On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:25 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> > > On 8/25/2019 6:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sunday, August 25, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/25/2019 2:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019, 12:38 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 8/24/2019 11:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 12:51 AM Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 2:16 PM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Saturday, August 24, 2019, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish < >>>>>> li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via >>>>>>> Everything List wrote: >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK >>>>>>> with the >>>>>>> > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of >>>>>>> physical >>>>>>> > > things. >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. >>>>>>> Do you mean >>>>>>> > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would >>>>>>> deny that >>>>>>> > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if >>>>>>> the brain >>>>>>> > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it >>>>>>> isn't >>>>>>> > disembodied. >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > Brent >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment >>>>>>> could >>>>>>> be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) >>>>>>> scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) >>>>>>> exists in any fundamental sense. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, >>>>>> power, etc to the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The mind is a pattern distinct from any of it's physical incarnations. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That does not imply that it can exist without some form of physical >>>> realization. >>>> >>> >>> While I agree any mind requires an >>> instantiation/incarnation/realization, before we can continue I think we >>> need to clarify what is meant by "physical". >>> >>> For example, do you think there is any important difference between a >>> mathematical structure that is isomorphic to a physical universe and that >>> physical universe? >>> >>> >>> A mathematical structure is a relation between propositions defined by >>> some rules of deduction. >>> >> >> >> This confuses truth with proof. >> >> >> c.f. Pontius Pilate >> >> >> It is static. >>> >> >> All change is relative. >> >> >> There is no change in a mathematical structure. >> > > Nor in physics. C.f. Einstein. > > > "I'd rather know some of the questions than all of the answers." > A. Einstein > Pilate asked a question. > > > > >> >> >> >> >> It has no "accidental" or as Bruno would say "geographic" features. Two >>> mathematical structures can be isomorphic precisely because of this. >>> >> >> This shows only that there's often many ways of talking about what is >> fundamentally the same thing. >> >> >> Don't you notice that "fundamentally" is a weasel word, signally that >> your sentence is strickly false. A Leibniz noted, if two things are the >> same then they are only one thing. >> > > That's what I said. > > > So if you could (although I think you can't) create a mathematical > structure exactly the same as our universe, it would be our universe and it > would be physical. > > >From this it follows that if platonism is true, and all possible mathematical structures exist, it accounts for our observation of a physical universe. Unless for some reason our universe is not a possible mathematical structure. You and John have argued this, stipulating that "accidents", "randomness", and "time" are not mathematical. But I don't think you have convincingly shown any of these are properties of the universe rather than effects of observation. > > >> >> >> >> >> It is impossible that a mathematical and a physical structure be >>> isomorophic. >>> >> >> Why? >> >> >> Because physical things have "accidental" attributes and relations. >> > > Define accidental. I'm not sure you can define it in such a way that a > physical object could have it while a mathematical object could not. > > > One not necessary, > If every possible mathematical structure exists, then everything (including what you might call accidents) is necessary. > random. > It is generally impossible to differentiate a random sequence from one produced by an algorithm. What you may take as evidence of randomness could instead be the output of a complex deterministic algorithm. If QM required collapse, or if the universe had to be envisioned as an evolving 3d space, rather than a static 4d spacetime, I would agree with you that would be strong evidence against mathematical existence, but since both of these ideas have been shown as unnecessary complications of the simpler physical view (i.e. spactime, and no collapse qm) I consider those successes to be evidence in favor of mathematical existence. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiHXqBu4KnqMZc8qat3L5%3D0o13F9bh%2B8Vu%2BstvZ0fyBcg%40mail.gmail.com.
