> On 30 Jul 2019, at 15:06, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 4:36 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >> definitions can't compute, not even official definitions. Only physical > >> machines can compute. > > > It is just plain obvious that a definition cannot compute. > > Yes it is utterly obvious, and yet about every third word in your posts about > the nature of computing is "definition", "theory" or "proof" even though none > of those things can compute.
But I did try to explain you that you are confusing “definition”, “theory”” or “proof”, which are syntactical finite object with what they represent (in the intended model). To sum up, “2+2=4” does not compute, but the fact that 2 + 2 = 4 is true, and closer to the kind of thing we need to say that a computation is emulated, using the mathematical definition of emulation given by the logicians and theoretical computer scientist. > > > what you seem to miss is that the model [...] > > Models can't compute. It provides the meaning of “compute”, in this case. It gives the way to represent the partial computable function in tiny segment of the arithmetical reality. (Of course you are supposed to have already accept the use of the excluded middle principle for the arithmetical proposition, and later we can show that we can restrict a lot the portion of arithmetic that we really need to assume, and which is very small (the sigma_1 arithmetic, the partial computable part, incarnated in the notion of universal dovetailing). > > > elementary arithmetic has been shown to be Turing complete. > > Arithmetic, elementary or otherwise, can't compute. The Arithmetical reality (the one that logician often represents by an infinite structured set in (intuitive or formal) set theory) cannot compute, nor can a physical universe, for one simple reason. We can’t give inputs or output. By definition. But those type of realities can still dovetail on all computations. Computer science is somehow 0-dimensional. > But a Physical Turing Machines can *do* arithmetic, and nobody has ever found > anything else that can. Nobody has found a non physical machine to emulate a physical machine, indeed, we cannot make energy from natural numbers alone. But with the mechanist hypothesis, a computation supports the consciousness of someone believing in physical machine, (and as shown later having good reason for such belief (stability, consistency, a large set of notions of continuity, etc.). The minimal amount to assume for all computations and emulations to exist is a tiny segment of the arithmetical reality, in which we all believe (even the Sunday philosophers which only claim to have doubt on this). So, the very notion that there is a physical universe does not make much sense than to say that one universal numbers is superior to all others, which is just a way to cheat: to copy Nature, and then claim that “that” is the reality, which makes the mind-body problem under the rug. We have just no choice here other than study the mathematics of our computational extension (“our” refers to us the universal numbers, not the humans) and compare with the observations. As far as I can see, mechanism is confirmed by nature (thanks to Everett and quantum logicians). > > > If the “phantom” computation, that is, the person supported by some > > arithmetical computation, are not conscious > > You constantly accuse me of making assumptions There is no problem with “making assumption”. It is just that I have shown that you cannot possiblyI try only to show that you are using two assumptions which, when taken together, leads to a contradiction. Those are the assumption of Digital Mechanism, and the assumption of physicalism/materialism. > but Bruno, you have just made one. Except for yourself any conclusion you > make about the consciousness or lack of consciousness of ANYTHING is based on > an assumption, and it's an assumption that has zero evidence in favor of it > and zero evidence against it. > And there is zero chance of that situation ever changing. That's why, in > dramatic contrast to intelligence theories, consciousness theories are so > easy to come up with, and it's why they are so completely useless. I only assume Mechanism. The YD + CT. CT assumes the small amount of arithmetic explained above. I show that mechanism to be incompatible with physicalism or weak materialism. Then, I provide strong arguments that the theorem of Gödel, Löb, Solovay (and many others) + the quantum observable favours strongly the many-histories interrelation of arithmetic found by the universal machines in arithmetic. Obviously, as a scientist, I am agnostic on the existence of a primitive physical universe, but with Mechanism, this notion does not make sense (even with extremely weak version of mechanism, like with oracles, …) You are the one assuming both Mechanism and Physicalism/Materialism. I assume only Mechanism, mainly for the sake of the reasoning, and curiosity. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3jZ_oL3Bye89tWyQUyneC%2BssryQv3d2JrThWiQdSn4hw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3jZ_oL3Bye89tWyQUyneC%2BssryQv3d2JrThWiQdSn4hw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4C4F59FF-B4D9-4AE4-9B64-9BCE3116608D%40ulb.ac.be.
