On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 5:00 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> > > On 10/23/2020 8:21 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 4:46 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On 10/20/2020 1:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 1:26 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 10/20/2020 5:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 15 Oct 2020, at 22:53, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/15/2020 12:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 1:56 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>>> You should have read Vic Stenger's "The Fallacy of Fine Tuning". Vic >>>> points out how many examples of fine tuning are mis-conceived...including >>>> Hoyle's prediction of an excited state of carbon. Vic also points out the >>>> fallacy of just considering one parameter when the parameter space is high >>>> dimensional. >>>> >>> >>> Hi Brent, >>> >>> Thanks for the suggestions. I did read Barnes's critique of TFOFT ( >>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1112.4647 ) and I just now read Stenger's reply: >>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1202.4359.pdf >>> >>> I think they both make some valid points. It may be that many parameters >>> we believe are fine tuned will turn out to have other explanations. But I >>> also think in domains where we do have understandings, such as in >>> computational models (such as algorithmic information thery: what is the >>> shortest program that produces X), or in the set of all possible cellular >>> automata that only consider the states of adjacent cells, the number that >>> are interesting (neither too simple nor too chaotic) is a small fraction of >>> the total. So there is probably fine tuning, but it is, as you mention, >>> extremely hard to quantify. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> But my general criticism of fine-tuning is two-fold. First, the >>>> concept is not well defined. There is no apriori probability distribution >>>> over possible values. If the possible values are infinite, then any >>>> realized value is improbable. Fine tuning is all in the intuition. Charts >>>> are drawn showing little "we are here" zones to prove the fine tuning. But >>>> the scales are sometimes linear, sometimes logarithmic. And why those >>>> parameters and not the square?...or the square root? Bayesian inference is >>>> not invariant under change of parameters. >>>> >>> >>> At least for the cosmological constant, there seems to be some >>> understanding of its probability distribution, and it is relatively >>> independent of the other parameters in that it is unrelated to >>> nucleosynthesis, chemistry, etc. Therefore it is our best candidate to >>> consider in isolation from the other parameters in the high-dimensional >>> space. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Second, calling it "fine-tuning" implies some kind of process of >>>> "tuning" or "selection". But that's gratuitous. Absent supernatural >>>> miracles, we must find ourselves in a universe in which we are >>>> nomologically possible. And that is true whether there is one universe or >>>> infinitely many. So it cannot be evidence one way or the other for the >>>> number of universes. >>>> >>> >>> Let's say we did have an understanding of the distribution of possible >>> universes and the fraction of which supported conscious life. If we >>> discover the fraction to be 1 in 1,000,000 would this not motivate a belief >>> in there being more than one universe? >>> >>> >>> No, because it is equally evidence that one universe (this one) was >>> realized out of the ensemble. You are relying on an intuition that it is >>> easier to explain why all 1,000,000 exist than to explain why this one >>> exists. But that's an intuition about explaining things, not about any >>> objective probability. Every day things happen that are more improbable >>> than a million-to-one. >>> >>> >>> >>> You need to take all the histories, which we know exists in arithmetic, >>> >>> >>> I don't know what "exists in arithmetic" has to do with existence. >>> >>> then consciousness will differentiate on those histories which seems to >>> be fine tuned. Like you say, we have to eliminate the selector, except for >>> consciousness. >>> >>> Until Everett no one thought it necessary to suppose all the >>> counterfactuals happened "somewhere else”. >>> >>> >>> >>> Well, there was Borgess of course, and the idea is present in the whole >>> neoplatonism, arguably. Then, for any one who believes that 777 is odd >>> independently of him/herself, all computations are run independently of >>> anyone. >>> >>> >>> That's a non-sequitur. One can try dividing 777 by 2. One can't verify >>> all computations are independently or dependently of anyone. >>> >> >> If you accept the independent truth of the equation "Y = 2X+1" in the >> case of "Y=777" and an integer X, then you should likewise also accept the >> existence of all computations, >> >> >> How can you be so casual about leaping from "This statement is true." to >> "The relation it expresses entails that the relata exist." "True" and >> "exist" are even different words. >> > > We've argued this countless times before, so I don't want to repeat it > again. The truth that 777 is odd implies the existence of an integer X, > which is 1 more than 777 divided by 2. Truth has ontological implications > and consequences when they relate to the existence or non-existence of > other entities. > > > >> "Watson is the companion of Holmes" is true in many logics (just note >> that it's negation is false) yet nobody thinks it makes Sherlock Holmes >> into a person who existed. >> > > What reality are you applying the word "exists" within? You never > specified it, which makes any answer regarding the existence or > non-existence of Watson ambiguous. > > > Exactly the problem. If I say "In the world of Conan Doyle's novels" then > it's true. In what world is 777 odd? In the world of arithmetic. In this > world...it depends. In most interpretations it's true in this world. But > it doesn't follow that all the other, infinitely many, inferences true in > arithmetic are likely true in this world. > > Brent > > > >> In mathematics, "exists" means has a value that satifies (makes true) >> and expression. It says nothing about whether you can kick it and whether >> it kicks back. >> >> > Kicking back occurs from the perspective of entities existing who live > within long computational histories which occur in platonically existing > computational threads, which exist if you assume arithmetical truth. > > > But that's assuming the thing you're trying to argue, that the world is > nothing but computations in arithmetic and is all such computations. > You implicitly assume a certain reality too. We all must. What's the problem so long as the assumption is stated up front? If we can show that an assumed theory is compatible with our observations, and if we can achieve that for a theory with fewer total assumptions, that is progress. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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