> > > > --- "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@> wrote: > > > > > I must say the idea that conscious phenomena are physically > > > unexplainable is jumping the gun a bit, hope the whole thing > > > doesn't rest on that as consciousness research is only > > > in it's infancy and while there are mysteries the research > > > that has been done is fascinating in showing how even > > > individual neurons can be mapped creating whole reaction > > > systems in the brain, influencing memory and desire and the > > > consequent action we choose to take. As I always say, let > > > the evidence speak for itself, and to do that we need to be > > > sure we have it all in before jumping to conclusions. Bit > > > early to say things we don't understand are impossible. > > > > > > > --- "PaliGap" <compost1uk@> wrote: > > > > We're both at an equal disadvantage, not having read the book. > > But, like you, having scanned some reviews, one starts to > > 'take a view'. But I think you should take heed of your > > initial reaction - "He (Nagel) is an atheist poseur". Surely > > you would agree now that that was way, way off target? > > --- "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@...> wrote: > > No. And I didn't say poseur either, as soon as the idea of > intelligent design pops up you know someone is taking the piss > as there aren't any irredcible structures in nature and there > are many theories about how mind is fundamental/inevitable/ > a consequence of/the reason for the universe and at present they > are all things you can choose to believe or not. They all point > to some sort of "special place" for us which sounds suspicious > to me. >
Salyavin, please note that 'impersonal intelligence' doesn't contradict Darwin's evolution. In fact, it auguments evolution theory and makes it more apparent. This gives the ID people a real problem. They have no choice but to bring up 'personalised intelligence' which turns their theories to muck. If Science can explain 'false memories,' 'imaginations', 'hallucinations', 'delusions, 'illusions' etc, maybe it can explain consciousness some day. > > --- "PaliGap" <compost1uk@> wrote: > > > > In the same way, I don't think Nagel is saying 'lay off > > consciousness you Science guys! This is something about which > > we must necessarily remain ignorant'. On the contrary I think > > he hopes for a revised scientific understanding, one in which > > the 'hard problem' of consciousness is not an anomaly. > > > > --- "salyavin808" <fintlewoodlewix@...> wrote: > > No, I get that he isn't saying that, it's weird that consciousness > is the way by which we understand things and it's the last > thing that is getting a serious look in by science. And it's > all most interesting. Did you have a browse of Susan Blackmores > page: > > http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Research/consciousness.htm > > She wrote a book (actually interviewed loads of consciousness > researchers) about the Hard Problem and where it might lead. > Very interesting the ideas that are being explored in neuro- > physiology, my copy is out on loan otherwise I'd quote chapter > and verse about the role the optic nerve appears to play in > generating consciousness, it connects to all sorts of structures > that are known to play a part, not just vision. > > Whatever the explanation the tricky bit is going to be reconciling > it with subjective experience as you point out below. Trouble is we > humans get so self important about what is, after all, a tiny part > of what goes on in our brains - and we do know it is going on and > generated in there. Consciousness is something the brain *does* > we just have to work out how..... > > > > I *think* that from his view it is similar to, say, the > > situation at the time of the Michelson/Morley experiments. The > > developing crisis in the prevailing outlook *could* always > > have been defended in the way you do (above). > > > > "I must say the idea that the ether (aether?) is not > > detectable is jumping the gun a bit, hope the whole thing > > doesn't rest on that as ether research is only in it's > > infancy. As I always say, let the evidence speak for itself, > > and to do that we need to be sure we have it all in before > > jumping to conclusions. Bit early to say things we can't > > detect are impossible". > > > > But as we know though, a paradigm shift occurred and we moved > > on. Bye bye ether. > > > > So, at what point do we say that this 'hard problem of > > consciousness' has to be accepted as a refutation of something > > fundamental that we are stubbornly sticking to (materialist > > reductionism)? Never? > > > > I suppose the answer is "until something better comes along". > > The question is: Does Nagel offer that, or point in the > > direction of that? I don't know (yet). > > > > From Prospect Magazine: "Thomas Nagel is not crazy" : > > > > "Nagel's pessimism about science's ability to explain things > > like consciousness has a long history. In his seminal 1974 > > essay "What is it like to be a bat?", he argues that even if > > you knew every single physical fact about someone, you'd still > > have no idea what it is like to be them. I could know > > everything there is to know about perception, but I'll never > > know what it feels like to be colour-blind, save some horrible > > accident. Similarly no matter how much we know about bats' > > ability to use echolocation we can never really know what it > > is like to be a bat flying about in the dark, navigating with > > reverberating sound waves. So, given that we are all conscious > > beings, it seems science is missing out on something quite > > fundamental. There are facts, or parts of reality, it leaves > > behind. > > > > Nagel's argument has been criticised in a variety of ways. > > Philosophers like Daniel Dennett or Paul Churchland argue that > > Nagel's whole approach is flawed. We are of course conscious, > > but consciousness is a phenomenon that can eventually be > > explained by science the same way heat and colour are. The > > residual "what-its-like- ness" is just an outdated term with > > no real meaning, rather like obsolete scientific theories > > about the "ether" or "phlogiston." > > > > But this line of attack is hard to accept. To us it really > > does feel as if there is something "it-is-like" to be > > conscious. Besides their strange account of consciousness, > > Nagel's opponents also face the classic problem of how > > something physical like a brain can produce something like a > > mind. Take perception: photons bounce off objects and hit the > > eye, cones and rods translate this into a chemical reaction, > > this reaction moves into the neurons in our brain, some more > > reactions take place and thenÂ…you see something. Everything up > > until seeing something is subject to scientific laws, but, > > somewhere between neurons and experience, scientific > > explanation ends. There is no fact of the matter about how you > > see a chair as opposed to how I see it, or a colour-blind > > person sees it. The same goes for desires or emotions. We can > > look at all the pieces leading up to experience under a > > microscope, but there's no way to look at your experience > > itself or subject it to proper scientific scrutiny. > > > > Of course philosophers sympathetic to science have many ways > > to make this seem like a non-problem. But in the end Nagel > > argues that simply " the mind-body problem is difficult enough > > that we should be suspicious of attempts to solve it with the > > concepts and methods developed to account for very different > > kinds of things." And I think many of us are sympathetic to > > this line of reasoning." > > > > http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/blog/philosophy/thomas-nagel- > > mind- and-cosmos-review-leiter-nation/ > > >
