> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>>>>
>>>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that
>>>> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement
>>>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which
>>>> behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and
>>>> it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter
>>>> is “magical”.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter),
>>>> then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves
>>>> intelligently.
>>>
>>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a
>>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing
>>> complete.
>>>
>>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this
>>> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought
>>>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>>>
>>>
>>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing
>>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random
>>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations
>>> run us, if I may say.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>>>
>>> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails
>>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for
>>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic
>>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
>>>
>>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense
>>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing
>>> sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely
>>> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to
>>> computation. [
>>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>>
>>> <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf>
>>> ]).
>>>
>>>
>>> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is
>>> non-Turing.
>>>
>>> This new article may be of interest:
>>>
>>>
>>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not
>>> just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them,
>>> too"
>>> ]
>>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>>
>>> <https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity>
>>> ]
>>
>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably
>> inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a
>> product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without
>> adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t
>> see any evidence for such a move.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject
>> of
>>
>> Galileo's Error
>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>>
>> by Philip Goff
>> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>
>
>
> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but
> present the idea and use it.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is no
>> evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of matter
>> (the subject of science).
>
> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and
> then infer relation between those measurable numbers.
>
>
> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume
> matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and of mind,
> which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it experimentally,
> which is not a good sign.
>
> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid assuming
> it when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside some
> primary matter. (I am the skeptical here).
>
> When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without
> empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving
> problems (that can prevent science).
>
> I claim no truth, I just show that we can test experimentally between
> mechanism and materialism (shown incompatible), and that the current
> evidences favour mechanism. I give the means to test if there is more than
> numbers, and the test not only found nothing, but found what we need to
> explain the appearances without doing an ontological commitment.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> "physicists measure numbers" isn't the case from the perspective of "numbers
> do not exist”.
OK.
But “numbers do not exist” makes immediately computaionalism (digital
mechanism) false or senseless.
> - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/
> (Numbers belong to a Platonic realm. They do not exist in nature.)
I agree. That is somehow justifiable with mechanism: if nature is ontological,
numbers have to be higher order mental pattern, and mental has to be physical.
But of course this makes Mechanism wrong.
>
> Physicists make instruments and get readings from them which they record in a
> language of "numbers".
>
> I don't know if we need matter that hypercomputes (like the hypothetical
> black hole computer) , or
> 1. higher-order computing (computations with infinite objects [
> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
> ])
> 2. experience processing (programming with experiential semantics [
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ ]).
> are enough.
I don’t know either, but what I do know is that IF mechanism is true, we have
to explain matter and nature from the universal numbers’ “hallucination” in
arithmetic. And that works enough well to get already a quantum logical
structure on the observable, so it might be worth to continue the testing.
Bruno
>
> - pt
>
>
>
>
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