On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 7:06 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
*>>> Numbers can change all the time.* > > >> you can't answer the simplest questions concerning that. If 7 changes > to 8 does that mean the number 7 no longer exists? > > > I*ndeed, locally, * > We're only talking about integers here, so what on earth does "locally" mean in that context? > > *When a diophantine polynomial simulates a register machine* > All machines change. No polynomial changes. Therefore a polynomial can not simulate a register machine or any other sort of machine. > > in the arithmetical reality, and add 1 to a register containing 7, 7 is > no more in that register, but 8 is. > And how exactly does a pure number add 1 to a register, or add 1 to anything, how does a pure number *do* anything at all? And even if it has somehow actually done something if its a machine then other parts of the machine need to detect that a change has been made, so how can the integer 9 tell if the integer 7 is in the "register" (whatever the hell a register made of pure numbers is) or not? And for the integer 9 to detect a change in the pure number register it must have information on the contents of that pure number register before the change was made, where and how was that information stored? > *What you miss is that the arithmetical reality is Turing universal. It > is easy to structure a Model M (a Reality) satisfying the Peano axiom into > a combinatory algebra.* > * ab = c* > *Is defined by* *M satisfied "phi_a(b) = c”. * > That's one of your major problems right there, whenever you say "Is defined by" you seem to think that a human definition somehow changes objective reality. And that's what I meant when I said you can follow the individual steps in a proof but when you get to the end you don't understand what you've just proven. >> After both you and me have made our assumptions then we both need to > work out the consequences of those assumptions, so eventually we'll both > come to physics, and then chemistry, and then biology, and then humans > making physical Turing Machines. Regardless of if we start with numbers > or the quark gluon plasma of the Big Bang it doesn't matter because > neither are conducive with intelligence or consciousness, although the > consequences of those things may be after 13.8 billion years. > > *> If we start with gluons, it will be hard, and very confusing, to > explain that the illusion of gluons does not depend on which universal > machinery is assumed,* > What is confusing is what you just said. *> To explain the origin of the physical laws, it is simpler to not take a > too much physically inspired reality.* > I don't know what that means either, but it doesn't matter because it's irrelevant. We're not talking about the origin of physical laws we're talking about the origin of intelligent behavior and consciousness and the fact that physical processes are needed for both. In the same way I don't need to explain the origin of life to know that biology is needed for humans to be intelligent. > *Can you define the number 1 using only physics?* > I know you love definitions but all of them are derivative, with physics I can give you something far more fundamental than a mere definition. A definition is made of words, and the definition of the words in the definition are also made of words that can be found in a dictionary, and those words also have definitions that are also made of words and they are also in the dictionary and.... The only thing that can give a definition meaning and allow us to break out of this endless cycle of words chasing after words is EXAMPLES. Physics allows me to say I am pointing with my finger at ONE tree right now, not two not three just one. *> I will just wait for you to understand UDA step 3. * I will just wait for you to fix your silly blunder in step 3 that renders the entire thing utterly ridiculous, I believe I'll will be waiting for a very long time. And I do wish you'd remember IHA. >> If 3 pounds of Carbon Hydrogen Oxygen and Nitrogen grey goo is an > "infinite machine of some sort" (whatever the hell that means) then why > can't 3 pounds of Silicon? > *> You have to explain how that silicon would make some computation more > real than others.* > When 3 pounds of Silicon or 3 pounds of Carbon Hydrogen Oxygen and Nitrogen grey goo make a calculation something changes, when pure numbers make a "calculation" absolutely positively *NOTHING* changes. *> Of course you need step 3 to get the proof that this is just logically > impossible.* > Of course you need to fix the ridiculous error made in step 3. *>>> “physical law” is not defined.* > > >> It's *EXACTLY* as well defined as "defined" is defined, no more no > less. > > *> Then again you assume primary matter*. > Please define "define". But when you do define "define" obviously you can't use any words in the definition that themselves have definitions because if you do you'd just end up with a tautology, and don't use examples that involve "primary matter" either because you don't believe in that. > *> But the point is that this assumption is incompatible with mechanism.* > Huh? If I don't assume "primary matter" why should I say no to the digital doctor and cancel my plans to get frozen after I die? > *> We know that elementary arithmetic is Turing universal since the 1930s.* > No! We have known that Turing Machines are Turing universal since the 1930s and we've known that numbers are not machines since antiquity. > > *I can explain* > No you can't explain because you clearly don't understand what Turing did. > >> your "computation" requires no energy because you have not erased > information, or written information, or read information, or done anything > at all. > > > *> In arithmetic, computations does not require primitive physical energy. > * > That's not the only thing that does not require "primitive physical energy", doing NOTHING doesn't need it either, and your phantom fairy tail calculations are doing exactly that, NOTHING. > >> It pains me that I have to spell this out but a computer needs to be > able to compute, and by itself a LISP interpreter can't compute, by > itself it can't *do* anything, it never changes, it just sits there. > > *> That is just so false, and shows that you have no idea what a universal > machine is.* > I know that all machines, universal or otherwise, need to be able to *do* something, and pure numbers can't . > *> If you say that a computation require matter, * > I do. > > *then you put in that computation something which is neither Turing > emulable, nor recoverable from the first person indeterminacy on all > relative computations. * > If you put a gun to my head I couldn't say what that word salad means. *> But then Mechanism is false.* Just tell me why I should say no to the digital doctor. > >> regardless of if it's primary or not there is no logical reason for me > to say anything other than "yes" to the digital doctor given that I > personally like existence more than nonexistence. > > *>The point is logical. No need to invoke our personal opinion. * > Yes there is. Personal opinion is important because of YOUR definition of "mechanism"; whether it's logical to say yes to the digital doctor or not depends on the goal you seek and that depends on if you prefer existence or nonexistence. John K Clark > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2DqsZPAqq%3DdRBD1zY1qV7cYPDMGF9w6bkNd5z5b5dPww%40mail.gmail.com.
