With Mechanism the physical laws remains persistent because they are the same 
for all universal machine, and they come from the unique statistics on all 
computations (in arithmetic, in lambda calculus, in any Turing universal theory 
or system).

In a sense, they are even more solid than what we can infer from any 
observation, ans physics is reduced to arithmetic. Their invariance is 
guarantied, as long as 2+2=4.

I can give references where this is explained (and proved using my favorite 
working hypothesis in the cognitive science).

I don’t claim Mechanism is true, to be sure, but if true, the laws of physics 
are given by the observable mode of self-reference (mainly []p & p, []p & <>t, 
and []p & <>t & p), with “[]” representing Gödel provability predicate.

Bruno


> On 26 Jun 2021, at 13:43, Tomas Pales <litewav...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Recently I've been thinking about why we live in a world with stable laws of 
> physics, out of the plethora of all possible worlds. Why does the sun rise 
> every day, why is the intensity of the Earth's gravitational field constant, 
> why do causal relations ("the constant conjunction between causes and 
> effects", as Hume put it) persist in time?
> 
> While the anthropic principle might be used to explain why the laws have been 
> stable in the past (because this stability is probably necessary for the 
> evolution of living or conscious organisms such as humans), it doesn't seem 
> to explain why we should expect that the laws will continue to be stable in 
> the future. In fact, it may seem that such a stability is very unlikely 
> because there are many ways our world could be in the future but only one way 
> in which it would be a deterministic extension of the world it has been until 
> now. 
> 
> But in the book Theory of Nothing by Russell Standish I have found an 
> argument that seems to claim the opposite (if I understand it correctly): 
> given the way our world has been until now, this world is more simple if its 
> regularities (such as laws of physics) continue than if they are 
> discontinued, and simple worlds are more likely (more frequent in the 
> collection of all possible worlds) than more complex worlds. (A simpler 
> property is instantiated in a greater number of possible worlds than a more 
> complex property.) Such a deterministic world is fully defined by some 
> initial conditions and laws of physics, while a world whose regularity is 
> discontinued at some point would need an additional property that would 
> define the discontinuation and thereby make the world more complex.
> 
> Can it work like that? If so, I guess the probability that the laws remain 
> stable is growing with the time that they have actually been stable. So now, 
> after more than 13 billion years of stable laws of physics in our universe, 
> is the probability that they remain stable overwhelmingly high (practically 
> 100%)?
> 
> Here is a link to the book:
> https://www.hpcoders.com.au/theory-of-nothing.pdf 
> (the persistence of laws of physics is discussed in chapter 4, parts 4.1 and 
> 4.2)
> 
> 
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