--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <authfriend@...> wrote: > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "Xenophaneros Anartaxius" <anartaxius@> > wrote: > > > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <authfriend@> wrote: > > > > > > You should probably read the essay: > > > > > > http://organizations.utep.edu/Portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf > > > > > > Knowing what it is like to be your identical twin brother > > > is no more possible than knowing what it is like to be a > > > bat. You can imagine to a certain extent what it would be > > > like for *you* to be a bat or to be your identical twin > > > brother, but you cannot know what it is like for a *bat* > > > to be a bat, nor what it is like for your identical twin > > > brother to be your identical twin brother. > > > > > > As far as Batman is concerned, there is nothing that it > > > is like for Batman to be Batman, since he doesn't exist. > > > > I did read Nagel's essay some years ago, but just taking > > what you have written here, I have a few comments. > > > > There is something it is like to be Batman because this > > persona was created in the human mind of Robert Kane. > > There is something that it is like to be Robert Kane > creating Batman. There is nothing that it is like > to be Batman, as I said, because Batman does not exist.
In the academic vernacular: Nagel's point is an ontological, point, not an epistemological one. I think we can agree that the world we live in is full of many things. The inventory of this world is our ontology. Mine includes the planet Mars, Mozart's Requiem, my big toe, my wife, the number 4,039, and so on. YMMV. On my desk there is an empty coffee mug, a computer that is nicknamed "Parmenides" on my LAN, and our cat Dexter. The statement "there is an x such that there is something that is what is like to be that coffee mug" I take to be false. The statement "there is an x such that there is something that is what is like to be the computer called Parmenides" I take to be false. The statement "there is an x such that there is something that is what is like to be Dexter" I take to be true. So what? Well this clarifies the problem of "consciousness" (or "being"). It points us towards the "hard problem". That is to say, on the basis of most folks' ontology there exists in the world things that can "take a perspective" (which is surely better than things that can "have a first person ontology"? It seems odd to say that one's ontology includes first person ontologies?). >From a materialist, or a physicalist, or a naturalistic point of view it is hard to explain how "things with perspectives" could "come to be". Try to persuade me however much you like, I cannot see how a computer for example could ever have "a perspective" in the way alluded to here. It might pass the Turing test; it might walk, talk, and otherwise act indistinguishably from a human. But I see no reason to believe that it would be true *for that reason alone* that there would be an x such that there would be something that is what is like to be that thing. > > The human mind can envision things, situations, people, > > which previously did not exist, and bring them to fruition. > > I am thinking how realistically good actors portray > (snip) > > This has nothing to do with what Nagel is talking about. Indeed. Nothing. > > What is the certain extent that it is possible to imagine > > what it is to be like someone? > > It varies. > > > If it is true you cannot know what it is like to be even > > your twin, if you had one, what does this say for your > > supposed ability to know what a person's motives are, what > > they are experiencing when they make a post here on FFL? > > As I believe I said above, "You can imagine to a certain > extent what it would be like for *you* to be a bat or to > be your identical twin brother..." > > Now, I know you read that, because you asked me what "a > certain extent" was. So why are you asking that question > as though I hadn't already covered it? > > > According to the account above, it would seem likely that > > you are very much overstepping what it is possible to > > *plonk* >
