> Good example of what is known as "intellectual > masturbation" or "pseudo intellectualism." :-D
It's not even *Robin's* masturbation. He needs other people's ideas even to do that. :-) --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, Bhairitu <noozguru@...> wrote: > > On 10/25/2012 04:30 PM, Robin Carlsen wrote: > > MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF NATURE IS > > ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE by Thomas Nagel > > > > But to explain consciousness, as well as biological complexity, as a > > consequence of the natural order adds a whole new dimension of difficulty, > > I am setting aside outright dualism, which would abandon the hope for an > > integrated explanation. Indeed, substance dualism would imply that biology > > has no responsibility at all for the existence of minds. What interests me > > is the alternative hypothesis that biological evolution is responsible for > > the existence of conscious mental phenomena, but that since those phenomena > > are not physically explainable, the usual view of evolution must be > > revised. It is not just a physical process. > > > > If that is so, how much would have to be added to the physical story to > > produce a genuine explanation of consciousness--one that made the > > appearance of consciousness, as such, intelligible, as opposed to merely > > explaining the appearance of certain physical organisms that, as a matter > > of fact, are conscious? It is not enough simply to add to the physical > > account of evolution the further observation that different types of animal > > organisms, depending on their physical constitution, have different forms > > of conscious life. That would present the consciousness of animals as a > > mysterious side effect of the physical history of evolution, which explains > > only the physical and functional character of organisms. . . > > > > For a satisfactory explanation of consciousness as such, a general > > psychophysical theory of consciousness would have to be woven into the > > evolutionary story, one which makes intelligible both (1) why specific > > organisms have the conscious life they have, and (2) why conscious > > organisms arose in the history of life on earth. . . > > > > [S]ome kind of psychophysical theory must apply not only nonhistorically, > > at the end of the process, but also to the evolutionary process itself. > > That process would have to be not only the physical history of the > > appearance and development of physical organisms but also a mental history > > of the appearance and development of conscious beings. And somehow it would > > have to be one process, making both aspects of the result intelligible. . . > > > > This would mean abandoning the standard assumption that evolution is driven > > by exclusively physical causes. Indeed, it suggests that the explanation > > may have to be something more than physical all the way down. The rejection > > of psychophysical reductionism leaves us with the mystery of the most basic > > kind about the natural order--a mystery whose avoidance is one of the > > primary motives of reductionism. It is a double mystery: first, about the > > relation between the physical and the mental in each individual instance, > > and second, about how the evolutionary explanation of the development of > > physical organisms can be transformed into a psychophysical explanation of > > how consciousness developed. > > > > The existence of consciousness is both one of the most familiar and one of > > the most astonishing things about the world. No conception of the natural > > order that does not reveal it as something to be expected can aspire even > > to the outline of completeness. And if physical science, whatever it may > > have to say about the origin of life, leaves us necessarily in the dark > > about consciousness, that shows that it cannot provide the basic form of > > intelligibility for this world. There must be a very different way in which > > things as they are make sense, and that includes the way the physical world > > is, since the problem cannot be quarantined in the mind. . . > > > > This dissatisfaction with an explanatory stopping place that relates > > complex structures to complex structures is what underlies the constant > > push toward reduction in modern science. It is hard to give up the > > assumption that whatever is true of the complex must be explained by what > > is true of the elements. That does not mean that new phenomena cannot > > emerge at higher levels, but the hope is that they can be analyzed through > > the character and interactions of their more elementary components. Such > > harmless emergence is standardly illustrated by the example of liquidity, > > which depends on the interactions of the molecules that compose the liquid. > > But the emergence of the mental at certain levels of biological complexity > > is not like this. According to the emergent position now being considered, > > consciousness is something completely new. > > > > Because such emergence, even if systematic, remains fundamentally > > inexplicable, the ideal of intelligibility demands that we take seriously > > the alternative of a reductive answer to the constitutive question--an > > answer that accounts for the relation between mind and brain in terms of > > something more basic about the natural order. If such an account were > > possible, it would explain the appearance of mental life at complex levels > > of biological organization by means of a general monism according to which > > the constituents of the universe have properties that explain not only its > > physical but its mental character. > > > > > > Good example of what is known as "intellectual masturbation" or "pseudo > intellectualism." :-D >
