> On 6 Oct 2019, at 10:31, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 6, 2019 at 1:19:52 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 5 Oct 2019, at 13:08, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, October 5, 2019 at 2:21:34 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 4 Oct 2019, at 20:04, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, October 4, 2019 at 8:28:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 4 Oct 2019, at 00:53, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> The question is about quantum many worlds. Not cosmology. >>> >>> Cosmology assumes the quantum at a cosmological scale, and it is where a >>> collapse makes the less sense. Who would observe and be responsible for the >>> collapse of the universal wave? Belinfante estimates that the >>> Copenhagen-von Neuman formulation of QM requires an external god looking at >>> the universe, like materialism requires a god selecting a unique >>> computation, but that’s no more doing science. >>> >>> François Englert, who worked in quantum cosmology, was very annoyed by the >>> collapse problem, and was relieved that it makes sense to just abandon the >>> collapse idea. The collapse is usually not even defined in any >>> intelligible sense, and it introduces a duality incompatible with >>> Mechanism, but also with the scientific attitude, I would say. >>> >>> With mechanism, there is only one consciousness which differentiates into >>> many 1p histories, and they interfere statistically, notably by allowing a >>> 1p plural observable and sharable reality. >>> >>> Why to believe in any “world"? >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Applied sciences >>> >>> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_applied_science#Branches_of_applied_science >>> >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outline_of_applied_science#Branches_of_applied_science> >>> >>> do not need Many Worlds Interpretation (as far as I can see). >>> >>> If there is no reason to use MWI in applied science, there is no reason to >>> consider MWI in science at all. >> >> That leads back to instrumentalist metaphysics, which is the same as “shut >> up and calculate”. You don’t need any world, not even one, in that case. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> It could appear so, but I say it leads to codicalism (between >> instrumentalism [strict antirealism] and realism). > > “Codicalism” or even “formalism” necessitates sigma_1 arithmetical realism, > which is the only ontology possible when we assume mechanism, but > consciousness and matter become phenomenological, and necessitate in > principle the whole of the mathematical reality, which is multiple and > undefinable (by machines, provably by machine’s too). > > Bruno > > > > > > JD Hamkins - https://twitter.com/jdhamkins > <https://twitter.com/jdhamkins?lang=en> - has expanded the definition of > "definable" in mathematics. > > Nothing is settled and written on stone tablets, like The Ten Commandments.
No, but once we fix the theory in which we are reasoning, then we cannot change the definition, just to claim something different about reality. I have not the time to follow the link, but if you think that his change of the definition of “definition” is relevant, please provide more explanation. I use the rather simple theory of Tarski, where definable means “expressible” in some first order logical formula, or expressible through some objects themselves definable in some first order theory (finite our recursively enumerable set of first-order formula). I am aware of many generalisation, but they are not relevant for my point. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/df9674d6-9a21-4651-9be7-b340b7d79273%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/df9674d6-9a21-4651-9be7-b340b7d79273%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/052DA5D1-A1EE-4BF9-9F3A-914C3FB314E8%40ulb.ac.be.
