> On 19 Jan 2021, at 18:54, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, January 19, 2021 at 6:04:34 AM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote: > > On Sun, Jan 17, 2021 at 4:48 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com > <applewebdata://F349B1D8-4839-4D31-8B63-1861E6FEF93D>> wrote: > > >>>> And if Many Worlds is correct then there is an Alan Grayson for every > >>>> horse in that race, and there is an Alan Grayson who saw every one of > >>>> those horses win. And if Many Worlds is not correct then something even > >>>> stranger must be. The one thing we know for certain is that whatever > >>>> quantum interpretation turns out to be true it's going to be weird, very > >>>> very weird. > > >>> Obviously, a horse race isn't a quantum process, > > >>You say it's obvious that you don't split because you'd feel it if you did, > > > I never made that claim. But which split are you referring to? > > You're asking me?! Which of the 5.39 * 10^44 splits that happen every second > are YOU referring to? > > > you guys have no clue what world your resident in > > Yes, and that's why we can't make exact predictions, and that's why the > quantum world behaves so strangely. > > So contrary to some who think I know zilch about the MWI, I DO know what > world I am in !
Then you need to abandon the Mechanist hypothesis, and Darwin etc. With the mechanist hypothesis, we can in principle duplicate you in 100 numerically identical copies, put in different rooms; and you cannot know which rooms is supporting you. Then you can learn that you are indeed “duplicated” or “multiplied” by aleph_0 (at least!) in all models of elementary arithmetic. Even without mechanism, it is unclear how you could know which world you are in, or even if such world can make sense, but some hope remains. You still need to tell which theory of mind you are using. > It's the world in which I made my bet, and won or lost. This will only define an equivalence relation along (local) worlds/histories/computations. > All other ALLEGED world are DERIVATIVE from this one, and I have zero contact > with them unless you have a postulate which asserts otherwise. All computations exist independently of “you”. “This world” is a universal indexical idea available to all machines, but it never refer to a particular world. Using mechanism, that can be related to some version of Gödel-Löb incompleteness theorem. > If you guys would make a bet, you'd have access to secret knowledge. Also, > since in the race there are exactly 10 possible winners, and you assert a > world comes into being for each winner, why do you assert so many worlds? Is > it because you're taking into account the varying positions of the horses as > the race progresses? Why not avoid all this confusion and creation of worlds > with zero energy sources, and accept that the wf collapses, and ceases to > apply when the race ends. AG Because this enforces to describes observers by a theory violating quantum mechanics, and covariance, special relativity. It re-introduce dualism, without any intelligible theory of mind. All this to avoid the other worlds/histories? > > John K Clark To be sure I was answering Grayson, here. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ca37e71d-c778-4c79-9bf0-31945862ffafn%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ca37e71d-c778-4c79-9bf0-31945862ffafn%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/727E37ED-7C1D-44A4-96C7-9E5C46376512%40ulb.ac.be.
