--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, bbrigante <no_reply@> wrote: > > > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <jstein@> > > wrote: > > > > > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, MDixon6569@ wrote: > <snip> > > > > However I did have to chuckle when Jimmy Carter tried to take > > > > a poke at Bush when he referred to illegal wire tapings and > > > > spying on of citizens Martin Luther King and wife. What was so > > > > funny was Ted Kennedy was sitting not 30 feet from Carter and > > > > it was John Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy that ordered the wire > > > > taps on the Kings. > > > > > > > > OOOPs! Who was Jimmy trying to embarres? > > > > > > > You've just "embarressed" yourself. Here's the Church > > > Commission report on the wiretapping of Dr. King: > > > > > > http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIIb.htm > > > > > > Read it and weep. > > > > ***************** > > > > From the link you cite, Robert Kennedy did approve wiretaps on > > King, although the FBI went further than Kennedy had in mind, > > evidently: > > That's the understatement of the month. > > Obviously Kennedy shouldn't have approved the wiretaps > in the first place--at least morally; it was legal for > him to do so--and apparently he did so reluctantly. > > But how MDixon thinks the FBI's vastly worse behavior > reflects badly on *Teddy* Kennedy, who has been outspokenly > opposed to Bush's ILLEGAL wiretapping of many thousands of > Americans, is really hard to figure.
Of course, it is good ethics not to visit the sins of the father or brother upon the son or brother. But, of course, Teddy is only a senator in the first place because of his family connections, so it is fair game in the eyes of those who place importance upon familial connections. > > > > > > http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIIb.htm > > > > IV. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE > > SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE > > Introduction and Summary > > > > In October 1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved an FBI > > request for permission to install wiretaps on phones in Dr. King's > > home and in the SCLC's New York and Atlanta offices to determine > the > > extent, if any, of "communist influence in the racial situation." > > The FBI construed this authorization to extend to Dr. King's hotel > > rooms and the home of a friend. No further authorization was sought > > until mid-1965, after Attorney General Katzenbach required the FBI > > for the first time to seek renewed authorization for all existing > > wiretaps. The wiretaps on Dr. King's home were apparently > terminated > > at that time by Attorney General Katzenbach; the SCLC wiretaps were > > terminated by Attorney General Ramsay Clark in June 1966. > > > > In December, 1963 -- three months after Attorney General Kennedy > > approved the wiretaps -- the FBI, without informing the Attorney > > General, planned and implemented a secret effort to discredit Dr. > > King and to "neutralize" him as the leader of the civil rights > > movement. One of the first steps in this effort involved hiding > > microphones in Dr. King's hotel rooms. Those microphones were > > installed without Attorney General Kennedy's prior authorization or > > subsequent notification, neither of which were required under > > practices then current. The FBI continued to place microphones in > > Dr. King's hotel rooms until November 1965. Attorney General > > Katzenbach was apparently notified immediately after the fact of > the > > placement of three microphones between May and November 1965. It is > > not clear why the FBI stopped its microphone surveillance of Dr. > > King, although its decision may have been related to concern about > > public exposure during the Long Committee's investigation of > > electronic surveillance. > > > > This chapter examines the legal basis for the wiretaps and > > microphones, the evidence surrounding the motives for their use, > and > > the degree to which Justice Department and White House officials > > were aware of the FBI's electronic surveillance of Dr. King. > > > > A. Legal Standards Governing the FBI's Duty to Inform the Justice > > Department of Wiretaps and Microphones During the Period of the > > Martin Luther King Investigation > > > > The FBI's use of wiretaps and microphones to follow Dr. King's > > activities must be examined in light of the accepted legal > standards > > and practices of the time. Before March 1965, the FBI followed > > different procedures for the authorization of wiretaps and > > microphones. Wiretaps required the approval of the Attorney General > > in advance. However, once the Attorney General had authorized the > > FBI to initiate wiretap coverage of a subject, the Bureau generally > > continued the wiretap for as long as it judged necessary. As former > > Attorney General Katzenbach testified: > > > > The custom was not to put a time limit on a tap, or any wiretap > > authorization. Indeed, I think the Bureau would have felt free in > > 1965 to put a tap on a phone authorized by Attorney General Jackson > > before World War II. 130 > > > > In "national security" cases, the FBI was free to carry out > > microphone surveillances without first seeking the approval of the > > Attorney General or informing him afterward. The Bureau apparently > > derived authority for its microphone practice from a 1954 > memorandum > > sent by Attorney General Brownell to Director Hoover, stating: > > > > It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone > > surveillance is the only possible way to uncovering the activities > > of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In > > such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest > > requires that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal > > Bureau of Investigation. This use need not be limited to the > > development of evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an > intelligence > > function in connection with internal security matters equally as > > important as the duty of developing evidence for presentation to > the > > courts and the national security requires that the FBI be able to > > use microphone surveillance for the proper discharge of both such > > functions. The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone > > surveillance by the FBI under these circumstances and for these > > purposes.... I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important > > intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the > > national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the > > unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest. 131 > > > > The Justice Department was on notice that the FBI's practice was to > > install microphones without first informing the Justice Department. > > Director Hoover told Deputy Attorney General Bryon White in May > > 1961: > > > > in the internal security field we are utilizing microphone > > surveillances on a restricted basis even though trespass is > > necessary to assist in uncovering the activity of Soviet > > intelligence agents and Communist Party leaders.... In the interest > > of national safety, microphone surveillances are also utilized on a > > restricted basis, even though trespass is necessary, in uncovering > > major criminal activities. 132 > > > > A memorandum by Courtney Evans indicates that he discussed > > microphones in "organized crime cases" with the Attorney General in > > July 1961: > > > > It was pointed out to the Attorney General that we had taken action > > with regard to the use of microphones in [organized crime] cases > > and . . . we were nevertheless utilizing them in all instances > where > > this was technically feasible and where valuable information might > > be expected. The strong objections to the utilization of telephone > > taps as contrasted to microphone surveillances was stressed. The > > Attorney General stated he recognized the reasons why telephone > taps > > should be restricted to national-defense-type cases and he was > > pleased we had been using microphone surveillances, where these > > objections do not apply, wherever possible in organized crime > > matters. 133 > > > > The Justice Department later summarized this practice in a brief to > > the Supreme Court: > > > > Under Departmental practice in effect for a period of years prior > to > > 1963, and continuing into 1965, the Director of the Federal Bureau > > of Investigation was given authority to approve the installation of > > devices such as [microphones] for intelligence (but not > evidentiary) > > purposes when required in the interest of internal security or > > national safety, including organized crime, kidnappings, or matters > > wherein human life might be at stake. 134 > > > > On March 30, 1965, at the urging of Attorney General Katzenbach, > the > > FBI adopted a uniform procedure for submitting both wiretaps and > > microphones to the Attorney General for his approval prior to > > installation. Director Hoover described the new procedures in a > > memorandum to the Attorney General: > > > > In line with your suggestion this morning, I have already set up > the > > procedure similar to requesting of authority for phone taps to be > > utilized in requesting authority for the placement of microphones. > > In other words, I shall forward to you from time to time requests > > for authority to install microphones where deemed imperative for > > your consideration and approval or disapproval. Furthermore, I have > > instructed that, where you have approved either a phone tap or the > > installation of a microphone, you will be advised when such is > > discontinued if in less than six months and, if not discontinued in > > less than six months, that a new request be submitted by me to you > > for extension of the telephone tap or microphone installation. 135 > > > > One week later Katzenbach sent to the White House a proposed > > Presidential directive to all Federal agencies on electronic > > surveillance. This directive, formally issued by President Johnson > > on June 30, 1965, forbade the nonconsensual interception of > > telephone communications by Federal personnel, "except in > connection > > with investigations related to the national security" and then only > > after obtaining the written approval of the Attorney General. The > > directive was less precise concerning microphone surveillance: > > > > Utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to overhear > > nontelephone conversations is an even more difficult problem, which > > raises substantial and unresolved questions of constitutional > > interpretation. I desire that each agency conducting such > > investigations consult with the Attorney General to ascertain > > whether the agency's practices are fully in accord with the law and > > with a decent regard for the rights of others. 136 > > > > B. Wiretap Surveillance of Dr. King and the SCLC: October 1963 -- > > June 1966 > > > > On September 6, 1963, Assistant Director William Sullivan first > > recommended to Director Hoover that the FBI install wiretaps on Dr. > > King's home and the offices of the Southern Christian Leadership > > Conference. 137 Sullivan's recommendation was apparently part of an > > attempt to improve the Domestic Intelligence Division's standing > > with the Director by convincing him that Sullivan's Division was > > concerned about alleged communist influence on the civil rights > > movement and that the Division intended, as Sullivan subsequently > > informed the Director, to "do everything that is humanly possible" > > in conducting its investigation. 138 > > > > Sullivan's recommendation was viewed with scepticism by the FBI > > leadership since Attorney General Kennedy had rejected a similar > > proposal two months earlier. Associate Director Clyde Tolson noted > > on the memorandum containing Sullivan's Proposal: "I see no point > in > > making this recommendation to the Attorney General in view of the > > fact that he turned down a similar recommendation on July 22, > 1963." > > 139 Director Hoover scrawled below Tolson's note: "I will approve > > though I am dizzy over vacillation as to influence of CPUSA." 140 > > > > In late September 1963 the FBI conducted a survey and concluded > that > > wiretap coverage of Dr. King's residence and of the New York SCLC > > office could be implemented without detection. 141 On October 7, > > citing "possible communist influence in the racial situation," > > Hoover requested the Attorney General's permission for a > wiretap "on > > King at his current address or at any future address to which he > may > > move" and "on the SCLC office at the current New York address or to > > any other address to which it may be moved." 142 Attorney General > > Kennedy signed the request on October 10 and, on October 21, also > > approved the FBI request for coverage of the SCLC's Atlanta office. > > 143 > > > > Two memoranda by Courtney Evans indicate that the Attorney General > > was uncertain about the advisability of the wiretaps. On October > 10, > > the Attorney General summoned Evans to discuss the FBI's request > for > > the wiretaps on Dr. King's home telephone and the New York SCLC > > telephones. Evans wrote: > > > > The Attorney General said that he recognized the importance of this > > coverage if substantial information is to be developed concerning > > the relationship between King and the communist party. He said > there > > was no question in his mind as to the coverage in New York City but > > that he was worried about the security of an installation covering > a > > residence in Atlanta, Georgia. He noted that the last thing we > could > > afford to have would be a discovery of a wiretap on King's > > residence. > > > > I pointed out to the Attorney General the fact that a residence was > > involved did not necessarily mean there was any added risk because > > of the technical nature of the telephone system.... After this > > discussion the Attorney General said he felt we should go ahead > with > > the technical coverage on King on a trial basis, and to continue it > > if productive results were forthcoming. He said he was certain that > > all Bureau representatives involved would recognize the delicacy of > > this particular matter and would thus be even more cautious than > > ever in this assignment .... 144 > > > > According to Evans' memorandum, the Attorney General signed the > > authorization for the wiretap immediately after this conversation." > > > > (more at link) > > http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIIb.htm > > > ------------------------ Yahoo! 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