> On 28 Sep 2019, at 14:55, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, September 28, 2019 at 4:18:58 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: > > You must have a special definition of "computable number". As I see it, other > than PI, e, and possibly a few other irrational numbers, no computer can > fully compute any of them, which have the cardinality of the continuum. You > can't even define those numbers so how the heck can you compute them? You > could take a string representing some rational number, and then insert digits > randomly, to produce an approximation of some irrational number. It will > always be an approximation since your program will never halt. And how will > you define that random string you're inserting without referencing some > quantum measurements, say of spin? AG > > > > > > Books on computability theory are all wrong: They are based on Platonism.
Only in the formal sense of platonism. We need to give sense to “this machine does not stop”, or to “this Diophantine equation does not admit any solution”. We just accept the belief that either A is true, or A is false, if A is a closed sentence of arithmetic. > > In contrast, real computability takes the world as it really is, Using the adjective “real” is crackpot, (even blasphemy in the theology of the machine). “Real” is a good meta-term, in some colloquial context, but it should be use with extreme moderation. Like “fictionalism” it assumes that some theory is unreal, and is equivalent with “my religion is the true one”. That is an argument per authority in disguise. > > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ > <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/> > > Real computing is computing voided of Platonism. > > OK. It is a naturalist or materialist assumption, and so, by the UD Argument necessitate to abandon the Indexical Digital Mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science. Bruno > > > > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/41bf9334-9453-4f2c-a678-762455d353c5%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/41bf9334-9453-4f2c-a678-762455d353c5%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/196C8D91-1845-4443-81FB-E4854C0FF1E6%40ulb.ac.be.
