On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 19:47, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 7:35 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 18:21, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 5:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:51, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:35, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett < >>>>>>>> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> How do you figure that? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every >>>>>>> outcome happens, with probability one. The Born rule says that different >>>>>>> outcomes have different probabilities. So MWI + Born gives two >>>>>>> incompatible >>>>>>> results for outcome probabilities. Hence Everett is incoherent -- >>>>>>> incompatible with the Born rule. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The probability that an outcome happens and the probability that an >>>>>> observer will see a particular outcome are two different things. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Only if you say so -- Nature doesn't care what you say! There is an >>>>> observer for every outcome. Or do you really believe in a dualist model? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Nature agrees that different observers will see different outcomes, >>>> since they are not in telepathic communication. >>>> >>> >>> Which observer are you? What outcome do you see? >>> >> >> I am potentially any of them, but only one, which is why it is >> probabilistic. This is independent of consciousness and quantum mechanics. >> A rational character in a computer game that branches would reason the same >> way. >> > > > Yes, it is a problem inherent in all indexical reasoning. Either you are > all of the copies, and hence the probability for you to see any particular > outcome is unity, or you are only one of the copies, and the rest are > zombies. That is the dualist position, and it is necessary if you want to > get probabilities other than unity for outcomes. > > The reasoning is like that in the many minds model of QM of Albert and > Loewer, and they now explicitly acknowledge that the reasoning underlying > that model is manifestly dualist. > All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are privileged. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWP%2B_cBxkadYNYkRAOeXdqBkec2UsbUkWgKNAPi-pc%2BSA%40mail.gmail.com.
