> On 25 Aug 2019, at 07:43, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 2:14 PM Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au > <mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>> wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 01:15:38PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au > > <mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>> wrote: > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything > > List wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish < > > li...@hpcoders.com.au <mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > > > > > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs > > and wings > > > > > can't > > > > > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no > > minds that > > > > > might be > > > > > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical > > things, > > and > > > > > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist > > for > > minds > > > > > to exist. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? > > > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with > > the > > > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the > > > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical > > > > things. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do > > you > > mean > > > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny > > that > > > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if the > > brain > > > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't > > > disembodied. > > > > > > Brent > > > > > > > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could > > be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) > > scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) > > exists in any fundamental sense. > > > > > > Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, etc > > to > > the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. > > > > Neither the brain, nor the vat is a body. The body is actually > simulated by the evil daemon, and doesn't exist ontologically. Hence > disembodied. > > That is a very narrow definition of a "body". A body is the corporeal thing > that, in this instance, "supports" the mind. So the vat and its surrounds > are every much a body as the skull and its attachments are in the case of the > physical human body. > > Now Brent makes good arguments (and I echo simular arguments in my > book) that a body must exist phenomenally (ie exist as an experience > of the mind), but nowhere does there appear to be a requirement for > the body to exist ontologically (in the same reality as the brain and > the vat in this example). > > I agree with Brent's point. On the other hand, if you are talking about a > mind (and its associated body) existing entirely in a virtual reality, then > we have to consider what is the physical 'computer' that instantiates that > virtual reality.
All piece of matter are but maps on our relative accessible computations/history (computation seen from inside, a notion made precise with the modal logic G*, which I like to call machine’s theology, for obvious (greek) reason. A Universal machine cannot exist without a physical reality, because it implies it from its first person view. That physical reality is a consequence of the logic of the machine’s observable ([]p & <>t (& p)). > > This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must > exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that > something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to > do this. > > I am with John here. Talk of a "disembodied" mind (or calculation). is just > so much hot air. I ask for evidence of such things, and none has been > provided to date. "Minds" (or calculations) are the consequence of physical > operations. That is revisionism. The notion of computation has been discovered by mathematicians working on the foundation of mathematics, as a way to avoid some paradoxes. You confuse “physical implementation of a computation” with “computation”. That is like confusing a function and a set representation a function. It is a common error. But when doing metaphysics, that error becomes important to avoid. A mathematical object is different from all its representations through any other mathematical objects. Bruno > > Bruce > > Bruno Marchal claims the opposite - that arithmetic, or in > fact any abstract system capable of universal computation, is > sufficient for the job. To be quite frank, I'm a fence sitter in this > debate, as I've yet to see any physically realisable experiment that > can settle the matter. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQdoDaKLhF1HMqvM7cbybqUAdaA0Vp0xyVznT95n2YHnw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQdoDaKLhF1HMqvM7cbybqUAdaA0Vp0xyVznT95n2YHnw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FF9FED51-A1DB-4DF0-9D31-11563E7D4F27%40ulb.ac.be.
