> On 22 Apr 2019, at 23:34, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, 23 April 2019 00:20:49 UTC+3, Brent wrote: > > Actually it will work just like the car you replicated. So why won't the > replicated driver work just like the driver? > > No, it won't. Because you need the driver to set it in motion. > > That's not what you said. You said "There are special relations in the > brain through which consciousness can act upon the world. You cannot copy > those relations, since they are not material." So now you say there are > special relations in a brain that doesn't exist. But you don't know what > they are. > > There is no brain.
When using “is” or “exist”, people should make clear is they talk on ontological existence (what we assume to exist at the start) and phenomenological existence. With mechanism, there is no brain in the ontology, but there are still brains and atoms in the first person plural view of all universal number. Now, to assume consciousness being primary is no more explanative than assuming matter, or some god. It is an abandon of trying to explain, which always assumes as few things as possible. With mechanism, not only we get a web-of-dreams structure in arithmetic, but we get already an explanation of the quantum aspect of reality, so we get a confirmation of a theory of consciousness (or theology). Bruno > > So they are memories that can never be remembered. > > They can be remembered if the relations are re-established. Like these mice > cured of Alzheimer that started to remember: > > https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-12-experimental-alzheimer-drug-memory-mice.html > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
