On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 9:23:29 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > > On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 5:51 AM John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 6:31 AM Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> *> if you think that Carroll’s got it right, you do accept step 3, (as >>> Carroll accept it, according to Jason) * >> >> >> If Jason thinks Carroll accepts it then Jason is full of shit. And I've >> read Carroll's book, you haven't. You two should actually read the book, >> then we'll talk. >> >> > I guess you never clicked the link I provided at the start of this > thread. I'll transcribe it for those who can't access the video: > > Sean Carroll: > > So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the > 1600s, but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this > implication of classical mechanics was realized. > It's a clockwork universe. That the way classical mechanics works is if > you tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in > classical mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every > part, and you knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large > computational capacity, > Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence the > past and future would be as determined and known as the present was because > that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is fixed once you > know the present moment. > > But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire universe. There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is further aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical mechanics the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise configuration. Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who should know better. AG
> > Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a > little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still > possible. > So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have > infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future > with perfect accuracy. > But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so > any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently > random events. > > Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can > predict what will happen to the entire universe*. > > > This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA. In an experiment involving > duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges. There is no actual > randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the > characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make > definite predictions concerning their experiences. Sean Carroll gets > this. Max Tegmark gets this. You got it at least once 6 years ago on this > list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could > not predict which process they would end up in. This is enough for you to > proceed to the next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the > duplicates. You are almost there. > > Jason > > > > Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a > little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still > possible. > So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have > infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future > with perfect accuracy. > But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so > any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently > random events. > > Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can > predict what will happen to the entire universe*. > > > This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA. In an experiment involving > duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges. There is no actual > randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the > characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make > definite predictions concerning their experiences. Sean Carroll gets > this. Max Tegmark gets this. You got it at least once 6 years ago on this > list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could > not predict which process they would end up in. This is enough for you to > proceed to the next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the > duplicates. You are almost there. > > Jason > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cc154622-2019-42cc-9195-79e3645f9c76%40googlegroups.com.
