> On 19 Aug 2019, at 21:40, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 18, 2019 at 5:53 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >>> I believe in the physical reality, but I do not necessarily believe that > >>> the physical reality is the fundamental reality. > > >> Who cares? > > > It is the subject of the thread. > > It most certainly is NOT! The title of this thread is "Observation versus > assumption", and both observation and assumption are very complex phenomenon, > and just like intelligence and consciousness they can NOT be fundamental or > primitive. > > > why do you insist that fundamental stuff must exist to dignity a > > computation as “real". > > I have no idea what that means, but I know the only thing I insist is that > fundamental stuff be simple, and neither consciousness or observation or > assumption or intelligent behavior is simple.
The simplest thing which is non trivial and that I can conceive is elementary number theory. 2+2=4 is conceptually more simple than the quantum vacuum. Consciousness, intelligence and observable are indeed things to derive, and mechanism derive it from number relations, which is natural given that they implement all computations already. But observation become a type of bet-confirmation (or bet-refutation) in a statistic on many computational relative consistent extension (that is why physics has to be recovered from []p & <>t and variants, with p sigma_1). > >>>Look at experimental physicists. They measure numbers only, > > >> How can you measure the pure number 7? > > > OK. I meant (if course) they measure numerical magnitude, > > No they do NOT measure numerical magnitude! Experimental physicists measure > physical magnitudes and describe what they found in the language of > mathematics. How could you even in theory measure the numerical magnitude of > the number 7? Does that magnature ever change? The result is a number, then we can interpret the number in term of the magnitude of something, but the physicalist adds something by committing itself in the idea that the magnitude refer to a physical universe, where the computationalist explains the appearance of the magnitude by the mathematics of machine or number-self-reference, without adding the ontological commitment in some sort of stuff, whose role in consciousness would preclude us to say “ye” to the digitalise surgeon. > > >> every time you try to explain what you mean by "mechanism" you start > >> using words like "fundamental " and "primitive" which are irrelevant in a > >> philosophical discussion about immortality, intelagent behavior or > >> consciousness. > > > Mechanism is "Yes Doctor”. > > I have actually said "yes" in that situation and I've put my money where my > mouth is so obviously I believe in what you call "mechanism", and I can make > a logical case for "yes" being the correct answer without expressing any > opinion whatsoever about what is or is not fundamental; I may have opinions > on that subject but they play no part in what I say to the doctor. > > > It needs CT, and some amount of arithmetical realism to define what is a > > digital machine. > > I don't need a definition of a digital machine or a definition of anything > else to figure out that "yes" is the logical thing for someone to say to the > doctor if they like existence better than oblivion. > > > That physics is no more the fundamental science is a consequence, > > I strongly disagree, but even if you're correct "yes" would still be the > logical thing to say to the doctor. So even if you convinced me that physics > is not more fundamental than mathematics I would still believe in what you > call "mechanism”. Nice! > > >> There are an infinite number of computational relationships, but most of > >> them are nonsense and pure mathematics has no way to sort the sense from > >> nonsense, but physics does. If you have one rock of a certain mass moving > >> at a certain velocity and then you get another identical rock then you > >> have exactly 2 times the energy and momentum, not 1 or 3 or 4 or any other > >> number, only 2 will work. Without physics numbers wouldn't even have a > >> consistent meaning. And of course there would be no way to make a > >> calculation or form a thought. > > > Model theory illustrate that pure mathematics has meaning. > > Model theory can't think Nor did I say that. > so it can't illustrate anything if there is no receptive mind around. You > can't just say X has meaning you've got to specify who gets that meaning. That is the point of computer science and (theoretical) AI. The one making sense of words and numbers are the universal word or the universal number/machine. You want the physical universe to be *the* chosen universal numbers, but with mechanism, we have a substitution level, and below that level, all universal numbers(and their corresponding computations) play an observable role, and QM illustrates that that might the case. > A book has no meaning to you if you don't know the language it's written in, Not really. The book might be without a meaning accessible to me, but still accessible to another one. We might decide that a book has meaning if there is one universal number making genuine sense from it. That explain why we took time to decipher all manuscripts. We bet there is a meaning well before we succeed in deciphering it. > and without anything physical there would be no one and no thing to receive > meaning. Without physical implementation, there is no direct physical use, but without a FORTRAN interpreter, no FORTRAN code could have meaning. Now, there are infinitely many FORTRAN interpreter making sense of infinitely many FORTRAN data in arithmetic. > > >> in pure mathematics there is nothing special about 2+2=4, 2+2=5 works fine, > > > No. 2+2=5 entails 0 = 1, > > OK so 0=1, that's fine. No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > There is nothing physical in existence so 0=1 causes no trouble to any thing > because there are no things, there are not even simple things much less > complex minds that are disturbed by paradoxes. I assume arithmetic. In the TOE extracted from Digital Mechanism, I assume not more than what is taught in primary school, and is used in most theories (about almost any subject). Physicalist assumes a physical reality. I do not, as I derive it from much simpler assumption. Particles and waves acquire phenomenological existence. They don’t disappear. > > >> Whatever that primitive stuff is there are 2 things we know for certain > >> about it: > 1) It has contrast, that is to say everything either exists or it does not > and there is a detectable difference between the two; "nonexistence" has the > property of infinite unbounded homogeneity and existence is everything else. > 2) The primitive stuff must be able to be organized into parts that are > themselves organized in complex ways and behave in ways the unorganized > primitive stuff could not. > > > That works well for the numbers. > > I don't think they do because there would be no contrast. If nothing physical > existed then pure numbers would have the property of infinite unbounded > homogeneity, so they wouldn't exist either. Contrast comes from the fact that some arithmetical relation are true, or false, or undecidable by this or that machine/number, etc. Number theory is not a subbranch of physics a priori. If you have a physical definition of natural number, let me know, but usually people claiming they have found such a definition are easily shown to have used them implicitly. It is very hard to define numbers in a physical reality which do not assume them, because to describe physics already assume numbers. > > >> To hell with definitions, Turing taught us how to BUILD a digital machine. > >> So we can just point and say a digital machine is one of those. > > > He gave the first definition of Digital machine (together with Post, > > Church, etc.). > > You like fundamental stuff, at least you talk about it all the time, well... > examples are more fundamental than definitions. Ultimately all definitions > are derived from examples. > > >> You don't have to assume numbers or anything else, you only need to > >> observe that things change in time and space > > > Assuming time and space is much more than assuming numbers. > > Nobody assumes time and space they observe them. The whole point of Plato, and of the dream-argument, is that observation of X is not a proof of the existence of X. > Immanuel Kant goes even further and says time and space are more than just > empirical but are what he calls a "pure intuition”, I would have said “less than empirical”. But Kant contradicts himself in the critics of its practical reason. Kant is not so easy to interpret, nor even to translate. > and without them no experience is possible, Not with digital mechanism, unless you mean an only if here. It is ambiguous. Without the illusion of space-time there is no (N, 0, s, +, *) because (N, 0, s, +, *) implies the illusion of matters. > not even the experience of numbers. I think Kant was pretty much right about > that. > > >> Some computations, like the sort INTEL makes with their silicon, can play > >> a part in cause and effect, and some "calculations", like your silly > >> phantom calculations, can not. > > > Only if the silicon is blessed with Holy water. Oh you bless it only with > > Holy Matter. That’s not my religion > > Call it Holy Water blessed or call it Holy Silicon blessed I don't care, but > are you really going to tell me with a straight face that your phantom > calculations can produce all the effects that INTEL's Silicon calculations > can? Yes. It actually did. INTEL, silicon, matter are all in the head of the universal machine. The mathematical explains where INTEL comes from ... > ! Do you really want to say that? If your answer is "no" or even "no but" > then you've still retained some sanity but if the answer is "yes" then…. You need to first understand that (N, 0, s, +, *) satisfies the existence of all computations, and then to explain me what is your stuff, with definition or example, and how that stuff acts negatively of the consciousness of the John Clark emulated in arithmetic, and positively on the John Clark emulated by a physical stuff. As I said, your problem is that if this stuff has a role, either that role is Turing emulable, but then some John Clark in arithmetic will be conscious (and part of the global indeterminacy) or it is not Turing emulable, and this prevents me to say Yes to the doctor for Digital Mechanist Reason. > > >>> That is a reason why I do not assume, neither matter, nor consciousness, > > >> Not even your own consciousness? You think you may be a zombie? > > > No, I derive consciousness and matter from the computational relation. > > Nobody derives consciousness from computational relations or derives it from > anything else. And nobody assumes consciousness either. I know I'm conscious > from direct experience and, assuming that you're conscious, you have done the > same thing I have. But you seem to accept mechanism, which force you to accept some computationalist account of consciousness, but then, that theory of consciousness will applied to the (relative) numbers. If you insist of physical-computationalism, you have to explain the role of the stuff in your theory of consciousness. Then, as I said, if that stuff is not Turing emulable, you contradicts your bet on Mechanism. > > >>> (A Löbian machine is a universal machine capable of proving its own > >>> Turing universality. > > >> A universal Turing machine can emulate any Turing Machine by reading its > >> input tape which contains the description of the machine to be simulated > >> as well as the data to be worked on. So all "Löbian machines" are Turing > >> Machines but not all Turing Machines are "Löbian machines". > > > Indeed. The Löbian machine believes in enough induction axioms to be able > > to prove that they are universal. > > I am a Turing Machine but I am not a Universal Turing Machine You are a universal Turing machine. Every humans are. > or a "Löbian machine” As far as you are arithmetically sound, you are Löbian too. You are universal, and you can, in principle, proves it, so you are Löbian. Anyone believing in PA is Löbian, as long as they stay arithmetically sound. > because there are some problems that a Turing Machine can solve with a > *finite* amount of tape that I can not because my tape is too short. So I > can't prove I'm universal because I'm not. And yet I'm conscious. A universal Turing machine is a finite object. It might (and will) sooner or later asks for more memory space. But the memory space is in the environment, not in the definition of the finite set of quadruplet. That is why I like to use the expression “universal number”, with number being natural number, because a universal machine is typically, like all machine, a finitely describable entity. > > >>> The John Clark in arithmetic change relatively to the universal numbers > >>> running them. Take the number corresponding to a simulation of our > >>> cluster of galaxies at the level of strings with 10^(10^10000) decimals. > > >> That huge number never changes, or at least it wouldn't if it existed, but > >> if the entire expanding accelerating universe I don’t assume a physical universe in the TOE. Nor do I assume a primitive physical universe in the thought experience. > > > I don’t assume any of this. > > If that huge number can change then so can any number, so when the number 7 > changes to something else the number 7 no longer exists. So in this new > reality how much is 4+3? Changes are defined in the relative way, like in Block-Universe view of GR. > > >>> Programming language are not just set of characters. There is a grammar, > >>> and a notion of reality attached > > >>The notion of reality that needs to be attached is hardware, Hardware and software are relative notion, except for the physical hardware, which is not a software at all, but a phenomenological perception by the universal numbers. > a computer made of matter that obeys the laws of physics; because without > that the programing language is just a set of characters that never change > and is incapable of changing anything. > > > That shows you have never read a book in mathematics, or you did not > > understand anything in there. > > If you really believe, and apparently you do, that a proof has been found > that pure numbers can change Relatively to other number, through number relations. Obviously “a number can change” is nonsense, but in the course of a computation, even, made in arithmetic, a number can change. > and have the power to change things in the physical world A number cannot change something in the physical world. But the relation between the numbers can make relative numbers experience change. > that are not pure numbers then, as I said before, although you may be able to > follow all the small steps in a proof once you get to the end you don't > understand what it is that has been proven. If you follow all the steps of a proof, starting to premises that you accept (momentarily or not) then you accept the conclusion (momentarily or not), or you reject the premise. > > >>> Indeed. They don’t even assumes anything physical, unless they have a > >>> chapter on the physical machines, which is rare in the theoretical > >>> textbook I refer too. But none assume a primitively real reality. > > >> Oh no we're back with "primitive”! > > > It is what we are discussing. > > I thought we were discussing more interesting and complex things like > intelligent behavior and consciousness. … explaining consciouness in the Mechanist Frame requires revising our philosophy of matter, and reject physicalism. > > >> You agree a Physical Turing Machine can do things that pure numbers can > >> not and that's all that's important, it's irrelevant if it's primitive. > > > It is the subject of the discussion. > > I thought we were discussing more interesting and complex things like > intelligent behavior and consciousness. > > >> if anybody on this list did not believe in physical reality they'd be > >> killed the first time they tried to cross a street. > > > Everybody believe in the physical reality. Not everybody believe that the > > physical reality is not reducible to another realm. > > How is that relevant? An Amoeba is reducible to atoms but the Amoeba has a > property the atoms lack, life. That we have to reduce atoms to machine’s phenomenology if we want Mechanism not leading to contradiction. > > > To you agree with Euclid’s proof that there is no biggest prime number? > > That is a physical question. It depends on if the expanding accelerating > universe has the capacity to perform a infinite (and not just astronomical) > number of calculations and I don't know the answer to that but I have reasons > to be somewhat skeptical. So you don’t agree with Euclid? His proof of the infinity of prime number is orthogonal to physics. It says nothing in physics, and it uses nothing in physics. (Don’t reply this by saying that Euclid needs the physical reality to express its proof, because that is a confusion of level: there is no physical assumption in Euclid’s *proof*). Bruno > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1P0VMWA80hgtUMnmqKVoLHquf%2B11evC4%2B_UB5cbN1MRQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1P0VMWA80hgtUMnmqKVoLHquf%2B11evC4%2B_UB5cbN1MRQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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