> On 2 Dec 2019, at 11:53, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 3:26:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 1 Dec 2019, at 09:51, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 2:12:38 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: >> >> It seems like a simple question aching for an answer. Why do physicists, >> many of them at least, prefer a baffling unintelligible interpretation of >> superposition, say in the case of a radioactive source, when the obvious >> non-contradictory one stares them in their collective faces? AG >> >> >> >> >> The fundamental and psychological problem many physicists have is that they >> take some mathematics (in some particular theory) and assign physical >> realities to its mathematical entities. > > That is the interesting problem. We use a mathematical formalism, but any > simple relation between that formalism and reality, to be correct, needs to > NOT make the superposed terms disappearing (indeed the quantum computation > exploits typically different terms of the superposition, like already the two > slits). > > De Broglie defended the idea that quantum mechanics was false on distance > bigger than an atom, and predicted that the EPR influence is absent on any > macroscopic distance, advocating your idea that the formalism should not be > taken literally; but eventually Bell has shown this to be testable, and > Nature has confirmed the formalism (Aspect and followers). > > So, it is just false to NOT attribute a physical reality to all terms in the > wave. We would lost the interference effect. The problem of how to interpret > the wave is not solved by distantiation with the wave formalism, as Nature > confirms the weirdness imposed to the formalism. > > > > >> Most of them do not understand the nature of mathematics: It's a language >> (or collection of languages) about mathematical entities - which are thought >> of differently depending on one's philosophy of mathematics. (It is best to >> say they are fictions.) This is especially true when probability theory (as >> defined in mathematics) is involved. > > With QM, the problem is that the amplitude of probability do interfere. In > arithmetic too, and for a mechanist, the conceptual problems are solved in a > radical way, as there is no time, nor space, only correlated minds. The > fiction is not in the math, but in the assumption that “physical” means > ontological. > > > >> This hopping between physical realities and mathematical entities leads them >> to them being unable to distinguish between them, or to communicate to the >> public the true nature of physics. > > > I would say that the problem comes from the materialists who mostly seem > unable to understand that the assumption of an ontological physical universe > is a very BIG assumption, without any evidences to sustain it, beyond the > natural instinctive extrapolation from simple experiences. When doing > metaphysics with the scientific method, it is important to be agnostic on > this, as it is the very subject of the research. > > Bruno > > > > > "So, it is just false to NOT attribute a physical reality to all terms in the > wave." > > There are formulations without the wave function, so - until there is more > that can be found out about what's "below" the quantum phenomena we've > observed so far - the wave function can be done without.
What I said did not depend on the formulation of quantum mechanics. All formulations are equivalent (in the non relativist case; in the relativist case Feynman’s formulation (generalising Dirac) is the correct one. > > All these formulations (with or without wave functions) give the same > probabilities to match to experiments, but "Counterfactual indefiniteness” > <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/11/27/quantum-concurrent-prolog/> > remains In all formulations of QM, and also just with Mechanism, we have a similar problem. With Mechanism, or with Everett’s formulation, the indefiniteness of the counterfactual admits a simple non magical explanation (as I try sometimes to explain intuitively with the thought experiences). The counterfactual indefiniteness becomes a particular case of the indefiniteness of whatever your “mental accessible neighbourhood” does not depend on. All personal lives are given by sequences of projections on the partial trace of a universal dovetailer, and this can be tested by comparing the logic of the quantum alternatives with the logic of the classical alternative seen by some “right” self-referential modes. There is the room there, as we get variate quantum logics for all first person singular and plural modes of self-references. I recall that all modes of self-reference are given by the variant of the definition of knowledge by Theaetetus, which are imposed by incompleteness (cf p, []p, []p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p). No self-referentially correct universal machine “believing in the induction axioms” (which makes it Gödel-Löbian) can miss this. Digital Mechanism includes the Church-Turing thesis, which makes us able to translate many problem in the “philosophy of mind” of the universal machine into mathematical problem. The main discoveries is that the machines universal believing in enough induction axioms, like PA (Peano Arithmetic), is aware of its own limitation, and very simple inductive inference abilities makes such machine quickly aware of the “mind-body problem”. You can define (reflexive) consciousness by the “knowledge” of your ignorance, and such machine will come up with terms for those things they cannot defined without referring to some implicit or explicit “absolute truth”. With Mechanism, the sigma_1 truth is enough, but of course, to prove this you need much more (I expect pi_1 in the oracle of Truth, that is bigger (in unsolvability degrees) than all the sigma_i and pi_i. The arithmetical reality explains itself, including the stable physical histories, and the existence of a non rationally justifiable part of what it is nevertheless able to know. Mechanism does not allow the axiom if the infinite, but this does not mean that the machine believing in the infinite, like believing in the complex numbers, will not be better than those who don’t, notably those questions related only to numbers and digital machines. The analytical, the topological, the physical, … are internal arithmetical views, , which result from infinitely many projections from the space of histories to history. Technically, the invariance of the first person experience for the arithmetical “delays” of reconstitution plays a role to “stabilise” the sharable histories, and some dovetailing on random numbers too. We are multiplied by large infinities. You did mention linear logic, which is indeed a good tool to get the tensorial many-bodies structure, but that linearity has to be extracted from the modes of self-reference if we want to keep track of the justifiable and non justifiable part of the first person knowledge. The thought experience provides a tensor by the sharing of multiple observer of the annihilation and reconstitution boxes, but in arithmetic we get too many tensor products, and it is hard to make it unique from the self-reference. It should, but the nesting of the modalities makes it intractable. As suggested by what it describes, we might need a quantum computer! Somehow, the physical reality is the derivative of the mind of the universal machine, or the mind of the universal machine is the sum of the physical histories accessible by the universal machine, but that is true only in the limit, in a sense related to Solovay G*. Bruno > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d237f0a3-c671-4995-85b2-409ce9643bb7%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d237f0a3-c671-4995-85b2-409ce9643bb7%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AC9F5C2E-D56C-441D-84F3-A0A57C661AF7%40ulb.ac.be.
