> On 3 Dec 2019, at 23:06, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> My brain currently has only one state. > How do you know that? How could you know that. > > It is a pretty good hypothesis. >> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these do >> not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states consistent >> with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you ever prove >> such a thing? > We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume > mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the > infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness. > > The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe is > what it is,
In which theory of mind? Once you assume non-mechanism, you need to give your theory of mind, and explain how it allows a unique universe. > and your brain, being part of it, is what it is. No need to choose anything. You need to choose a non-mechanist theory of mind. You are back to complete ignorance. Note that Mechanism can be weakened a lot (like with Oracular Turing machine) without changing the nature of the problem. Indeed, once you assume some infinities, the complexity of the problem grows, even just its formulation. I am a scientist, and I like Mechanism, not because I would think it is true, but because the mind-body problem becomes a mathematical problem (extracting physics from intensional arithmetic/computer science), and we can already test the proposition physics (and it fits rather well). > > > Of course, this should not be a problem for a non-mechanist, except that he > has to provide its non-mechanist theory of mind, and still explain the role > of the (not finitely descriptible) substrate in generating its consciousness. > > So why should that be a problem? My non-mechanist theory of mind is that mind > is what brains do. That is not a theory. How do you explain the qualia and their non rational communicability. To use the ontological (metaphysical) assumption of a primary physical universe to explain mind is not better than to assume a god. It explains nothing. You need a *testable*(refutable) theory of mind. > Why should I need to explain the role of the substrate in generating > consciousness? I simply have to do normal science and explore the > relationship between my physical brain and my conscious experience. Maybe > difficult, but no > insurmountable conceptual issues. Your problems here are all of your own > making. The Mechanist hypothesis is the older hypothesis in science and metaphysics. Darwinism use it. Molecular biology confirms it. To assume non-mechanism is usually done by religious literalist and their explanation is purely magical. I am not sure you are aware of the difficulties of the mind-body problem. At least you don’t use Mechanism to hide it, like many materialist. I will wait for your theory of mind. And then I will wait for your explanation of why there is a physical universe, something that mechanism explains entirely (and I don’t know any theory succeeding in that task). It explains also why the laws of physics have a mathematical shape. Bruno > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTCL4mUSo5NUfqLhCm%2BUNw1pOKtjyVMLgo%3D5SGV%3DpWw7Q%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTCL4mUSo5NUfqLhCm%2BUNw1pOKtjyVMLgo%3D5SGV%3DpWw7Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A0FA38DB-034D-4726-9687-322120305DB2%40ulb.ac.be.
