On Wed, Mar 10, 2021, 4:38 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> > > On 3/10/2021 9:41 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Wed, Mar 10, 2021, 11:29 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> >> >> On 3/10/2021 1:18 AM, Tomas Pales wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, March 10, 2021 at 6:40:51 AM UTC+1 Brent wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 3/9/2021 3:52 PM, Tomas Pales wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, March 10, 2021 at 12:29:07 AM UTC+1 Brent wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 3/9/2021 3:03 PM, Tomas Pales wrote: >>>> >>>> The law of identity determines what can possibly exist, namely that >>>> which is identical to itself. But what is the difference between a possibly >>>> existing object and a "really" existing object? I see no difference, and >>>> hence all possible objects exist, necessarily. >>>> >>>> >>>> So everything that does not exist is something that cannot possibly >>>> exist. But does that mean in the future or just now. If it means *just >>>> now* then it's a trivial tautology, equivalent to "It is what it is." >>>> and has no useful content. But if it means now and the future, even >>>> confined to the near future, it's false. >>>> >>>> >>> When you talk about something you must define it. The temporal position >>> of an object is part of its definition (identity). So when object X can >>> exist at time t, then it must exist at time t. It's trivial, just an >>> example of the law of identity. >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> To which someone might say something like: "But there is a red car >>>> parked in front of my house. Isn't it possible that, at this moment, a blue >>>> car would be parked there instead? Then the blue car would be a possible >>>> object that obviously doesn't exist." Um, no. A red car can't be blue; that >>>> would be a contradiction, a violation of the law of identity, and hence >>>> impossible. A blue car might be parked in front of my house in a different >>>> possible world but then we are talking about a different world, and not >>>> really about my house either but rather about a copy of my house in that >>>> other world - and the fact that you can't see that other world is not a >>>> proof that it doesn't exist. >>>> >>>> >>>> c.f. Russell's teapot. >>>> >>> >>> c.f. Granny's glasses - when she can't find them, they don't exist >>> >>> The question is what is the difference between a possibly existing >>> object and a "really" existing object? The fact that you don't see >>> something doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. >>> >>> >>> That you can put it's name in a sentence doesn't mean it does exist >>> either. Or even that it's (nomologically) possible. >>> >> >> I am not saying that something exists. I am not even saying that >> something is possible (identical to itself). I am just saying that if >> something is possible then it exists, because I don't see a difference >> between possible and "real" existence. >> >> >> Then you've either (1) changed the meaning of "real" existence (2) >> changed the meaning of possible or (3) gone mad. >> >> Brent >> > > Then Minsky was mad: > > https://youtu.be/hVJwzVD3jEs > > > Minsky says real is relative to "this"...not your meaning. He doesn't > define what he means by possible. It's interesting that he takes as an > example repeated addition and says he can't understand how there could be a > world in which it doesn't exist. But only a moment before he's discussing > things existing in computer games, which can only do finite arithmetic. > He said his preference would be to get rid of the word 'real' and only speak of 'possible', because exist doesn't add anything (except for the case of relative existence within the universe, like the button in his shirt). But thinks it's a useless concept to speak of other possible universes being 'real', and prefers only using possible in that context. Whether he thinks possibility by itself is enough for existence is not clear, but he suggests it when he says we could be part of the logical possibilities of a program that was never turned on. Jason > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/11f2a79b-659f-730a-c7a6-aa4c15286915%40verizon.net > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/11f2a79b-659f-730a-c7a6-aa4c15286915%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhy0ELUGkacWMY6vyk_jxMQ3zf%2BhVaoDYToyENYZw35Hw%40mail.gmail.com.
