On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 6:04 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:02 AM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute the idea >> that you could put a finite program in your friend's head and you wouldn't >> not be able to tell the difference? >> >> >>> I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be defined as a >>> finitely describable TM. >>> >> >> If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person you mean >> mind, this is the assumption of the computational theory of mind. >> > > That is the claim that is in dispute; Goedel and Turing find it unproven > at best. > No one is claiming computationalism is proven. But in any event, CT implies minimally "weak AI", which is all my thought experiment requires. > > >> And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to model a person, >>> physics says it will be entangled with the environment and effectively >>> random at a low level. Even Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is >>> not TM emulable. >>> >> >> Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints of the >> apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is subjective, not >> objective). >> > > That is idea stems from a confusion in your (Bruno's) definition of first > person and third person views. In Bruno's person-duplication thought > experiments, there is a distinction between 1p and 3p that makes sense in > that context. But this does not carry over to QM, where there is no > viewpoint that sees fully unitary quantum evolution. > Though we cannot observe each of the states from the vantage point of any single branch, we can infer their existence as the only viable explanation for how quantum computers work. The third person view is then an element of our theory, like the inside of blackholes (unseen yet every bit as part of the reality implied by the theory as what we can see). > Bruno seeks to avoid this fact this by defining a first person-plural > (1pp) point of view. But that is just another name for what is normally > considered the third person perspective. Changing the name does not change > the substance..... The randomness of QM is third person and objective. > It's first-person shareable, like the realities shared by the scientist and assistant in Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment, where the scientist uses a quantum-triggered bomb vest instead of a gun. > > When it comes to replicating the behaviors of a close friend, these >> concern objective out-wardly visible objective behaviors, rather than the >> first person experience of your friend. >> > > This is either badly worded, or you are agreeing that the outward > objective behaviours of your friend are 3p in the usual sense, > I am. and influenced by the randomness of QM. > This is irrelevant to my argument. > Likewise, the first person experiences of your friend follow one path of > the quantum branching -- we do not experience all branches of the MWI > simultaneously. Your arguments against the conclusion of Goedel and Turing > have no merit. > > I don't know what the above is in reference to. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
