> On 27 Aug 2019, at 05:15, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 8/26/2019 7:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 9:33 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <everything-list@googlegroups.com <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> >> wrote: >> >> >> On 8/26/2019 6:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> What does "distinct" mean in that? It's a distinction you make because >>>>>> you can think of a brain and processes of the brain as separate. Just >>>>>> like you can think of an automobile plant as distinct from the steps >>>>>> required to make a car. But that doesn't mean that a car can be made >>>>>> without any physical process. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is distinct in the sense that bits are different from electrical >>>>>> voltages or scribbles on paper. >>>>> >>>>> Yes and insurance is different from cash. So what? A bit is just a >>>>> physical thing that you choose to regard purely in terms of its >>>>> computational relations...we calll the "abstractions" for a reason. >>>>> >>>>> Under your own definition of abstraction above, there is a distinction >>>>> between a mind and a brain. There's not an identity relation between the >>>>> two, as one discards unnecessary details. >>>> >>>> "Unnecessary" to what? >>>> >>>> The specification of the mind. >>> >>> But you don't know that. You're merely assuming that a mind can be >>> specified without reference to a physical world in which it exists. >>> >>> If functionalism is true, and if it's description is not infinite, then it >>> can be. >>> >> >> But one of the specifications of the mind may be that it's physically >> instantiated. Otherwise it couldn't perceive or act. >> >> You agreed that the computation would act the same regardless of the source >> of the information. So I don't know why you think it would not act. > > The mind needs a body to act.
Correct. But it does not a primary real body, as any mind has infinitely many virtual body in arithmetic, and it has even an apparent primary body, which emerges from the first person indeterminacy on all its relative virtual bodies. Bruno > The mind is a process in the brain or computer. As a process per se it can't > act. > > Brent >> >> Also, you agreed "physical" is just a relation between an observer and a >> structure which might be mathematical. So what makes any Turing machine any >> more or less capable than any other for processing an observer? >> >> Jason >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh-fjxtAKPy6LsZ4B2wriO7%2B2PY9%2BAfgF8F%2BAqreJ8xvQ%40mail.gmail.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh-fjxtAKPy6LsZ4B2wriO7%2B2PY9%2BAfgF8F%2BAqreJ8xvQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cb47bfe8-dfc1-23f8-a99b-84de4f055195%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cb47bfe8-dfc1-23f8-a99b-84de4f055195%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E345AABC-611C-464E-8E3B-026D7140334D%40ulb.ac.be.
