> On 7 Dec 2019, at 18:56, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 6, 2019 at 8:43 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > >> that very silly theory can not say who that shadowy mysterious person > >> called Mr.You is, > > > The mechanist hypothesis assures that both copy have the right to be > > qualified as you. > > So yesterday before the duplication when there was only one it would be > idiotic to ask which one of the one will see Moscow!
That does not follow, given that the question is on the first person experience, and the Helsinki guy know that he will survive (as he believes in Mechanism and we assume mechanism to be correct), he know that whoever he will be, he will only been able to see one city, and so he know, in Helsinki, that he cannot have any certainty if he will live personally the experience “I see M” or the experience “I see W”. > > >> nor can it say what the correct answer to a obvious question turned out to > >> be, "what one and only one city did Mr.You end up seeing??” > > > Indeed. That is the point. That is the first person indeterminacy, > > I agree that is the point, and that's exactly why first person indeterminacy > is complete gibberish, Only because you forget that the mechanist believes that he will survive the duplication, and that in all accessible situation, he will live a unique singular experience. > as rational a concept as asking " How many blitzphits will a klogknee have > tomorrow?" > > > that you are using each time you defend Everett. > > Yes, with Everett if you ask me which version of me will be the man that sees > the coin come up heads when the coin is tossed tomorrow I will say it will be > the version of me that sees heads. And yes the answer is banal, but then it > was a banal question. That makes my point. > > >> It can't say what the correct answer was EVEN AFTER the "experiment" is > >> long over. > > > That is where you forget to put yourself in the shoes of the guy making the > > experience. > > It's physically impossible to put myself in the shoes of the guys having the > experiences because 4 feet are involved and I only have 2, there are 2 guys > having A first person experience. In the 3p description. But that is not what is asked. > > > After the experiment, it is easy to understand that both know very well the > > answer, > > Forget the answer, both before and after the "experiment" nobody even knew > what the hell the question was! The question was “where do you expect to survive”. The sewer is plain, simple and banal: I expect to find myself feeling having arrived in Moscow, or in Washington, and never in both. And both copies can assess that fact, which would not be the case if he claim that he would have lived both. As you say, two feet cannot get four shoes, indeed. That’s the point. > > >> So the outcome of the "experiment" has produced precisely ZERO bits of > >> new information because everybody already know the man who saw Moscow > >> would become the Moscow Man and the man who say Washington would become > >> the Washington Man. > > > But that is tautological. > > DUH, I KNOW! But it's your scenario not mine, The point is not on the scenario, but on the question. > something that is not an experiment and something that contains very little > thought. > > > After the experience, each copy get one bit of information. > > Before the experience everybody and everything already knew that the man who > saw Moscow would be the Moscow Man and the man who saw Washington would > become the Washington Man, Indeed. And the guy expect a probability one for “drinking a cup of coffee in a unique city”. > so after the experience everybody received precisely ZERO bits of new > information. In the 3p description, but obviously not in each 1p description of the result. The W guy will say, NOW I see that I see W, but I could not have guess that in Helsinki, and similarly for the M guy. So, FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW, they did get one bit of information. You just keep moving from what is asked, which concerns the 1p many resulting views after the self duplication/multiplication, to the third person description of the experience, which is, tautologically, the description of the protocol of the experience. It is easy to understand that in the iterated self-duplication experience, not only the majority of copies will assess to be unable to make definite prediction, but the majority will assess the P(W) = 1/2 prediction correctly. Bruno > > > Your use of matter is similar to the pseudo-explanation “God did it”. > > And that is my cue to say goodnight because i know from experience you never > say anything of interest after you invoke that word. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1AC%3DbhT9k2w1NjbJvE0MAvQ%2BGEQebRFX21itDucO0bkQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1AC%3DbhT9k2w1NjbJvE0MAvQ%2BGEQebRFX21itDucO0bkQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A97A9981-9DD5-481F-8A1C-9055A075F727%40ulb.ac.be.
