> On 6 Jul 2019, at 13:32, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, July 6, 2019 at 1:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 6 Jul 2019, at 05:57, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, July 5, 2019 at 9:27:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 4 Jul 2019, at 10:57, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, July 4, 2019 at 3:31:27 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> > On 3 Jul 2019, at 19:54, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> > <everyth...@googlegroups.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> > You may be able to access your subjective time, but does it provide a >>> > measure...and if so what is it? >>> >>> >>> >>> We get three candidates for the logic of the measure one, given by the >>> logic of the intensional variant of G ([]p): >>> >>> []p & p >>> []p & <>t >>> []p & <>t & p >>> >>> With “[]” = Gödel’s beweisbar, and p is any sigma_1 arithmetical sentences >>> (it models the Universal dovetailing). >>> >>> If that logic verifies some technical condition (described by Von Neuman in >>> some papers), the logic should provides the entire probability calculus, as >>> it has to do if Mechanism is correct. >>> >>> G and G* splits both []p & <>t and []p & <>t & p. So we get 5 logics, but >>> normally, only the starred logic should provides the measure, because it >>> depends on the true structure made by the 1p experiences, and not the >>> experienced experiences. Our future depends non locally of all our existing >>> “preparation” or “reconstitution” that exists in the (sigma_1) arithmetic >>> (the universal dovetailer). >>> >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If that above is a correct experientiality logic, then what would be a >>> 'machine' -- defined in terms of physics (or chemistry or biology) -- to >>> execute it? >>> >>> We know one 'machine' exists: our brain. But what machine is that? >> >> >> >> That’s a very good question, but not an easy one, especially if you are not >> familiar with the “universal dovetailer argument” and our >> self-multiplication in arithmetic. >> >> The brain exist phenomenologically, and it is not a machine, even if it is >> something which supports computation. In fact it is the same for a computer. >> >> You could say that a brain or a computer is a digital machine (supporting >> our computation), but that it is itself supported by an infinity of >> computations. Intuitively (accepting classical quantum physics momentarily) >> a piece of matter is a map of all the realities you will access if you >> attempt to figure out some aspect of those sub-level computations. You can >> imagine that there is one computation for each possible position (and >> momentum) of each electron in that piece of matter, and the electron itself >> is a complicated invariant of some possible field. But the multiplication >> can be triggered by the observation, by some alien, even far away, of its >> own piece of matter. Such a multiplication is contaminated by the alien to >> you, at the speed of light (or below) assuming again the physics of today >> (which we seem to recover until now). >> >> It is certainly hard to imagine: a brain our a physical computer is made up >> of the histories we can share, and which are supported by the infinitely >> many computations (which are run in Arithmetic) with more details than we >> need to have our computational state. >> An image would be that a piece of matter is made of those computations, but >> that is still a misleading metaphor, as matter is not something made of >> anything, but is more like a qualia (a first person notion), which we can >> share among locally independent universal machine. >> >> I can argue, that both intuitively (with some many-world account of QM) and >> formally (using the self-reference logics and the quantum logical formalism) >> that nature confirms this (with some degree), but that will not help, QM >> itself does not admit simple interpretation, and there is no unanimity of >> how to interpret it. Mechanism makes this both more simple (the many >> computations are easy to study), and more complex, because the internal >> views are based on incompleteness which is rather counter-intuitive too. >> >> It is exactly what I am searching: what is matter when we understand that >> the physical reality is more like an infinity of computer simulation >> interfering statistically? The math, a bit like with the current physical >> theories, can only give epistemic observable and predictions rules, and that >> is how we can test mechanism experimentally. Matter conceived as something >> made of tiny particles is a concept that we need to abandon: they are >> abstract feature introduce by ourself when we look at things, but with a >> very general notion of ourself (all universal machines in arithmetic). The >> math suggest that the “bottom” of the physical reality is a highly >> symmetrical structure which is highly not symmetrical from the perspective >> of the average universal number in arithmetic. >> >> I hope this helps. I will make a glossary which should add more help, soon >> or a bit later, >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> The Kantian perspective is >> >> logic-of-X ≠ X-in-itself >> >> -- which is noumena, or matter. >> >> All our conceptions of the world are prisoners of our logic (languages). > > That is a good reason to make clear which logic we are using. The use of the > classical (usual) Church-Turing thesis means that we use classical logic in > the base Turing-universal ontology . We need that a program, when enacted (on > some input, or not) will either stop, or not stop, independently of us > knowing which is the case. > Then the phenomenologies (which emerges from incompleteness) get their own > logic (intuitionist for the first person) and quantum for the material > self-modes. > > Cf: > > p, > []p > []p & p first person mode > []p & <>t material mode > []p & <>t & p. Material and first person mode > > Bruno > > > > > > Whatever logic it is, its semantics (of a theory in that logic) is the > elephant in the room. > > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_of_logic > - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory> > e.g. Whereas universal algebra provides the semantics for a signature, logic > provides the syntax. > - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/model-theory/ > > Semantics is the wild, wild west of logic.
You might try to make a point, perhaps. Semantic is obviously very important. Logic can be divided in three chapters: - theory of theories and proofs (cf Gödel) - semantics (Model theory) (cf Lowenheim, Skolem and Tarski, Mostowski, …) - the relation between, theories and models, that is the study of (all) theories and all their semantics, usually through completeness and incompleteness theorems. Semantic is the heart of “modern logic”. I do avoid using it here to much, because it is quickly rather technical. I hope people have some idea that the structure (N, 0, +, *) (which is the set N with the usual standard interpretation of + and *) is a model of both RA and PA. I might say a bit more in the glossary I am preparing. All “rich” theories have infinitely many non isomorphic models, and by incompleteness no theories at all can study its own semantics, but some theories can still say a lot about it, like its own incompleteness. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/35e27240-6b10-4658-94ce-92ee435116a6%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/35e27240-6b10-4658-94ce-92ee435116a6%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AD2C6DD3-1305-4453-9CCB-99A76428283F%40ulb.ac.be.
