> On 18 Jun 2019, at 15:44, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 6:51 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> 
> >> Me? I'm the one that needs to explains what "physical reality" means??!!  
> >> I don't know what it means Bruno, it's your term not mine, that's why I 
> >> wanted you to answer the above question so I could get some idea what you 
> >> mean by it. 
> 
> > You are the one invoking it to say that some computations are real, and 
> > other are not.
> 
> And I gave a specific example of what I meant long ago,

I debunked it. You were begging the question, assuming implicitly the existence 
of an irreducible physical reality.




> I now ask you to do the same. I said if the thing you call a "calculation" 
> was physically real them INTEL was a fool for messing around with silicon and 
> if it was not physically real then they were not fools and the company is 
> unlikely to go out if business anytime soon. So I ask you again: If there was 
> a "physical reality" how would things be different if there was not a 
> "physical reality”?

With mechanism, if there is a *primitive physical reality* things would be like 
if 0 = 1. 




> 
> > If we both agree that such a notion does not make sense, then stop invoking 
> > it.
> 
> Does that mean you will stop talking about "physicalism " and "materialism" 
> and "primary matter" and "physical reality”?

We need to take about the things we prove to make no sense, of course. You 
can’t avoid mentioning unicorn, if your goal consistes in showing that there is 
no unicorn.




> And I sure wish you'd stop talking about "machines " when the only example of 
> one you can come up with is a few lines of ASCII characters.


You confuse mathematical object and their syntactical description.



> 
> > You talk like if you new the truth. Of course Mechanism *is* an assumption.
> 
> See that's the trouble with you. Even on the rare occasions when you do give 
> a clear concise definition you don't stick with it, there is no consistency 
> in your definitions. You said Mechanism is the belief that "we can survive a 
> digital brain transplant operation ", but there is no assumption involved in 
> that, we know with as much certainty as we know anything that we can survive 
> that because we already have,  as I said 3 posts ago: " I know for a fact I 
> have survived from the day I was born to today, and every day since I was 
> born I have been undergoing a brain transplant operation, atoms are 
> constantly shifting out of my brain and new atoms shifting in to replace 
> them. My brain is made out of last year's mashed potatoes.”  

That OK FAPP. But when we do metaphysics seriously, even the idea that we can 
derive B from A & B has to be assumed. We put all the cards on the table in 
those hot and complex subject.



> 
> I suppose if you wanted to be perverse you could say I have not survived and 
> have in fact died every day since I was born, but then all you've done is 
> redefine the word "death" to mean something trivial and I don't care if I 
> "die" if that's what it means. When I use the word "die" I mean oblivion, and 
> I stick with my definitions.  
> 
> >>But I still don't know if I believe in something you call "physicalism" 
> >>because you can't explain how it would make any difference if it were true 
> >>of not.
> 
> > What are you missing in may explanation?
> 
> Explanation? I heard a lot of bafflegab but no examples and you never 
> answered my very reasonable question:  How would a world where "physicalism" 
> is true differ from a world where "physicalism" is not true? Until you answer 
> that question I won't know what you mean by the word.


It would be an inconsistent reality, with no laws at all.



>  
> > Did you not pay for cryogenic of your head after death?
> 
> Yes I payed $80,000, unlike some people I put my money where my mouth is.
>  
> > That is like saying “yes” to the doctor, indeed a future unknown doctor.
> 
> True.
>  
> > All of transhumanism is based on the Mechanist hypothesis or act of 
> > faith/hope.
> 
> The act of faith/hope does not involve the general principle but the specific 
> implementation. Will I really be frozen very soon after my death? As my brain 
> is slowly brought down to liquid nitrogen temperatures will the inevitable 
> fluid currents in it be laminar or chaotic? Will my brain really remain at 
> liquid Nitrogen temperatures until Drexler style nanotechnology is developed? 
> Will anybody in the distant future think I'm worth the bother of reviving? I 
> don't know the answers to any of these questions and if the answer is no to 
> even one of them then I'm dead, but I won't be any deader than if I was not 
> frozen at all.

Yes, there are many assumption, but that include the truth of mechanism, 
arithmetic., etc. This is not necessary FAPP, but we have to be totally clear 
in the theories, as much as logic permits.




> 
> > With mechanism, given your brain to a digitalist surgeon, without 
> > precaution,  is like sending all your password on the net. If ever 
> > mechanism is practised some day, most people will pay a lot to assure some 
> > quantum security so that they don’t take the risk to be copied and to wake 
> > up in the dungeon of some sadistic individuals …
> 
> When you have surgery to fix an ingrown toenail you undergo general 
> anesthesia and are unable to defend yourself,  you could be kidnapped and 
> wake up in the dungeon of a sadistic surgeon. It could happen but it probably 
> won't , however that would be a far easier way to get people to torture than 
> to repair and revive a brain frozen 100 years previously with primitive 
> technology.
> 
> If somebody goes to the trouble of reviving me I will be unable to give them 
> anything of value in return, the only reason they'd do it is because they are 
> benevolent. It's a long shot I know but I figure a slim chance is better than 
> no chance at all.
> 
> And besides, if Everett's Many World's is true then some version of you 
> definitely will wake up in the dungeon of some sadistic individual regardless 
> of if you're frozen or not.

Yes, but we have partial control, and change the probabilities. Even in 
Everett, use the stairs is more secure than jumping out of the window.




> But if Everett is right why do I bother to get frozen at all? Because 
> although Many Worlds is my favorite quantum interpretation I wouldn't bet my 
> life on it.

That is reasonable. 

Bruno 


> 
> John K Clark
> 
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