On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 11:02 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:

> On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
>
> That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend Many-Worlds or
> any particular ontology. I defend nothing. Rather, I’m struck by the
> curious fact that insisting on “nothing extra” in quantum mechanics—like
> ordering one’s bourbon neat—can mean quietly negating a host of other
> flavors that were right there on the menu. Yes, the Born rule is a triumph,
> and I fully recognize its power for quantum computing, materials science,
> lasers, and more. Still, there’s a subtlety: that “neat” approach—while
> perfectly valid pragmatically—relegates all those wavefunction branches to
> the realm of “not real.” It looks minimal but actually demands a long list
> of invisible exclusions.
>
> In fact infinitely many that have already been preemptorily ruled out
> because they don't satisfy Schroedinger's equation.  The reason this is
> called the "Everything List" is because the originators wanted to discuss
> theories like Max Tegmark's and Bruno Marchal's that *everything*, in
> some sense happens and each of us is only a thread of it.  Both have argued
> that this is "simpler" because no additional assumptions are needed to
> exclude all the things we don't see, they are just on different threads.
>
>
> You can convince yourself of explaining the list's raison d'etre to me if
> it makes you feel better with the straw man because Many-Worlds never says
> “all conceivable worlds exist.” It says, rather, that all the outcomes
> allowed by the wavefunction’s unitary evolution (i.e., by Schrödinger’s
> equation) are realized in some branch.
>
> Exactly.  My point is you're reverting back from the original list's
> founders to a "Few Worlds" and calling it "Many Worlds" because you've
> rejected the more comprehensive idea.  If you believed the arguments you
> make for MWI as simpler you would apply them consistently and arrive at Wei
> Dai and Bruno's ideas.  That's where they came from.
>

I have always thought that the argument from simplicity was deeply flawed.
What is simple for one person is probably a Rube Goldber contraption for
someone else.

Bruce

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