On 5/6/2019 8:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 6:04 PM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com
<mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
On Tue, May 7, 2019 at 7:02 AM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com
<mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:41 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List <everything-list@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
I am not following where this point is going. Do you dispute
the idea that you could put a finite program in your friend's
head and you wouldn't not be able to tell the difference?
I was just reacting to you statement that a person can be
defined as a finitely describable TM.
If by person you mean body, then perhaps not. But if by person
you mean mind, this is the assumption of the computational
theory of mind.
That is the claim that is in dispute; Goedel and Turing find it
unproven at best.
No one is claiming computationalism is proven. But in any event, CT
implies minimally "weak AI", which is all my thought experiment requires.
And there is also the point that whatever TM you use to
model a person, physics says it will be entangled with the
environment and effectively random at a low level. Even
Bruno agrees that the physics of the world is not TM emulable.
Quantum physics is emulable. It's the first person viewpoints
of the apparent randomness are not. (but this randomness is
subjective, not objective).
That is idea stems from a confusion in your (Bruno's) definition
of first person and third person views. In Bruno's
person-duplication thought experiments, there is a distinction
between 1p and 3p that makes sense in that context. But this does
not carry over to QM, where there is no viewpoint that sees fully
unitary quantum evolution.
Though we cannot observe each of the states from the vantage point of
any single branch, we can infer their existence as the only viable
explanation for how quantum computers work.
Not at all. In fact a quantum computation only works because all the
wrong answers have a high probability of being eliminated by destructive
interference...which requires that they be computed in the same world.
The third person view is then an element of our theory, like the
inside of blackholes (unseen yet every bit as part of the reality
implied by the theory as what we can see).
And yet nobody thinks there is actually a singularity at the center of
black hole. We recognize that infinities are not physical.
Bruno seeks to avoid this fact this by defining a first
person-plural (1pp) point of view. But that is just another name
for what is normally considered the third person perspective.
Changing the name does not change the substance..... The
randomness of QM is third person and objective.
It's first-person shareable, like the realities shared by the
scientist and assistant in Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment, where
the scientist uses a quantum-triggered bomb vest instead of a gun.
So do you believe Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment implies
immortality? Have you read Wilson's "Divided by Infinity"?
Brent
When it comes to replicating the behaviors of a close
friend, these concern objective out-wardly visible objective
behaviors, rather than the first person experience of your friend.
This is either badly worded, or you are agreeing that the outward
objective behaviours of your friend are 3p in the usual sense,
I am.
and influenced by the randomness of QM.
This is irrelevant to my argument.
Likewise, the first person experiences of your friend follow one
path of the quantum branching -- we do not experience all branches
of the MWI simultaneously. Your arguments against the conclusion
of Goedel and Turing have no merit.
I don't know what the above is in reference to.
Jason
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