> On 26 Aug 2019, at 01:57, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 11:03 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > On 25 Aug 2019, at 14:01, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:39 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> On 25 Aug 2019, at 10:10, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com >> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> The mathematical structure might describe these things, but descriptions >>> are not the things they describe. >> >> I think you confuse the mathematical structure, and the theory describing >> that mathematical structure. Those are very different things. >> >> I think that is exactly the mistake that you make all the time. > > Where? I don’t remind you ever show this. > > I have said it many times. A mathematical structure is an abstract human > construct. Such a structure might go some way towards describing physical > reality, but the map is not the territory.
How could an infinite mathematical structure be an abstract human construct. How do you know if it is not the idea of a physical reality which is a human covenant fiction. You talk like a priest, who knows things. That’s OK, because you are at least consistent (you believe in materialism, so it is normal to abandon Mechanism). But then you talk like if we knew, which is the mark of the charlatans. > > Contrarily, when you say that a mathematical structure describe things, that > is like saying that the physical universe describes the content of a book on > physics. > > You beg the question. You are assuming that the mathematical structure is the > reality, Not at all. I have proven that IF Digital Mechanism is true, then we CANNOT assume more than a universal machinery. > and that the physical universe is the description of that structure. Wrong > way round, yet again. That was the absurd conclusion, in a a proof by redact ad absurd. Neither the mathematical reality, nor its border (the physical reality) are description, except the physics become the study of the relative maps on the set of relative computations. We don’t need (and can’t) go out of the (sigma_1) arithmetical reality. > > > A reality, be it physical or mathematical, is not a description, but the > thing being described by some theory. > > You are using your own mathematician's understanding of the relationship > between a theory and a reality. You claim that a model that instantiates the > theory is a reality for that theory. That is just a matter of particular > linguistic usage, and it has nothing to do with the relationship between > physical reality and the mathematical theories used to (partially) describe > it. The theorem in mechanism is that the physical reality has to be entirely explained in the universal machine phenomenology. Nature confirms this, at a place where physics either is inconsistent or eliminate consciousness. > > > PA describes a portion of the Arithmetical Reality, which can be shown never > completely described by *any* (effective) theory. I take this as a strong > evidence that the arithmetical reality is independent of me, and actually, > quite above me (and that is provable when we assume mechanism). > > You really do get hung up on what you think Godel proved when he showed that > some true statements in arithmetic are not theorems. That simply uses a > notion of "truth" that is outside theorems of the system. It has nothing to > do with existence or an ontology. By definition the ontology is what we take as primitive, and not explainable from less. Why add an ontology when there is no evidence for it, and it brings insoluble problem (like consciousness). > > > You might have a conventionalist philosophy of mathematics, but if that > philosophy was true, why would we give a million of dollars for a solution to > Riemann hypothesis? Or how to explain why the formula of the partition of > numbers is so much more difficult than the formula for the composition of > numbers, as I showed once. The composition of n is the number of way you can > describe n as a sum of numbers, taking the order into account. The partition > of n is the same, except the order of the sum is not taking into account. The > number of composition is simply 2^(n-1), but the number of partitions is > given by the most complex (in the two sense of the word) formula in > mathematics. > If the arithmetical reality was conventional, I would have simplified all > this already :) > > Arithmetic is defined by certain axioms. Not entirely. That the point of Gödel: we cannot define Arithmetic. You confuse the theory and the model/reality. > Systems of axioms can have consequences that were not dreamed of when the > axioms were formulated. It is worth than that. The arithmetical reality satisfies proposition which we cannot prove in our theories. > There is nothing more to it than that -- it is not some super revealed > "truth”. Agreed, but it is still true and play a role in our consciousness and in the origin of the physical laws. It provides a surrational corona in between the rational (locally provable) and the irrational (false). It is all what is true, but that we cannot prove, (yet some part of it is believable, observable, knowable, sensible). It is studied by the mathematics of G* minus G (and the intensional variants). > > > You don’t need to accept full realism. You need to accept that phi_x(y) > converges or not. You need to believe that the program i stops on x or does > not stop on x. Whatever number x is. Nothing more. > > Some computations halt and some do not. Oh! Good. You are arithmetical realist after all. But that is normal, as you need to be realist on analysis and probably set theory if you want build your non computational theory of mind (as you need, at the least, to get some ontological matter). > And you can't always tell in advance which is which ... this is not the > source of all wisdom. I am not sure if we disagree on anything, except we work in different theory. Bruno > > Bruce > > If you do metaphysics/theology with the scientific attitude, you cannot > invoke words like “truth”, “real”, “god”, “universe” in your theory, but you > might use them in some meta-theory, to give sense to your theory, > temporarily. > > Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTaDDLvetZRqQCLQ2fneRg_i%3DHuDsQde3mnMBZ6FQ1H4A%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTaDDLvetZRqQCLQ2fneRg_i%3DHuDsQde3mnMBZ6FQ1H4A%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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