobody can look into the future. > > > This you will probably need step 4, 5, … to grasp. > > And I will probably never read step 4 because you will probably never repair > the ridiculous blunder you made in step 3. If there were a blunder, you would show it, and you would avoid the insults. > > >When you say that the H-man will see both cities, do you mean that he will > >see both cities at once. > > I can't answer your question until I know what the referent to the personal > pronoun "he" in the above is. Obviously, the context says that it is the H-guy. The one who will, for a third person observer, survives in both cities, bit, obviously, from its first person view, will survive only in one city, that NO third person observer can predict without making one of them into a zombie. You ask me to answer a 1p-answer in a 3p-way. That is just impossible, without doing the 1/3 confusion. > I'm pretty sure it doesn't refer to anybody who remembers being the Helsinki > Man Of course it does. The H-guy, you have agreed, survives in both city. But in Both city, he feel to be in one city, that he could not have predicted in advance in Helsinki. > but other than that I have no idea what one and only one thing you mean by > "he”, Then you make both H-guy into zombie. That is why you did say that the H-guy died, until you realise that this would contradict Digital Mechanism. It is so obvious you just want me to be crackpot, but by attacking the most easy part, even accepted by all my opponents (except Chalmers who probably did not know that this was not a problem). My opponents have different lies for different people. > if this were everyday life I'd know but this is very far from everyday life > because "he" duplicating machines are involved. Don’t put artificial difficulties where there ara none. We have agreed to all terms, the hypothesis and the means of reasoning. > > >>Which one of the two "1-views themselves" do you want to know about? If you > >>say "both" you can't still demand one and only one answer unless logic > >>means nothing to you. Don't you think the fact that you can't answer the > >>question even AFTER the “experiment" > > >Both can. The point is that they give different and of course incompatible > >answer. > > So there are 2 answers to the the question that you demand one and only one > answer to, and the 2 answers are incomparable. Yes. That is just obvious, as the first person does not feel the split. Bruno > There is only one sort of question that has that property, a gibberish > question. > > John K Clark > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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