> On 23 Dec 2020, at 00:44, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 10:35 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: > On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are > privileged. > > What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way if there > is to be a probability different from zero. > > Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it isn't > dualist? > > It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are zombies -- > you are still making a dualist assumption. > > The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the probability > that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. I am one > randomly sampled copy. > > > And that is precisely the dualist assumption that is intrinsic in all > self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this when > he says "That seems to imply dualism. All the bodies exist, but your soul > only goes with one." > > I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the probability > that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the carrots are > duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a particular > randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do, and there > seems to be no way around it. > > > Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand one > card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of the > people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will get > the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you have > identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent. > > The probability that one particular randomly sampled person will get the 3 of > spades is 1/52. > > > As I said. But who or what does the random sampling so that you are the > selected person? You cannot escape the dualist implications that easily.
That is the dualism between 3p (or []p) and 1p (or []p & p). That dualism is phenomenological, and unavoidable for any sufficiently reflexive machine. That phenomenological account is unavoidable, unless you identify truth and proof, but then you have to abandon mechanism (and thus Darwin & Co. but also QM-without-collapse). So you will need to eliminate consciousness and first person, and you will need a sort of ad hoc God to make the selection. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSriUUBW59tZzT3vb%3D39DRKd%3DR%3DOq8ZhcShnJ-FN%2BY1ZQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSriUUBW59tZzT3vb%3D39DRKd%3DR%3DOq8ZhcShnJ-FN%2BY1ZQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/08610A89-AACE-4141-9248-E51D72B5AC7E%40ulb.ac.be.
