> On 29 Sep 2018, at 13:34, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote: > > > > On Saturday, September 29, 2018 at 7:16:41 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 28 Sep 2018, at 21:00, agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 6:49:37 PM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com >> <http://gmail.com/> wrote: >> >> Thank you everybody for your responses. >> >> Bruno Marchal I looked at your statement, they are very interesting but some >> very good neruoscientists argue that brain is not like computer >> Here for example (4min video) Edelman: >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmyfQY4TaVc >> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmyfQY4TaVc> >> >> The question can be turned around. Why would anyone think a brain is >> strongly comparable or identical to a computer? It has some superficial >> similarities such as being able to store memory and logical functions (which >> are simulated by a computer), but its cells are not two state systems like >> computer transistors. AG > > > A bacteria is already a computer (at least), > > > Really? Then you should be able to identify the entities that store binary > information.
By computer I mean a number u such that phi_u(<x,y>) = phi_x(y), for some enumeration phi_i of the partial computable function. No need of binary information. But it needs digitally coded information, and that is given by the genome (the sequence of adenine, thymine, cytosine, guanine (French spelling, sorry). > And where is the clock which pulses and advances the instruction pointer? And > where is the instruction pointer located? AG Dont confuse a computer (universal number, universal Turing machine, …) and a von Neumann physical computer. Reread my explanation in the thread “why is Church’s thesis a miracle). Ask me question from there. Bruno > > and a neurone is already a rather sophisticated society of bacteria and > viruses, plausibly enough. So, a society of billions of neurons should not be > compared to transistors. The substitution level is plausibly much lower than > the level of neurons. > > But we don’t know in Nature anything which at some level is not emulable by a > computer, except for controversial notion like > > A) primary matter (if that exists, it is not emulable by a computer) > B) the reduction of the wave packet (if that exists, it is provably not > emulable by a computer). > > But there are no evidence neither for A) nor for B). > > Bruno > > > > > > >> >> Please give me your thought on that. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
