> On 13 Sep 2019, at 15:24, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 13, 2019 at 5:24:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 04:26, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:>>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 11:01:54 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 7:45:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Thursday, September 12, 2019 at 4:20:46 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, September 11, 2019 at 11:45:41 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>>
>> <https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/>
>>
>>
>>
>> Many Worlds is where people go to escape from one world of
>> quantum-stochastic processes. They are like vampires, but instead of running
>> away from sunbeams, are running away from probabilities.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>> This assessment is not entirely fair. Carroll and Sebens have a paper on how
>> supposedly the Born rule can be derived from MWI I have yet to read their
>> paper, but given the newsiness of this I might get to it. One advantage that
>> MWI does have is that it splits the world as a sort of quantum frame
>> dragging that is nonlocal. This nonlocal property might be useful for
>> working with quantum gravity,
>>
>> I worked a proof of a theorem, which may not be complete unfortunately,
>> where the two sets of quantum interpretations that are ψ-epistemic and those
>> that are ψ-ontological are not decidable. There is no decision procedure
>> which can prove QM holds either way. The proof is set with nonlocal hidden
>> variables over the projective rays of the state space. In effect there is an
>> uncertainty in whether the hidden variables localize extant quantities, say
>> with ψ-ontology, or whether this localization is the generation of
>> information in a local context from quantum nonlocality that is not extant,
>> such as with ψ-epistemology. Quantum interprertations are then auxiliary
>> physical axioms or postulates. MWI and within the framework of what Carrol
>> and Sebens has done this is a ψ-ontology, and this defines the Born rule. If
>> I am right the degree of ψ-epistemontic nature is mixed. So the intriguing
>> question we can address is the nature of the Born rule and its tie into the
>> auxiliary postulates of quantum interpretations. Can a similar demonstration
>> be made for the Born rule within QuBism, which is what might be called the
>> dialectic opposite of MWI?
>>
>> To take MWI as something literal, as opposed to maybe a working system to
>> understand QM foundations, is maybe taking things too far. However, it is a
>> part of some open questions concerning the fundamentals of QM. If MWI, and
>> more generally postulates of quantum interpretations, are connected to the
>> Born rule it makes for some interesting things to think about.
>>
>> LC
>>
>> If you read the link, it's pretty obvious that Carroll believes the many
>> worlds of the MWI, literally exist. AG
>>
>> Carroll also believes that IF the universe is infinite, then there must
>> exist exact copies of universes and ourselves. This is frequently claimed by
>> the MWI true believers, but never, AFAICT, proven, or even plausibly argued.
>
> The idea comes from Tegmark, and I agree with you, it necessitate more than
> an infinite universe. It requires also some assumption of homogeneity.
>
> Our universe is, on a large scale, homogeneous. But it can't be infinite
> since it has only been expanding for finite time, 13.8 BY.
Assuming that there is a physical universe, and that the big bang is its
origin. OK.
> I had a discussion with Brent about this some time ago, and he claimed finite
> in time doesn't preclude infinite in space. I strongly disagree. Perhaps I am
> missing something. Wouldn't be the first time. AG
I might be with you on this, at least from a physicalist perspective (in which
I do not believe, but which could be a consistent theory). From my
understanding, space itself is born with the Big Bang, *if* the Big Bang is the
origin (which I doubt), and that implies it is still finite after a finite time.
Now, with mechanism, I could show a model where space is infinite, but I think
time can be deduced from it to be infinite too, so yes. Maybe Brent can add
something (maybe he did already).
>
> Of course, (for those who are aware of Gödel 1931 and Turing 1936),
> arithmetic contains all computations, which entails, when assuming mechanism,
> an infinity of each os us.
>
> I really don't see how you make that jump.
The fact that all computations are executed in arithmetic is "well known” by
the expert in the field since the 1930s.
("Executed”is used in the mathematical sense of the logiciens who discovered
the computer). A (universal) Turing machine cannot distinguish, by
introspection, between being emulated by a physical reality, a god-created
reality, or an arithmetical reality, or any universal machinery. But the point
is that they can count the experimental evidences, as mechanism imposed extreme
strong constraints on what the physical laws can be.
> And what exactly does "assuming mechanism" mean? AG
As I said I my other post, it is just Descartes’ idea that our body obeys laws
which are locally computable, made precise by using Turing mathematical
definition of computability. It is the hypothesis that there no magic happening
in the brain, somehow. Or that the brain is Digitally emulable *at some
description level* relevant for staying alive and well.
With mechanism there is a many “world” (computation) of arithmetic, toward
which, in arithmetic, all sound machines converge.
Bruno
>
> That explains both where the appearance of universe come from, and the
> quantum mechanical type of formalism. In “many-world”, the “many” makes
> sense, but the term “world” is not well defined and should not been taken
> literally. It is more histories than worlds per se.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>> What's the argument for such a claim? Morevover, I don't believe a universe
>> of finite age, such as ours which everyone more or less agrees began some
>> 13.8 BYA, can be spatially infinite. Here I'm referring to our bubble, not
>> some infinite substratum from which it might have arose. AG
>>
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