> On 20 Jul 2019, at 13:26, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, July 20, 2019 at 2:58:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 19 Jul 2019, at 14:40, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:28:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> ... >> >> By assuming the existence of (primary) Matter, you lose the possibility to >> explain it, and you loss the mean to use the mechanist theory of mind, >> without providing a conceptually clear non-mechanist theory of mind. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> If a mathematical/logical theory can explain experience (the catchall for >> consciousness, selfness, qualia, etc.) then that is that and we an all go >> home. > > The experience is explained in the CTM. It is a semantical fixed point. It > explains why machine will introduce a word to describe a truth that they know > but cannot prove to others or even define in any 3p way. > > > > >> >> (If we didn't have experience, then we wouldn't be worrying about in the >> first place!) >> >> But if it can't, then it is something itself needs a home, and that home is >> matter, > > But the whole point is that it can. Machines have already a quite rich theory > of consciousness, and even God when taken in the original large sense (not in > the fairy tales sense which is con artistry). > > Bruno > > >> >> (Unless experiences are ghosts from an immaterial realm.) > > > The "machinist" approach to (theory of) consciousness is the one taken at > MIRI and CSAIL/MIT, with higher-order (modal) programming language theory, > theorem provers, and fixed-point (monadic) semantics. > > I think it's ultimately incomplete.
But even on elementary arithmetic (and still less on anything less elementary) all effective theories are incomplete. Incompleteness is rather reassuring, as it play a role for making the machine able to refute a large class of reductionist conception (on machine and numbers). Bruno > > @philiptrhift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ab46777f-d052-4d52-b723-16745d728641%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ab46777f-d052-4d52-b723-16745d728641%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/86B7842E-018F-445F-A2CD-B3146B52EFF9%40ulb.ac.be.
