> On 29 Sep 2018, at 11:22, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote: > > > > On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 8:57:54 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 29 Sep 2018, at 09:16, agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 6:40:05 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 18:37, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com >>>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote: >>>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about >>>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis: >>>> f >>>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences >>>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the >>>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures. >>>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse >>>> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide >>>> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc. >>>> >>>> What are your thoughts. >>>> >>>> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example >>>> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if >>>> you know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical >>>> reality. >>> >>> >>> With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a >>> (primitive/irreducible) physical reality. >>> >>> You are begging the question. >>> >>> In what way? The MUH says, for example, that for every mathematical >>> solution or equation, there is a (perceived) physical universe mapped >>> identically from, or into that solution or equation. I gave a simple >>> counter example. AG >> >> If that is the MUH, then that it is plainly ridiculous, indeed. To have a >> perceived universe, you need a measure on the computation/sigma-sentences. >> The physical emerges from an arithmetical phenomenon (assuming mechanism in >> cognitive science). >> >> The version of mathematicalism implied by mechanism does not lead any choice >> for the “physical reality”, it has to be a statistic on computations >> structured by the “observable” mode of self-reference. That indeed predicts >> quantum logic, and the many “histories” interpretation of arithmetic. Oracle >> are not impossible, but there are no evidence for them, and should be >> invoked in last resort (a bit like the “Alien” in cosmology). >> >> The empirical evidence is that there is no physical universe at all. >> >> Bruno >> >> This double-talk nonsense IMO. I clearly gave a counter-example to the MUH, > > > You want make some mathematical object physical real. That assume some > physical reality, which cannot be done. > > This is the MUH, not what I want or believe. AG > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis > > Tegmark's MUH is: Our external physical reality is a mathematical > structure.[3] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis#cite_note-Tegmark2008-3> > That is, the physical universe is not merely described by mathematics, but > is mathematics (specifically, a mathematical structure > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_structure>). Mathematical > existence equals physical existence, and all structures that exist > mathematically exist physically as well. Observers, including humans, are > "self-aware substructures (SASs)". In any mathematical structure complex > enough to contain such substructures, they "will subjectively perceive > themselves as existing in a physically 'real' world".[4] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis#cite_note-4>
That is refuted by the mechanist hypothesis and its consequence, although it is less wrong that materialism, it fails to see that the physical is phenomenological. I have developed this with more details a long time ago in this list. The shorter way to understand this is to study my papers. To equate mathematical existence with physical existence does not make any sense, and might be unfair to Tegmark (but his view have evolved, so I am not sure). That wiki entry is bad, but I would prefer people argue instead of relying on links, which distracts and add obscurity more than adding light. I have not the time, but I could criticised each line of that entry. Perhaps the main critics is that the “mathematical universe hypothesis” is not an hypothesis, nor a speculation. It is the material hypothesis which is the speculation here, as no-one has ever found the slightest experimental evidence for matter, in the ontological sense. Nothing makes sense in that wiki page. > > > To say that a mathematical object exist physically, does not make sense. It > starts with a category error. > > I don't think you know what the MUH is. I have falsified it. AG Good me too. But with mechanism, the material hypothesis, and/or physicalism, is/are falsified too. Bruno > > No mathematical object can be a physical object. But what remains possible is > that a physical object belongs to the dream of a person supported by > (infinity) of computation (which are arithmetical object a priori). > > > > > >> falsifying it. Moreover, I explained clearly why I used "perceived". I just >> meant that plane waves can never be observed, > > > You don’t need to go that far. The numbers 0, 1, 2, … cannot be observed. No > mathematical object can be observed. They do not belong to the category of > what can be observed. > > Now, an observation might be explained by a sort of arithmetical > prestidigitation. Some numbers can make some numbers believing in a lot of > things. > > > >> and since they are solutions to Maxwell's equations, the MUH is false. > > > The MUH is only the idea that the physical might be a part of the > mathematical. Not that mathematical things have to exist physically. > > Tp put it simply, mathematicalism is the idea that there is no physical > universe at all. > > There is no time, no space, no energy, those are just Löbian machine's > elaborate fiction to figure out our indexical local geography. > > Look at a experimental physicist. He measured numbers, and infer relation > between numbers, and then avoid the qualia:consciousness question, which > indeed is only “physical” in string version of materialism, which requires > the brain and body to be infinite entities. > > To refute mathematicalism, you need a theory of matter giving an observable > role to some infinite entities, having secondary observable consequence. > Mechanism is a bit like that: if the physics deducible from mechanism is > different from what we observe, that might be used to infer such infinite > entities, but the preliminary results, and QM, does not go in that direction. > > > > >> Deal with that directly and stop with the double talk about the >> non-existence of the physical universe. That's not even an issue, since I am >> only dealing with what can be observed. AG > > > If you take “observation” as a criteria of reality, you assume right at the > start the theology of Aristotle. > > I just say that this is incompatible with the idea that a brain is Turing > emulable. > > Study the sane04 paper, which explain all this, and ask question if something > is unclear. > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> >>> >>> Since the antic dream argument, we know that observation cannot be used to >>> prove that anything exist, but an observer. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>>> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> Regards >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> >>> >>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com >>>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote: >>>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about >>>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis: >>>> f >>>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences >>>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the >>>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures. >>>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse >>>> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide >>>> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc. >>>> >>>> What are your thoughts. >>>> >>>> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example >>>> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if >>>> you know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical >>>> reality. >>> >>> >>> With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a >>> (primitive/irreducible) physical reality. >>> >>> You are begging the question. >>> >>> Since the antic dream argument, we know that observation cannot be used to >>> prove that anything exist, but an observer. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>>> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG >>>> >>>> >>>> Regards >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <>. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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