> On 29 Oct 2018, at 11:38, Tomas Pales <litewav...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 10:35:39 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 28 Oct 2018, at 16:16, Tomas Pales <litew...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 3:37:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 21:33, Tomas Pales <litew...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary >>> assumption. >>> >>> My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical consistency. >> >> Logical consistency is an attribute of theories, or some class of chatty >> machines. I do not understand what you mean. >> >> I mean that an object exists iff it is consistently defined. In other words, >> it is identical to itself. It is what it is and is not what it is not. > > > An objet cannot be inconsistent. Its existence can be inconsistent in this or > that theory. > > An object can be inconsistent in the sense that it can be inconsistently > defined
Any object can be inconsistently defined. I can define the moon by the set of squared circles. > - and this I mean in the absolute sense, regardless of theory: an object that > is not identical to itself is inconsistent in any theory. Such an object > cannot exist. All other objects can exist somewhere. You are not using the (logical) terms in their standard meaning. It is hard to follow. I don’t undersetand what you mean by object. > >> But by assuming fewer objects (only finite natural numbers) you assume more >> principles: in addition to the principle of consistency you assume the >> axioms of finite arithmetic, to restrict the number of consistent objects to >> finite natural numbers. This restriction seems arbitrary; why would only >> finite natural numbers exist when it is possible that also other objects >> exist? > > > Because finite numbers can be shown to have infinite hallucinations, > especially when they mess with other finite numbers. And that leads to a > testable theology, which includes an explanation of where both quanta and > qualia comes from. Then assuming more than that in the ontology, introduces > unnecessary difficulties, probably inconsistency or deflation of predictions. > (Usually called white rabbit in this list (and in my long version thesis). > > I understand that not restricting ontology to finite arithmetic can be > impractical or can contain objects whose consistency we cannot confirm. But > reality doesn't seem to care whether we find it practical or whether we can > confirm its consistency. We need to bet on some reality. A (reasonable) theory is consistent if and only if it admits a model/reality. The problem of the ontology is not a practical problem. With mechanism, the axiom of infinity leads to an inflation of predictions, which is not what we are experiencing. Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
